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The loss of ecosystem functions and services related to the land-use change has 
become a concerning issue in Europe. The European Union has committed to reducing the 
ecosystems loss through the Biodiversity and the No Net Loss (NNL) Strategies (2012). 
These strategies propose instruments to ensure NNL, and invite the Members States (MS) 
to implement novel forms to compensate the loss over the environment, as for instance 
biodiversity offsetting mechanisms (BO) (European Commission 2011, Conway et al., 
2013b; Turcker et al., 2014; Froger and Hrabanski, 2015).  
 
There are mature and nascent biodiversity offsetting schemes addressing the loss of 
ecosystem functions and services due to the adverse environmental effects of 
developments project. Biodiversity Banking mechanisms are Market-Based Instruments 
for biodiversity offsetting (MBI) developed to offer a more cost- and ecological-effective 
solution to compensate the environment through the acquisition of credits delivering ex-
ante, and often, in-kind and off-site conservation actions. Biodiversity banks were 
developed by the first time in the 1970’s in USA and their pioneer appearance and 
implementation for conservation has inspired countries to develop a similar market and 
non-market based schemes to address ecological compensation of development projects. 
However, little has been studied from a scientific point of view on how environmental 
compensation can occur through a market-based mechanism. 
 
The overall aim of this research is to extend the scientific knowledge on the use of 
Biodiversity Offsetting Schemes as an instrument to regulate and deliver compensation 
for environmental impacts. More specific, this research provides a scientific background 
on the ecological impacts assessment methods and the institutions and policies of existing 
and nascent offsetting mechanism in the USA and Europe. This thesis presents an 
overview the current European initiatives and Directives, and the Members States 
regulations on environmental impacts compensation. Also, this thesis analyses the 
empirical use of the USA Conservation and Conservation Banking to identify the key 
institutional, political and ecological components needed for the scheme functioning. 
Lastly, this thesis presents a crossed-analysis between the EU and the USA schemes 
practices to discuss the theory-practices gap of these schemes. To conclude this thesis 
analyses the Italian Member State regulations for environmental impacts compensation to 
finalise with a proposal of actions to develop a market-based mechanism for biodiversity 
compensation that can be applied in Italy and other European countries. 
  
 
 
L’impoverimento degli ecosistemi e del loro funzionamento a causa dell’utilizzo 
incontrollato dei territori, sta diventando, sempre più, un tema estremamente rilevante in 
Europa. L'Unione Europea si è impegnata a ridurre tale impoverimento degli ecosistemi 
attraverso la Strategia per la Biodiversità e la quella del No Net Loss (2012). Queste strategie 
propongono gli strumenti necessari a garantire il mantenimento del funzionamento degli 
ecosistemi, e invitano gli Stati Membri (SM) ad implementare meccanismi innovativi che 
possano compensare tali perdite ambientali, quali per esempio il Biodiversity Offsetting 
(BO) (si veda in merito: European Commission 2011, Conway et al., 2013b; Turcker et al., 
2014; Froger and Hrabanski, 2015). 
 
Nel mondo esistono numerosi e crescenti schemi di compensazione sulla biodiversità 
che trattano il degrado dei servizi ecosistemici, specialmente quelli che si soffermano sugli 
effetti nocivi per l’ambiente di taluni piani di sviluppo. I meccanismi basati su transazioni 
di mercato sono stati sviluppati negli USA per offrire una soluzione più efficace in termini 
ecologici ed economici. Questi meccanismi di mercato funzionano attraverso l'acquisto di 
crediti di habitat che forniscono azioni di conservazione a titolo preventivo, e spesso, in 
modalità like-for-like in luoghi diversi al luogo impattato. Le banche biodiversità sono il 
migliore esempio di meccanismo compensativo di mercato. Queste banche sono state 
sviluppate negli anni Settanta negli USA, e la loro pionieristica comparsa, unitamente 
all’obiettivo di salvaguardia dell’ambiente, ha ispirato diversi paesi a sviluppare sistemi 
simili, basati sia su meccanismi di mercato e non, al fine di compensare dal punto di vista 
ambientale i progetti di sviluppo. Tuttavia, dal punto di vista scientifico sono ancora 
trascurabili i contributi riguardanti gli elementi necessari per un sistema di 
compensazione ambientale basato sui meccanismi di mercato. 
 
L'obiettivo principale di questa tesi è di ampliare la conoscenza scientifica relativa 
all'uso di meccanismi che si fondano su Biodiversity Offsetting, inteso come strumento per 
regolare e promuovere un riequilibrio degli ecosistemi. In particolar modo, questa ricerca 
fornisce una rassegna dei metodi di valutazione utilizzati per stimare gli effetti di tali 
cambiamenti ambientali, del ruolo esercitato dalle istituzioni e le relative politiche 
adottate per implementare schemi compensativi di tale impoverimento ecologico, sia nel 
contesto americano sia europeo. Tale studio, poi, analizza empiricamente lo schema 
  
compensativo statunitense adottato in ambito di impatto sugli habitat e specie protette, 
i.e. lo schema di Conservation Banking. Successivamente, questo contributo presenta 
un’analisi comparativa degli schemi adottati dall’UE e dagli USA per discutere di 
eventuali disparità che possano emergere, da un punto di vista puramente teorico e 
concettuale, tra i modelli osservati. Infine, per concludere, vengono esaminate le 
normative italiane per la compensazione degli impatti ambientali in tema di biodiversità, 
con l’intento di presentare una proposta operativa volta ad incentivare meccanismi di 
mercato applicabili sia in Italia sia in altri paesi europei. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
BB Biodiversity Banking 
BBOP Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme 
BEI Banking Enabling Instrument 
BO Biodiversity Offsetting 
CB Conservation Banking of Enlisted Species (USA) 
CEQA California Environmental Quality Act 
CWA Clean Water Act 
CWA Clean Water Act (short name for the FWPCA) 
EcIA Ecological Impact Assessment 
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment 
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment 
EIAD Environmental Impact Assessment Directive 
EPA Environmental Protection Agency 
ES Ecosystem Services 
ESA Endangered Species Act (USA) 
FSA Food Security Act 
FWPCA Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
GFNCA Federal Nature Conservation Act 
HD Habitat Directives 
HEA Habitat Equivalence Analysis 
HEP Habitat Equivalence Procedure 
HHA Habitat Hectares Approach  
HU Habitat Unit 
IEEP Institute for European Environmental Policy 
IMR Impact Mitigation Regulation, Eingriffsregelung 
IRT Interagency Review Team (USA) 
  
ISPRA Italian Institute for Environmental Protection and Research, Istituto Superiore 
per la Protezione e la Ricerca Ambientale 
LUC Land Use Change 
MB Mitigation Banking for Wetlands (USA) 
MBI Market-based instruments 
MEEDE Ministry of the Ecology, the Sustainable Development and the Energy 
MRT Multiagency Review Team (USA) 
MS Members States 
N.A. Not Applicable 
NNL No Net Loss 
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
NPL Nature Protection Law (England) 
NREA Natural Resource Equivalency Analysis 
NFWF National Fish and Wildlife Foundation 
PES Payment for Ecosystem Services 
REA Resource Equivalence Analysis 
RIBITS Regulatory In-lieu fee and Bank Information Tracking System 
SAC Special Areas of Conservation 
SCI Sites of Community Interest 
SPA Special Protection Area 
SPA Special Protection Areas 
SPV Superstrada Pedemontana Veneta 
SSSI Site of Special Scientific Interest 
USACE United States Army Corp of Engineers  
USBB United States Biodiversity Banking 
USFWS United States Fish and Wildlife Service 
WBD Wild Birds Directive 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
“The beginning of the most important part of the work” 
-Plato 
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1.1 Background 
 
Terrestrial ecosystems provide various functions, goods, and services to support 
the life on earth. Ecosystem functions refer to the biological and the fundamental 
process of ecosystems, that support the delivery of food and services for the benefit of 
humans (Constanza, et al., 1997). The Ecosystem Services (ES) are provided by a 
variety of natural and semi-natural ecosystems and landscapes that become necessary 
for human activities as they provide essential services for waste assimilation, water 
retention and supply, erosion control and sediment retention, air purification, 
recreation and culture (CIFOR, 2005). Such ES in turn support semi-natural 
anthropogenic activities like agriculture, hunting and fishing that respond to the 
society needs for food, housing, jobs creation and health care. Urbanisation and 
intensive agriculture are common activities that help satisfy society needs often in 
exchange for land for other ecosystem functions. The change of land use (LUC) alters 
ecosystem functions, and their provision of goods and services (Haygarth & Ritz, 2009; 
Ellis et al., 2013) jeopardising the entire ecosystem balance and conservation.  
 
Development activities referred as development projects in this study, are 
infrastructure improvements carried out to deliver social benefits and contribute to 
welfare in response to society needs (Constanza, et al., 1997). Development projects 
benefit society by responding to the needs of energy, transport, health facilities and 
education. The planning and execution of such projects often follow economic and 
ecological sustainability principles, as well as, comply with environmental legislations 
avoiding environmental injuries resulted by the change of land use. Land degradation, 
habitat conversion, air and water pollution are examples of common environmental 
consequences of development projects. Regulations governing the execution of 
development projects aim to guide improvement towards a sustainable and 
responsible development that protect the ecosystems (TEEB, 2010).  
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It is important to clarify that the concept of compensation for environmental 
damage is different from the compensation for impacts occurred during the execution 
of a development project. The former are losses over the natural resources and services 
caused by undesired circumstances as an accidental oil spill or hazardous substances, 
natural disaster occurrence, etc., while the latter refer to the residual unavoidable 
temporary or permanent losses of the natural resources and services due to the LUC 
related with a development project. The compensation of environmental damages and 
environmental impacts can have standard methods used to assess the ES injuries. 
However, their main differences centres in the predictability of the environmental 
injuries and the compensation processes regulated because the damage is not 
predictable and neither it is agreed to happen, while an environmental impact due to 
development is an authorised action. In Europe, environmental damage compensation 
is regulated by the Environmental Liability Directive (ELD, 2004/35/EU), and the 
environmental impacts of development projects are addressed by the Habitats, Wild 
Birds and the Environmental Impacts Assessment Directives (Chapter 4). In this thesis, 
the Habitat Equivalence Methods, commonly used in environmental damage, is 
explored to be used in compensation for LUC-caused impacts (Chapter 5). 
Nonetheless, this thesis does not address the process and regulations related to 
environmental damages to a larger extent. 
 
The loss of ecosystem functions and services related with LUC has become a 
concerning issue in Europe. Consequently, the European Union has committed to 
reducing the loss of ecosystems through the Biodiversity and the No Net Loss (NNL) 
Strategies (2012). All Members States (MS) are encouraged to half their biodiversity 
loss and restore 15% of the European degraded ecosystems by 2020 (target 2 of 
Biodiversity Strategy; European Commission, 2011). These strategies propose 
instruments to ensure NNL, and invite the MS to implement novel forms to 
compensate the loss over the environment, as for instance biodiversity offsetting 
mechanisms (BO) (European Commission 2011, Conway et al., 2013b; Turcker et al., 
2014; Froger and Hrabanski, 2015).  
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Italy hostess a large number of the European endangered species. The country 
supports nearly 50% of the plant species and 30% of the animal species of all Europe 
(ISPRA, 2014). The Italian history of civilisation has developed a unique mosaic of 
rural landscapes that have evolved since the time of the Roman Empire (Agnoletti, 
2012). More recently, in Italy, 55 hectares per day are paved (ISPRA, 2015). In the last 
thirty years, the LUC in Italy has been driven mainly by urban growth, a surface 
decrement of farmlands in lowlands and an increment of forest covered areas in the 
highlands because of lands abandonment (Marchetti et al., 2014). The high 
urbanisation rate and the low compensation actions of such land use changes are 
causing the decrement of permeable land important for sustaining the biodiversity, 
hydric retention and other ecosystem services. Consequently, the ES provision in Italy 
can be considered in jeopardy (Foley et al. 2005; Newbold et al., 2015). 
 
New conservatory and compensatory actions are needed to tackle the loss of ES 
and protect the remaining ecosystem functions, goods, and services. The development 
and implementation of novel environmental regulations inspired by the European 
NNL and Biodiversity Strategy can play a key role in the integration of environmental 
conservation, and satisfaction of society needs. Some countries in Europe have already 
started to develop and implement schemes to compensate environmental impacts 
derived from development projects. France and Germany, mandatorily, and Spain and 
the UK, voluntarily, have taken insights from the USA Conservation and Mitigation 
Schemes to develop and implement new regulations for environmental impacts 
compensation. These European offsetting schemes are setting the ground for more 
advanced and consistent policies for the conservation of European threatened and 
endangered species and habitats (Madsen et al., 2010; Madsen et al., 2011; Conway et 
al., 2013). In this thesis, the concept of ‘environmental impacts compensation 
schemes/programs/mechanism’ will be referred as Biodiversity Offsetting (BO).  
 
On May 28, 2015, the Italian Government approved a decree that will set the basis 
to develop and enforce new policies for safeguarding the ES provision and move 
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towards the implementation of a NNL initiative. The decree recommends the use of 
green infrastructure (i.e. including ecological corridors, riparian and coastal green 
belts, multi-functional farms, wildlife overpass, etc.) in response to the indications 
from the EU to use more ‘cost-effective’ alternatives from grey infrastructure 
(European Commission, 2016). Consecutively, the Italian Parliament has recently 
amended the environmental section of the Italian of 2014, in particular, the Article 70, 
which grants the Government complete authority to implement Payment for 
Ecosystem Services (PES) (Camera dei Deputati, 2016). PES, are market-based 
instruments (MBI) supporting the provision of ES, and in this regard, PES-like 
schemes can be implemented to compensate for environmental impacts.  
 
In Italy, there are few local initiatives that, to some extent, can be considered a PES 
for environmental impacts compensation, i.e. a Biodiversity Offset Scheme (Pileri, 
2007). One excellent example is ‘The Lombardy’s Green Found’. Although these type 
of schemes are working towards NNL, additional steps need to be undertaken to 
develop and implement a MBI of Biodiversity Offsetting that would respond to the 
EU Biodiversity and NNL Strategies, and the recent environmental amendment of the 
Italian Stability Law of 2014 and the newArticle 70. 
 
1.2 Problem statement 
 
Market-based biodiversity offsetting schemes are widely used in countries like USA 
and Australia to compensate environmental impacts derived from development 
projects. The European Union has shown interest in developing novel mechanisms for 
biodiversity compensation through the “Biodiversity Strategy 2020” and its initiative 
of “No Net Loss” launched in 2012. These two strategies aim to boost the development 
and experimentation of new schemes for environmental impacts compensations that 
would help improve the conservation of ecosystems across Europe. In that sense, the 
recently amended the Italian Environmental Law of 2014 and its new Article 70 
becomes the most important policy granting the Italian Government complete 
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authority to develop and implement a new Biodiversity Offsetting Scheme based on 
the concept of Payment for Ecosystem Services.  
 
Currently, the enforced policies for environmental impacts compensation in Italy 
are the existing European requirements to offset environmental impacts as indicated 
in the Habitat Directive (HD), Art. 4 (subdivision 3 and 4), and the Wild Birds Directive 
(WBD) of 1979 (79/109/EEC amended into the 2009/147/EC). Although the WBD states 
the willingness to protect bird species and their habitats, it does not require 
compensation for impacts by itself but through the Environmental Impact Assessment 
Directive (EIAD) (85/337/EEC). The articles 12 and 16 of the EIAD conditions projects 
impacting protected species and animals (listed in Annex IV) to be authorized only 
when no other alternative exists, it override public interest (Article 16[1]), or the 
related impacts do not impede maintaining a favorable conservation status of the 
species concerned (European Commission, 2007). On the other hand, the Habitat 
Directive (HD) of 1992 (92/43/EEC) Art. 6[3] and 6[4] also require compensation to 
projects with significant environmental impacts jeopardizing priority conservation 
areas, i.e. the Natura 2000 network of Special Protection Areas (SPA), Sites of 
Community Interest (SCI) and Special Areas of Conservation (SAC).  
 
The problem with the concrete execution of the environmental compensation on the 
ground accordingly to the HD, WBD and the EIAD, and the limited results to help 
reduce the loss of ES due to LUC in Europe are related to 1) the features to consider 
such impacts ‘significant’ in order to require legal compensation, 2) the lack of 
methodologies to assess the impacts, and 3) the guidelines or strategies to plan and 
fund the compensation of the identified impacts. The past lack of strategies, policies 
and incentives in Europe to direct environmental impacts compensation towards a 
MBI delayed the development of innovative schemes for biodiversity offsetting in 
most of the European countries, including Italy. Recently, the EU has encouraged MS 
to develop new forms of compensation to tackle the loss of ecosystem services, habitats 
and species through the European Biodiversity and NNL Strategy. Now, the problem 
________________________________________________________________________Introduction 
 
includes the lack of scientific knowledge to understand the different types of 
biodiversity offsetting, the key elements to develop a sustainable market-based 
instrument for environmental impacts compensation (as the governance, related 
institutions and stakeholder’s functions), and the understanding of the methodologies 
to assess the impacts and design the compensation.  
 
In synthesis, the problems addressed in this research study are the following:  
 
Problem 1. Requiring compensation for impacts under the European Directives 
 The lack of rules to identify the impacts and classify them as ‘significant 
impacts’ to require legal compensation.  
 
Problem 2. Assessing the impacts 
 The lack of standard scientific methodologies to assess the environmental 
impacts. 
 
Problem 3. Designing the compensation projects 
 The lack of guidelines or strategies to plan and fund of the compensation 
projects. As well as the identification of the receptor sites and their long-term 
maintenance. 
 
Problem 4. Understanding market-based biodiversity offsetting tools 
 The need of scientific knowledge to understand the development and 
enforcement of innovative schemes as MBI to address the compensation of 
environmental impacts related to the land use change associated with development 
projects. 
 
The first three problems relate to the implementation of the European Directives 
linked to Environmental Impacts Compensation and the gaps between the theory of 
the regulations and the practice to implement them and contribute to the EU 
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Biodiversity and NNL Strategy. Whereas, the fourth problem relates to the need to the 
scientific background to develop and implement a new form of environmental impacts 
compensations scheme in line with the concept of PES and its implementation in a 
market-based instrument for BO.  
 
1.3 Objectives and research questions of this study 
 
In the light of the increased awareness about the loss of ecosystem services, habitats 
and species due to the European land use change and the need of tools to tackle this 
issue, the overall aim of this research is to extend the scientific knowledge about the 
use of Biodiversity Offsetting Schemes as an instrument to regulate and direct PES to 
deliver compensation for environmental impacts.  
 
This study has identified the following three specific objectives related to the 
previous four presented problems to first, understand the current European 
regulations and mechanisms for environmental impacts compensation. And second, 
to fulfill the need of scientific knowledge to develop and implement a new market-
based biodiversity offsetting as a tool to compensate for the loss of ecosystem services 
due to the land use change by development projects.  
 
The specific objectives and related research questions of this research are the 
following: 
Objective 1. Study the EU regulations and methodologies used to compensate for 
environmental impacts due to the land-use-change related with development projects. 
 
1a) What are the regulations at European level that require compensation of 
environmental impacts related to the land use change due to development 
projects. 
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1b) What are the leading regulations implemented at country level that derived 
from the EU regulations? 
1c) What are the challenges and limitations of such country level schemes 
and/or programs and/or mechanism to help tackle the loss of ES in Europe and 
to develop a market-based instrument of BO? 
 
Objective 2:  Study the components of biodiversity offsetting as a market-based 
instrument for environmental impacts compensation. 
 
2a) What are the impacts assessing methods of biodiversity offsetting and 
biodiversity banking? 
2b) How the assessing methods are applied to empirical cases of impacts and 
the design of compensation projects?  
2c) What are the institutions and stakeholders related in biodiversity banking, 
what is their role and function?  
 
Objective 3: Analyze the similarities and differences between the biodiversity 
offsets in USA and Europe to learn from the most experienced schemes and develop a 
biodiversity banking model to be applicable for Italy. 
 
3a) What are the differences between the European efforts to compensate for 
environmental impacts and the American mechanism for biodiversity 
offsetting? 
3b) What are the Italian regulations for environmental impacts compensation 
and the current schemes of biodiversity offsetting?  
3c) What are the challenges and limitations to be faced in Italy to develop and 
implement a biodiversity banking scheme? 
 
1.4 Research structure  
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This thesis is structured in 3 Parts and 9 Chapters as follows:  
 
Part I FUNDAMENTS includes Chapter 1, 2 and 3. 
Chapter 1 introduces the subject matter of this study, the problem statement 
and the research objectives and questions. Chapter 2 provides a theoretical 
background about methods and mechanisms used for environmental impacts 
compensation, the biodiversity offsetting definition, the types of BO mechanism 
in general, and in concrete, the characteristics of MBI for biodiversity offsetting. 
Chapter 3, Material and methods, presents the research design and approaches 
used to address the problems that gave origin to the objectives of this research.  
 
Part II RESULTS AND DISCUSSION includes Chapter 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9. 
Chapter 4 explains the European regulations related to the compensation of 
environmental impacts and presents some examples of regulations enforced in 
Member States of France, Spain, England and Germany. Later, Chapter 5 analyzes 
the methodologies used in biodiversity offsetting to assess the environmental 
impacts and design the compensation projects, including the impacts unit of 
measure, and the compensation project price estimation.  
 
Chapter 6 proposes a metrics tailored for the case of Italy and exercise its 
empirical application in the case study of the high-speed roadway Pedemontana 
Veneta. Following, Chapter 7 studies the components of biodiversity offsetting as 
a MBI in theory and analyses the case of the American Conservation and 
Mitigation Programs (referred as US BO schemes) to understand the empirical use 
of market-driven schemes of BO, including its governance, related institutions 
and stakeholder’s functions. Chapter 8 analyses the gap between the biodiversity 
banking and the European initiatives towards environmental impacts 
compensation and NNL. Finally, Chapter 9 analyses the case of Italian legislation 
and its readiness to develop and implement a market-based instrument to 
compensate for the LUC derived from development projects.  
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Part III CONCLUSIONS presents the conclusions of this thesis. 
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
There are different schemes and tools used to implement environmental impacts 
compensation. First, this chapter defines the mitigation hierarchy and describes the 
concept of offsetting. Then, defines Biodiversity Offsetting (BO) and presents the 
different regulated and voluntary tools that can be used to offset environmental 
impacts, including the market-based mechanism used in BO. This chapter helps to 
understand the different market-based mechanisms for environmental impacts 
compensation including the features that characterize advance mitigation, which in 
this study is referred as Biodiversity Banking (BB).  
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2.1 The mitigation hierarchy  
 
The mitigation hierarchy is essentially the most known tool used along the project 
planning and programming that allows to identify the project’s environmental 
impacts and helps recognizing the options to avoid and minimize, as far as possible, 
the negative impacts applying the following steps of the mitigation hierarchy 
(Madsen, et al., 2010):  
 
1- Avoidance of the impacts at planning stage, 
2- Minimization of harm, i.e. reduce the duration intensity and/or extent of the 
impacts, 
3- Restoration using the primary remediation on-site, 
4- Compensation of the impacts, i.e. give back the natural resources and services 
towards their not net loss on the environment off-site or in-site, when possible, 
5- Offsetting indicates a particular type of conservation actions that can be seen 
as measurable conservation outcomes achieving no net loss and preferably a 
net gain of the ecosystem services lost. Offsetting occurs off-site the injured 
area. Net gain means reaching a higher level of natural resources and services 
going beyond its baseline. 
 
The avoidance step is essential at the beginning of the project planning to prevent, 
as far as possible, environmental impacts derived from the development project. After 
avoiding most of the impacts, the minimization step seeks to reduce the duration and 
intensity of the identified impacts. After this two first steps of the mitigation hierarchy, 
all still existing environmental impacts that will occur due to the development project 
are called unavoidable residual impacts. The last three phases of the mitigation 
hierarchy are used to identify and possibly quantify that unavoidable residual impacts 
seeking for actions to recompense the environment for the caused damage.  
 
_______________________________________________________________ Theoretical background 
 
 
The mitigation hierarchy addresses the recompense of the unavoidable residual 
impacts by the step 3, 4 and 5, i.e., through restoration, compensation and offsetting. 
Distinguishing the difference among this three terms is crucial. For this research, 
restoration has the same meaning that remediation and rehabilitation, i.e. measures 
taken to restore in-situ the injured resources and services towards their pristine 
condition (baseline). Thus, restoration can also be called primary remediation, so 
returning the damaged natural resources or impaired services towards their baseline 
condition on-site.  
 
The baseline condition is referred as No Net loss. It means reaching the level of 
ecosystem services that would have occurred without the ecosystem injuries but 
including natural and anthropogenic changes on the ecosystem services unrelated to 
the injuries (Dunford et al., 2004). 
 
Now, the terms offsetting and compensation are frequently interchangeable terms, 
however, the offsetting concept is well distinguished from compensation when talking 
about Biodiversity Offsetting (described in section 2.2) (Conway, et al., 2013; Madsen 
et al., 2010; ten Kate et al. 2004). Compensation measures are actions seeking to give 
back the natural resources and services towards not net loss on the environment. Such 
actions are preferably planned to compensate on-site, i.e. within the injured area 
whenever possible. On the other hand, offsetting is led by the compensation actions 
(step 4 of the mitigation hierarchy) aiming to achieve a higher level of natural 
resources and services going beyond its baseline, i.e. achieving a net gain. Thus, the 
compensation projects seeking to reach no net loss and preferably a net gain over the 
ecosystem services baseline are referred as Biodiversity Offsetting (BO) and they 
often occur off-site the injured area.  
 
Biodiversity Offsetting occurs when primary remediation, i.e. restoration, do not 
result in the complete rehabilitation of the environmental injuries. Therefore, BO 
carries out complementary and compensatory remediation measures to compensate 
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for the permanent and temporary impact. Complementary remediation measures 
occur off-site the injured area and compensate the permanent impacts by providing a 
similar level of the natural resources or services (Hood, 2012). Compensatory 
measures recompense for the interim losses, i.e. provide compensation for the natural 
resources and services pending recovery during the restoration period, either on-site 
or off-site the injured area (Hood, 2012; Martin-ortega et al., 2011).  
 
The following figure illustrates the application of the avoidance and minimization 
steps during the development project’s planning phase (A). And the consideration of 
the restoration, compensation, and offsetting of the residual environmental impacts 
(B). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                      Figure modified from ICMM, 2005 
 
Figure 1. Steps of the mitigation hierarchy 
 
A 
B 
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It has been a common practice to accept projects’ residual social and environmental 
impacts in exchange for the economic benefits of jobs and revenue that accompanied 
them (ten Kate, 2013). The expectations for receiving net social, environmental and 
economic gains, were often considered greater than the impacts on the environment. 
At present, developers in advanced countries like the USA and Europe, and in other 
developing countries like Mexico and Colombia (Madsen, et al., 2011), currently need 
to demonstrate that their project will have minimum negative impacts on the 
environment. In the USA even the residual unavoided impacts are assessed to be 
adequately compensated through Conservation Banking and Mitigation Banking 
Schemes.  
 
The Forest Trends Organization (2013) states that there are three principal 
motivations for developers to demonstrate no net loss or net gain of social and 
environmental values: 1) to comply with legal requirements for offsets or 
compensation now enforced in over 45 countries and under development in another 
27 (Madsen, et al., 2011) and/or the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) a 
planning law in many more countries; 2) the voluntary business case for no net loss, 
which although not legally required, offers a potential attraction to developers (TEEB, 
2010); and 3) to meet investors requirements. 
 
2.2 Definition and features of Biodiversity Offsetting 
 
Biodiversity offsets are defined as measurable conservation1 outcomes resulting 
from actions designed to compensate for significant residual unavoidable impacts 
arising from developments project after appropriate prevention and mitigation 
                                                          
1 Conservation here is considered as in-situ according to Article 2 of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity: “In-situ conservation means the conservation of ecosystems and natural habitats and the 
maintenance and recovery of viable populations of species in their natural surroundings and, in 
the case of domesticated or cultivated species, in the surroundings where they have developed 
their distinctive properties.” 
http://www.cbd.int/convention/articles/default.shtml?a=cbd-02  
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measures have been considered (ten Kate, et al., 2004). The goal of biodiversity offsets 
is to achieve no net loss and preferably a net gain on the ground on the ecosystem 
services, goods, and functions associated with biological diversity (ten Kate, 2013). 
Biodiversity offsetting often occurs off-site the injured area and include 
complementary and compensatory remediation measures to compensate for the 
permanent and temporary unavoidable residual impacts of development projects 
(Hood, 2012; Martin-ortega et al. 2011).  
 
In biodiversity offsetting, biodiversity is defined as the genetic diversity within 
species, species diversity within ecosystems, and ecosystem diversity across 
landscapes. Also, biodiversity values refer to all direct (consumptive and productive) 
and indirect (economic, ethical, educational, aesthetical and scientific) values of the 
biodiversity that support several ecosystem functions vital for human well-being, such 
as agricultural crops, timber, medicinal plants and industrial raw materials, air and 
water purification, climate regulation, and provision of recreational opportunities 
(Pearce & Moran, 1994). Thus, biodiversity and biodiversity values can be looked as 
important indicators that can provide a unit of measurement of the environmental 
impacts that BO aims to compensate. 
 
Biodiversity Offsetting is a potential tool for achieving the objective of no net loss, 
and preferably, net gain of biodiversity values during development projects. The 
developer is then identified as the liable party and is responsible for the compensation 
of the unavoidable residual impacts that remained after the execution of the first two 
steps of the mitigation hierarchy, i.e. avoidance and minimization. The residual 
impacts might then be restored, compensated and offset using primary, 
complementary and/or compensatory remediation measures.  
 
The residual environmental impacts comprise all natural resources and services 
injured that are lost temporary or permanently in consequence of the development 
project. The temporary losses also referred as interim losses, are those that after the 
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execution of the compensatory remediation measures, will eventually2 recover and 
reach the baseline level. On the other hand, the permanent losses are the natural 
resources and services that are entirely lost and will never be recovered. Under this 
circumstances, the party and the competent authority pursuing or authorising the 
development project may determine the compensatory remediation measures needed 
to compensate and possibly offset the permanent and interim losses (steps 4 and 5 of 
the mitigation hierarchy).  
 
2.3 Market-based instruments and biodiversity offsetting 
 
The policies to protect the environment set one goal and identify and enforce 
means to achieve that goal. The goal and the means are the two components that lead 
the policies for environmental matters (Stavins, 2001). This section focuses on those 
‘means’ and presents the different categories of market-based instruments that are 
used in environmental policy.  
 
According to the definition given by Robert Stavins (2001), MBI is regulations 
encouraging the desired behaviour by means of market signals rather than the direct 
enforcement of explicit directives regarding the environmental issue to be controlled.  
 
The types of MBI currently in use for biodiversity protection can be divided into 
four categories:  pollution charge systems, tradable permits, market friction reductions 
and government subsidy reductions. These categories currently lead the market-based 
environmental policy instruments, known as economic-incentive (Stavins, 2001).  
 
                                                          
2 The recovery time-profile of the injured natural resources and services, depending on their extent 
and gravity, is an issue of crucial importance when planning and scaling compensation measures. 
The different recovery time-dimension of the injured resources is being a subject of research and 
debate (Howe, 1990; European Commission, 2001; Ofiara, 2002; Boyd, 2000; Defrancesco et al., 
2008). 
Chapter 2__________________________________________________________________________  
 
 
1. Pollution charges systems. Also called priced-based system. These are the most 
antique and widely MBI used is the pollution charge system (Pigou, 1920). It 
uses taxes/charges/fees, on the amount of pollution or environmental issue that 
a firm or source generates. The challenge with this system is to identify the 
appropriate tax rate according to the environmental issue that wants to be 
controlled (Stavins, 2001).  
 
2. Tradable permits. Also known as, quantity-based permits are MBI under which 
an allowable quantity of level of pollution or impacts over the environment as 
water pollution or land use change is established and traded among the users 
needing to have such impact on the environment due to their activities. 
Tradable permits operate by creating a market for permits that allow engaging 
in an activity by restricting the quantity of this activity /a cap or a floor level 
allowed). For example, limiting the amount of activity that in excess is 
damaging to the environment as the greenhouse gases emissions, fishing, or 
impacts on the environment due to the development project. Examples of these 
instruments are the cap-and-trade, credit program, offsets schemes, tradable 
development rights (Stavins, 2001; eftec-IEEP et al., 2010). 
 
3. Market friction reducing instruments. These operate by improving the 
functioning of an existing market, but can always involve developing an 
entirely new market. Some examples are: a) market creation, b) liability rules 
by contracts/stewardship payments, debit for conservation swaps, and c) 
information programs by differentiating products through eco-labelling and or 
certifications (Stavins, 2001; Prokofieva et al., 2009; eftec-IEEP et al.,2010). 
 
4. Government subsidiary reductions. These instruments are the opposite of 
pollution charges systems. In this case, instead of having a payment-based 
system for a particular environmental impacts, the government provides 
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subsidies, taxes reduction or grants to incentivize good environmental 
practices (Prokofieva et al., 2009). 
 
Considering these definitions of the different types of MBI for environmental 
policy, it can be said that Biodiversity Offsets are a quantity-based instrument. When 
a particular type and amount of environmental impact on the environment is allowed 
by the permitting authority for the execution of a development project, this authority 
becomes the legal figure that can require compensation for that type and amount of 
environmental impact. Such impacts can be quantified and qualified by a set of 
methods (called metrics and later discussed in this thesis in Chapter 5) and measured 
in a unit commonly known as ‘debit’ in biodiversity offsetting. In this way, the metrics 
become the measurement unit of the impacts, and those can be compensated with 
positive impacts on the environment called ‘credits’. In this way, the compensation of 
the environmental impacts can be delivered through a market-based biodiversity 
offset, where the credits to compensate for the debits are exchanged from the supply 
side (landowners supplying the environmental credits) to the demand side (the 
developer causing an impact on the environment, debits).  
 
2.4 Payment for Ecosystem Services for a market-based biodiversity offsetting 
 
In a market-based biodiversity offsetting, the environmental impacts are 
compensated by the exchange of ‘credits’ that deliver positive impacts on the 
environment preferably in a relative ecological quantity and quality according to the 
impacts identified by the execution of the mitigation hierarchy. As defined in section 
2.1, biodiversity offsetting occurs using complementary and compensatory 
compensation, i.e. by actions to compensate for the permanent and temporary 
impacts. The complementary remediation measures occur off-site the injured area and 
compensate the permanent impacts by providing a similar level of the natural 
resources or services (Hood, 2012). Compensatory measures compensate for the 
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interim losses, i.e. provide compensation for the natural resources and services 
pending recovery during the restoration period, either on-site or off-site the injured 
area (Hood, 2012; Martin-ortega et al. 2011).  
 
Biodiversity offsetting aims to achieve no net loss and preferably a net gain of the 
ecosystem services, goods, and functions impacted by the development project (ten 
Kate, 2013). The means through which biodiversity offsetting can achieve such goals 
is by compensatory and complementary remediation on-site and off-site the impacted 
area. Considering the ‘off-site the injured area’ component of BO, the offsetting actions 
can be delivered by a third party, that will quantify and qualify the positive 
environmental results of its land management to be exchanged as credits in the market 
of biodiversity offsetting. The party supplying credits for the market of biodiversity 
offsetting can be rewarded by a payment for its delivered ecosystem service; such 
payment will be covered by the impacting party, i.e. whoever is executing the 
development project. 
 
Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) are “voluntary transactions where a well-
defined environmental service (ES) or a land use likely to secure that service is being 
‘bought’ by a service buyer (minimum one) from a service provider (minimum one), 
if and only if, the service provider secures the service provision (concept called 
conditionality)” (Wunder, 2005). Despite this definition, there are additional 
conceptualization issues within the definition of PES that arise from the difficulty of 
classifying and evaluating the meaning of a “well-defined ecosystem service” (Boyd 
and Banzhaf, 2007). Another issue with this definition is the strictly voluntary nature 
of the transaction. Several authors discuss the use of PES as a purely voluntary 
transaction or a government based transaction (Muradian et al., 2012; Sattler and 
Matzdorf, 2013; Vatn, 2010).  
 
There is very little knowledge about the correctness of using PES within 
biodiversity offsetting, and whether the payment would be voluntary or mandatory. 
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However, the concept of delivering a payment to a provider (group or individual) for 
the delivery of an environmental service can become a powerful mechanism to create 
a market for credits that would compensate for environmental debits of developers 
within biodiversity offsetting.  
 
2.5 Defining Biodiversity Banking  
 
Biodiversity Banking (BB) originated from the evolution of different forms of 
Biodiversity Offsets. As described by Bull et al. (2013), “offsets” encompass different 
mandatory policies or voluntary mechanisms with the common objective of 
compensating environmental losses through actions generating comparable 
biodiversity gains (ten Kate et al., 2004). The premise is that offsets are implemented 
as the last resort of the mitigation hierarchy and that NNL cannot be achieved without 
avoidance, mitigation and rehabilitation of the adverse impacts (BBOP, 2009; Froger 
et al., 2014). 
From an institutional point of view, biodiversity offsets can be classified into three 
types: (i) permittee-responsible mitigation, (ii) financial compensation and (iii) 
biodiversity banking (Froger et al., 2014; Calvet et al., 2015). 
(i) Permittee-responsible mitigation is also known as “in-kind” or “like-for-like” 
compensation. It consists of measures implemented to restore, rehabilitate, 
create or preserve habitats via direct ecological measures carried out by the 
developer, i.e. the project responsible obtaining the permit to perform land 
development. The permittee-responsible environmental compensation was 
conceptualized as “who pollutes pays” supported by ecologists and 
legislators (Morandeau and Vilaysack, 2012).  
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(ii) Financial compensation, also called in-lieu-fee, is a monetary transfer made 
from developers to agencies or other entities3 to pay for the equivalent 
environmental losses. This offsetting evolved from the idea of enlarging 
permittee-responsible compensation into larger-scale compensatory actions 
by favouring the economies of scale concept, i.e. reducing transactions and 
management costs by collecting money first, and carrying out the offsets after 
sufficient resources are available (McCann, 2013). Financial compensation 
benefits from the flexibility given to offset after the environmental impact has 
occurred, when a suitable offsetting receptor site and the financial resources 
to manage it are available. Financial compensations have shown ecological 
equivalency issues related to the time gap between the impacts and actual 
offset, the lack of additionality, the underestimation of environmental losses, 
and the release of the developers’ liability for the environmental impacts 
(Morandeau and Vilaysack, 2012) 
(iii) Biodiversity banking started gaining popularity at the beginning of the 
1990s as a result of the limited ecological outcomes of monetary 
compensation, and the high transaction costs of permittee-responsible 
offsets evidenced in the USA (DeWeese 1994, Marsh et al. 1996, Redmond 
et al. 1996, EDF 1999; Calvet et al., 2015). The biodiversity banks are the 
pieces of land devoted to environmental conservation using restoration, 
rehabilitation, enhancement, and or ecosystem creation in advance (ex-
ante) of the environmental impacts of development projects. 
 
Biodiversity banking can also be defined as a market-based BO that delivers 
environmental service benefits provided by landowners (supply side of credits) in ex-
ante the development project’s impacts (demand side). The ecosystem services 
provided to offset the impacts are commonly measured in the unit of ‘credits’ and 
exchanged into a market, a ‘biodiversity market’ (eftec-IEEP et al., 2010; 
                                                          
3 Depending on the country, entities can be local, regional or federal governmental agencies or 
other type fund managers. 
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Environmental Bank, 2012). The credits are calculated considering a set of features and 
characteristics of the natural resources and/or services expressed by a set of the single 
attribute’s measurements known as the metrics (addressed in Chapter 5). Such metrics 
must reflect the gains, losses and/or conservation of the environmental goods and 
services that are being exchanged (Madsen et al. 2011; Conway et al., 2013).  
 
In this study, BB embraces all supply offset schemes functioning with an 
intermediary structure, i.e. the for-profit biodiversity banks, or the non-profit entities 
owning or managing land where compensation measures take place. For example, 
mitigation banking and conservation banking in the USA; biodiversity credit banking 
in the UK; compensation supply in France, etc. The biodiversity banks are established 
in a particular piece of land managed to create, enhance, restore and/or preserve 
environmental assets that offset, off-site and ex-ante and preferably in-kind, the 
adverse impacts of development.  
 
BB schemes allow multiple projects with like impacts to compensate in one 
ecosystem-comparative location. Such sites become a biodiversity bank strategically 
managed with two main purposes: 1) to reduce financial and time-cost of the 
compensation actions. The ability to focus conservation efforts on fewer, larger, 
strategically located mitigation sites, is thought to greatly increase the chances that the 
compensation measures will be more likely to achieve ecological and business success 
because the BB is managed to reach ecological performance goals and economic return 
expectations (Denisoff, 2008);and 2) to reduce the transaction costs involved in the 
impact-compensation matching process that developers and agencies go through. BB 
offers a novel solution for achieving substantial impact compensation by incentivizing 
environmental businesses to preserve habitats and species.  
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MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
The methods used in this thesis vary according to each objective and related research 
questions that are answered in the different chapters of this thesis. 
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The Chapter 1 briefly introduces the background of this research, and the 
problems encounter that this thesis aims to solve through the statement of the 
objectives and research questions. 
 
The Chapter 2, ‘Theoretical Background’, of this thesis was stated after an 
exhaustive literature review about biodiversity offsetting using the Scopus database, 
and gray literature linked to reports and articles of country-level institutions web 
pages, as the Italian National Institute for Environmental Protection and Research, 
ISPRA, (Istituto Superiore per la Protezione e la Ricerca Ambientale), the US Fish and 
Wildlife Service (USFWS), and the French Ministry of the Environment. Also, some 
other research institutes were consulted as the Forest Trends Association and the 
Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme (BBOP). 
 
The chapters reporting the results of this thesis (Chapters 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9) 
followed specific methodologies as described below. It is worth to mention that, 
Chapter 8 discusses the results of Chapter 4, 5 and 7 and it recalls some information 
collected through the literature review for a better understanding of the concepts 
discussed.  
 
Table 3 synthezises the research framework of this thesis according to each 
objective and summarizes the methodology followed in each chapter.  
 
The Chapter 4, ‘Policies for biodiversity offsetting, collected information from 
scientific and grey literature to study the EU Directives that give the basis for the 
development of a new type of environmental compensation scheme in EU and 
presents the legislations of France, Germany, Spain and England that regulate 
biodiversity offsets. Scientific and grey literature were analyzed to collect information 
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from official websites such as: the Regulatory In-lieu fee and Bank Information 
Tracking System (RIBITS) in the USA; the Department of Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs (DEFRA) in the UK; the Ministry of the Ecology, the Sustainable 
Development and the Energy (MEDDE) in France; the Institution for the Protection 
and Environmental Research (ISPRA), and the Ministry of the Environment, Land and 
Sea of Italy; and the Bavarian State Office for the Environment in Germany. 
 
Additionally, some semi-structured interviews to key informants were executed to 
collect updated information about the French, German, Spanish and English initiative 
of MBI for biodiversity offsetting. Below, in “Chapter 9”, the research framework used 
to organize the semi-structured interviews is presented.  
 
The Chapter 5, ‘Valuation methodologies for biodiversity banking: the metrics’, 
studies the most applied methods used in environmental impacts compensation due 
to development projects and environmental damage assessment from scientific papers 
and scientific reports published by scientific associations like the Institute for 
European Environmental Policy (IEEP). This chapter analyzes the methodologies used 
in biodiversity offsetting to assess the environmental impacts and design the 
compensation projects, including the impacts unit of measure, and the compensation 
project price assessment.  
 
The Chapter 6, ‘Developing metrics for Italy’. A study of the English methodology 
to assess environmental impacts was carried using official material form the 
Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs. Consecutively, information about 
the Italian habitats and Natura 2000 sites was collected from the ISPRA and the 
European Environmental Ministry to customize the DEFRA’s metrics for the Italian 
environmental and habitat features and apply it to the empirical case study of the 
High-Speed Road “Pedemontana Veneta”. A collection of official data about the 
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Pedemontana Veneta case-study was collected through the Veneto Region to consult the 
Ecological Impact Assessment of such project. A deep analysis of the information 
collected and a consultation with key experts was executed for the elaboration of this 
chapter. In this chapter, ArcGIS® and Excel™ software were the main instruments 
used to assess the empirical impacts of the case study and to proposes two different 
potential offsetting projects. Annex 4 presents the Excel calculation model used in this 
Chapter. 
 
The Chapter 7, ‘Empirical application of biodiversity banking in the USA’, And 
Chapter 8, ‘Breach between the USA and Europe on Biodiversity Banking’. Chapter 7 
deepens in the application of the Conservation and Compensation Banking Schemes 
in the USA to understand these schemes’ governance, related institutions and 
stakeholders’ functions. To collect information for Chapter 7 and 8, a field research 
was conducted in California, Texas and Florida; and in France, the UK, Germany, 
Spain and Italy. Face-to-face, voice-call, semi-direct open interviews and field visits 
were conducted with environmental agencies, practitioners, consultants, lawyers, and 
researchers (Table 1). 49 face-to-face/voice-call semi-direct interviews were conducted: 
14 regulators, 13 bankers, 5 consultants and 18 lawyers or researchers. Nearly 92% of 
the interviews took place in California because its length of experience with BB. 
France, the UK, Germany and Italy exemplify different implementation of BB, going 
from experienced schemes in Germany, new development and piloting schemes in 
Frances, the UK and Spain, and to research-level regional BB-like mitigations in Italy.  
 
The stakeholders interviewed were selected based on their role in governmental 
or non-governmental entities regarding BB and other forms of offsets. The uneven 
number of represented roles in all studied countries is due to the heterogeneous 
knowledge distribution on biodiversity offsetting, i.e. in the USA there are more 
agency staff members and practitioners with knowledge on the empirical use of BB 
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that were willing to participate in our study than there were consultants and 
academics. In other countries like France, the UK, Germany and Italy there is limited 
knowledge on biodiversity banking. Therefore there were not as many people 
available to participate in this study.  
 
The interviews were carried out to collect data about the current policies and 
empirical practices of the American and European mitigation and compensation 
offsetting mechanism used in Chapter 8. Scientific and gray literature were also 
analyzed to collect information from official websites such as: the Regulatory In-lieu 
fee and Bank Information Tracking System (RIBITS4) in  the USA; the Department of 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) in the UK; the Ministry of the Ecology, 
the Sustainable Development and the Energy (MEDDE) in France; the Institution for 
the Protection and Environmental Research (ISPRA), and the Ministry of the 
Environment, Land and Sea of Italy; and the Bavarian State Office for the Environment 
in Germany. 
 
Table 1. Sample of interviewed actors. 
Role Number of actors 
USA Europe 
  DE FR IT UK 
Regulator 9  2 3  
Banker 10  2  1* 
Environmental consultant 3  1  1* 
Other (lawyer or researcher)  5  2 6 2 3 
Total 27  2 11 5 4 
*The interviewee’s role has the function of banker and environmental consultant at the same time 
and account for one person in the total number of interviews. 
                                                          
4 RIBITS, the Regulatory In-lieu fee and Bank Information Tracking System was developed by the 
USACE supported by USFWS, National Marine Fisheries Service (NOAA), and the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) and Federal Highway Administration to provide better information on 
mitigation and conservation banking and in-lieu fee programs across the USA.  
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Section 7.4 of Chapter 7, ‘The US Conservation Banking implementation practicalities 
and challenges’, presents the results of a field survey carried out to study the issues 
relates with the American Conservation Banking Program. The objectives were to 
assess the positive factors and pitfalls of Conservation banking in the USA, from the 
point of view of agency staff members (regulators), and practitioners (bankers). The 
study was based on the investigations previously realized at the University of 
California Davis in 2013 (Bunn et al., 2013) for the California Conservation Banking 
Program. The fundamental premise for enlarging this study in this thesis was that a 
USA nationwide study would give a more reliable data of the limiting factors and 
positive features of the Federally implemented Conservation Banking Program. 
 
An online questionnaire was sent to 34 bank sponsors of approved Conservation 
Banks in the USA and 20 agency staff members from different States. A total of 11 
practitioners, 34% response rate, was received after three months of data collection 
and active online survey. In total, 20 CB were represented from the States of Utah, 
Texas, Florida and California (Figure 2). While eight regulators participated in this 
study ( 40% response rate) from the Agencies of California Fish and Wildlife, US Army 
Corps of Engineers, Colorado Department of Transportation, Natural Resources 
Conservation Services, and Santa Cruz Planning Department. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Practitioners response information and distribution. 
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The questionnaire was elaborated and distributed using Qualtrics (Qualtrics, 
Provo, UT) online survey software. Annex 5 presents the list of questions sent to the 
regulators and practitioners. The survey questions were designed to: 1) Assess the 
criteria used by bankers and practitioners to create new conservation banks and 
identify challenges or factors hindering the banks creating process. 2) Assess the 
challenges and barriers to implementing an effective program nationwide. And, 3) 
identify policy changes that may help to improve the program. 
 
Annex 6 presents the final report summarizing the survey results that was sent to 
all the participants of this study.  
 
The source of the banks and banks sponsors data was collected from the following 
sources:  
• Ecosystem Market Place Data Base for Conservation Banking of Endangered 
Species us.speciesbanking.com 
• The National Registry for Conservation and Mitigation Banks of the Federal 
US Government: Regulatory In-Lieu Fee and Bank Information Tracking 
System Ribits.usace.army.mil/ribits_apex 
 
The Chapter 9, ‘Italian legislations and efforts towards biodiversity banking’, 
reviews the current Italian legislation on environmental impacts compensation to 
collect information on the basis for the development of a biodiversity scheme. Also, as 
in Chapter 4, the data collected for this Chapter used semi-structured interviews to 
key informants to collect updated information about the current efforts in Italy 
towards a MBI for biodiversity offsetting.  
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Table 2 presents the research framework used to develop a set of questions that 
guided the semi-structured interviews. Such framework is based on previous 
research on ES considered by Corbera et al., 2009; Prokofieva and Gorriz, 2013; and 
Leonardi, 2015. 
 
Table 2. The theoretical framework for biodiversity market qualitative interviews. 
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POLICIES FOR BIODIVERSITY OFFSETTING 
 
This chapter aims to study the European Directives that are leading the 
development of a new type of environmental compensation scheme in the EU and 
presents the case of the legislations in Germany, the UK, France, Spain and Italy and 
their particular initiatives directed to develop a biodiversity banking-like scheme. 
First, this chapter aims to recognise the currently enforced EU legislations requiring 
environmental impacts compensation steps, second, study the Biodiversity and No 
Net Loss Strategy to identify the actions directing the development of a biodiversity 
offsetting mechanism, and third, to identify the country-level existing initiatives, their 
components and implementation features to analyze their similarity with a 
biodiversity banking scheme.  
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4.1. Notions of biodiversity offsetting in the EU policies 
 
The European Union has reflected its commitment to reduce the impact on the 
biodiversity values by the creation of the “EU Biodiversity Strategy 2020” and the “No 
Net Loss” strategy. The Biodiversity Strategy requires all Members States (MS) to carry 
out actions that contribute to halving the current rate of biodiversity loss, and by the 
year 2020 to reach the restoration of 15% of European degraded ecosystems (European 
Commission, 2012). These strategies propose a set of actions to MS to achieve a set of 
specific targets.  
 
The Strategy 2020 sets five targets being the target 1 and two the most outstanding for 
the development of biodiversity offsetting schemes in Europe. Target 1:“To halt the 
deterioration in the status of all species and habitats covered by the EU nature legislation and 
achieve a significant and measurable improvement in their status[…]”. And, Target 2: “By 2020, 
ecosystems and their services are maintained and enhanced by establishing green infrastructure 
and restoring at least 15% of degraded ecosystems.” (European Commission, 2011). Most 
importantly, the Strategy 2020 invites MS to develop new instruments to achieve NNL, as 
for instance the use of market-based instruments. Action 7 invites MS to ensure no net loss 
of biodiversity and ecosystem services through, for example, compensation or offsetting 
schemes (European Commission, 2011). There is also a clear evidence that the European 
Union is working on the development of new measures that might become the start of a 
mandatory Biodiversity Offsetting Scheme for the Members States, as this action 7 
mentions that the “Commission will carry out further work with a view to proposing an initiative 
to ensure there is no net loss of ecosystem and their services”.  
 
The principle of NNL is also endorsed by the European Birds Directive (79/109/EEC) 
and Habitats Directive 92/43/EEC. Article 6(3) of the Habitat Directive requires 
appropriate assessment of any plan or project likely to have a significant effect on a 
Natura 2000 site and the Art. 6(4) requires compensation for the development impacts 
considered to damage the ecological integrity of Natura 2000 sites, which are 
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considered essential for reasons of overriding public interest: “[…] the Member State 
shall take all compensatory measures necessary to ensure that the overall coherence of Natura 
2000 is protected. It  shall inform the Commission of the compensatory measures adopted.” 
 
Furthermore, the Wild Birds Directive requires the MS “preserve, maintain or re-
establish a sufficient diversity and area of habitats for all the species of birds” (Art. 3 
2009/147/EC) and “take appropriate steps to avoid pollution or deterioration of the habitats or 
any disturbances affecting the birds” in Special Protection Areas (SPA), but also outside 
the SPAs (Art. 4, 4 2009/147/EC). 
  
4.1.1 The role of the Environmental Impact Assessment 
 
The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is a procedure developed to evaluate 
the likely environmental impacts of a proposed project or development, taking into 
account beneficial and adverse inter-related socio-economic, cultural and human-
health impacts (CBD, 2013). It aims to predict environmental impacts at an early stage 
in the project planning and design, find ways and means to reduce adverse impacts, 
thus shaping the projects to suit the local environment and present the predictions and 
options to decision-makers (CBD, 2013). 
 
The EIA has being introduced for the first time in Europe with the Council Directive 
85/337/CEE5 and further amended three times in 19976, 2003, 2009 and finally codified 
by the Directive 2011/92/EU of 13 December 2011. The execution of the EIA is 
mandatory for all the development projects included in Annex I of the Directive (Art. 
4,1 2011/92/EU). And, if the project proposed is not in Annex I, the Article 4 [2] 
encourages the MS to determine in which circumstances a project shall be made 
                                                          
5 Directive 1985/337/CEE on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on 
the environment. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eia/full-legal-text/85337.htm    
6 Directive 1996/11/CEE regarding the Environmental Impact Assessment mandatory for the public 
and private projects included in Annex I. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eia/eia-
legalcontext.htm  
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subject to an EIA. In this way, MS have freedom of authority to enforce or not the 
legislation that would channalize environmental compensation. This freedom of 
authority means that the concept of compensation appears indirectly in the EIA. The 
Article 5, point 3 (b) of this Directive sustains that the Annex I projects may present 
planned measures that follow the mitigation hierarchy. Therefore, it is a choice to 
require compensation is not made mandatory (Pileri, 2007). 
 
The Action 19 of the Strategy 2020, a “Biodiversity proof” of the no net loss of 
biodiversity and ecosystem services, states: “The Commission will continue to 
systematically screen its development cooperation action to minimise any negative impact on 
biodiversity, and undertake Strategic Environmental Assessments and/or Environmental 
Impact Assessments for actions likely to have significant effects on biodiversity”. This action 
reflects the EU initiative to enforce the EIA to minimise all significant effects on 
biodiversity, yet, at present, the main issues to enforce a legislation towards NNL are 
related to the lack of 1) a decision-making framework to ensure degradation is avoided 
wherever possible before compensation is envisaged (2020 Biodiversity Strategy, 
Action 7, 7a). 2) An overall non-binding framework at EU level providing guidance 
and exchanges of best practices for MS who have adopted voluntary or mandatory 
biodiversity offset policies, and 3) an EU level legal framework for NNL of ecosystems, 
which could make some of the above elements mandatory (ICF GHK and BIO 
Intelligence, 2013): 
 
Moreover, in April 2012 the European Parliament adopted a resolution in which it 
states that it  “Urges the Commission to develop an effective regulatory framework based on 
the ‘No Net Loss’ initiative, taking into account the past experience of the Member States while 
also utilising the standards applied by the Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme; note, 
in this connection, the importance of applying such an approach to all EU habitats and species 
not covered by EU legislation”. With this, the Parlament admits the gap existing between 
the habitats and species that are currently covered by a compensation requirement but 
that are not filled to achieve NNL (ICF GHK and BIO Intelligence, 2013). 
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4.1.2 The role of the Strategic Environmental Assessment 
. 
After the first EIA Directive 85/337/CEE the European Parliament and Council 
presented the Directive 2001/42/CE on the assessment of the effects of certain plans 
and programmes on the environment7. With this Directive the commitments go from 
specific to more general aspects related to the projects listed in the EIA. The SEA 
Directive applies to a wide range of public plans and programmes, and not only single 
projects like land use change, transport planning, energy, waste, agriculture, etc. It 
does not refer to policies, neither provide a list of plans/programmes similar to the 
EIA, on the other hand, it provides a mandatory procedure that must be executed 
before taking the decision of executing plans and programs that (Pileri, 2007; 
European Commission, 2012):  
 
1) Are prepared for agriculture, forestry, fisheries, energy, industry, transport, 
waste/ water management, telecommunications, tourism, town & country 
planning or land use, and which set the framework for future development of 
projects listed in the EIA Directive; 
 
Or 
 
2) Have been determined to require an assessment under the Habitats Directive. 
 
Thus, SEA is a precautionary package to analyze the project and minimize their 
effect on the environment (Pileri, 2007; Mazzetti, 2006). Annex I of the 2001/42/CE 
(subsection g), that at the same time refers to the Article 5, Environmental Report, it is 
stated that compensation are “the measures envisaged to prevent, reduce and as fully as 
                                                          
7 Directive 2001/42/CE on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the 
environment. Available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:197:0030:0037:EN:PDF  
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possible offset any significant adverse effects on the environment of implementing the plan or 
programme”. 
 
Falter and Scheuer (2005) suggest that as the EIA, Strategic Impact Assessment 
(SIA) is strengthened in the Article 6 of the Habitats Directive since it provides the 
possibility to present the Commission with a complaint about real legal impacts. HD 
Article 6 (4) deals with offsets for the loss of habitats and species, by requiring 
compensatory measures and informing the European Commission of the measures 
taken. In the case of a site hosting a priority natural habitat type and/or a priority 
species, more stringent measures should apply, becoming the source of biodiversity 
offsets of projects and schemes (ICF GHK and BIO Intelligence, 2013). 
 
In conclusion, as stated by Pileri (2007), the SEA does not address the concept 
offsetting per se because it is an instrument that functions after a vast analysis of the 
environmental impacts, and in a broader extension, the biodiversity values that need 
to be compensated. Such compensation must then be carried out with the same 
territorial scale that the programme/plan developed.  
 
4.2 Country-level initiatives towards a biodiversity banking in the EU 
 
In Europe, each MS has developed its compensation mechanism, and furthermore, 
different regions within one country can also follow diverse schemes. This section 
presents the legislation and initiatives at country or region level proposed as a tool for 
biodiversity banking (BB) in the countries of Germany, France, the UK and Spain.  
 
Germany, the UK and France are the pioneers of BB in Europe before Spain and 
Italy (Chapter 9). In 1976, three years before the enforcement of the Wild Birds 
Directive (WBD), Germany and France had already introduced mandatory 
compensation requirements. 
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4.2.1 Germany  
 
In Germany, the Impact Mitigation Regulation (IMR), Eingriffsregelung, was 
defined in the Federal Nature Conservation Act (GFNCA) independently of the 
Habitats Directive requirements (Darbi et al., 2009). Later, in 1993, the IMR was 
integrated with the Federal Building and Spatial Planning regulations introducing a 
BB mechanism, so-called “compensation pools” (Flächenpools) associated with “eco-
account” (Öko-Konten). With the revision of the Nature Conservation Act in 2002, the 
German Federal States were empowered to introduce the eco-account for any impact 
under the IMR with the aim of providing areas for remediation in the urban 
environments (Naumann et al., 2008). Due to this absolute control by the public 
sector8, there is not a private commercial functioning market for biodiversity credits 
up till now, although some private investors commence exploring it (BSOE, 2015a).  
 
Recent data from the State of Bavaria registered over 2100 banking sites accounting 
for nearly 20,000 hectares of compensation and replacement areas9 (BSOE, 2015b). 
Definitely, the scheme has introduced a new concept of compensation, but there are 
still essential elements needing attention to improve the long-term achievements for 
conservation, e.i. the perpetuity concept, long-term monitoring, ecosystem values 
equivalence between credits and debits through suitable metrics (Wenden et al., 2005; 
Jessel et al., 2006; Madsen et al., 2010; and Madsen et al., 2011). 
 
4.2.2 The UK 
 
On the other hand, in the UK no additional mandatory compensation requirements 
have been enforced yet on top of the current WBD, HD and EIA Directives. 
Nonetheless, the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) 
commenced exploring BB as one way to achieve the set goals of biodiversity 
                                                          
8 80% of all banks in Germany as still controlled by the public sector (Froger et al., 2014).  
9 Bavaria conserved an average of 2600 ha of land in the form of land-pool annually between 2008 
and 2009 (Morandeau and Vilaysack, 2012; OECD, 2013) 
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conservation (DEFRA, 2011a) and to tackle further biodiversity loss (DEFRA, 2011b). 
The pilot metrics developed by the DEFRA and Natural England (2011) for accounting 
debits and credits, were tested in 6 pilot banking areas10 for two years (2012-2014). 
With this voluntary pilot experience, DEFRA and related NGOs and private 
companies looked forward the outcome of a more effective and coherent standardized 
compensation strategy, and to persuade the private sector and local governments of 
the overall advantages of implementing BB through the country.  
 
The two-year trial phase of BB in England have finished, and there has been limited 
information about the outcomes. According to an interim report to evaluate the pilot’s 
halfway results (CEPL and IEEP, 2013), there was a lack of developers involvement 
and interest to implement an offsetting project. After all the piloting period, it has not 
been published much official information about the outcomes. It is yet unclear if any 
integration of BB will occur in the UK, and how the experience will be useful to 
develop a more streamlined compensation process. 
 
Although the lack of mandatory offsetting voluntary compensations are occurring 
through private ecological consultancies. For example, Environment Bank is an English 
private company working on biodiversity compensation agreements for developers and 
landowners. Despite biodiversity offsetting has not been made mandatory, Environment 
Bank has made voluntary biodiversity offsets a reality in England (Environment Bank, 
2012). Over 25 Local Planning Authorities across 15 counties involved with over 60 live 
planning applications have created a partnership with Environment Bank to receive 
individual support and implement their biodiversity offsets through the model of the 
exchange of debits and credits into a biodiversity banking scheme.  The total credit sales 
of Environment Bank up to Spring 2016 brought €1.9 million to the rural economy in the 
counties of Essex, Cambridgeshire, Lancashire, Warwickshire and Oxfordshire.  
Environment Bank is helping small environmental impacts of low time, cost or 
environmentally effective compensation to be offset through habitat banks offering a 
                                                          
10 Piloting Banks and metrics information available at https://www.gov.uk/biodiversity-offsetting 
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higher economic and ecologically effective compensation delivered by large areas of 
habitat creation or restoration.  
 
4.2.3 France 
 
Another country exploring BB schemes is France. The French State introduced the 
concept of avoiding, reducing and offsetting into its environmental legislation in 1976 
with the Nature Protection Law (NPL, n° 76-629 of July 10th 1976) through the so-
called “séquence ERC”. Although for more than three decades the last step of the 
mitigation hierarchy remained neglected or “ill-applied” through the EIA (Quétier et 
al., 2014). Compensations started to become a binding element, at least on paper, in 
2007 when the EU Directives were transposed into the French laws. This requirement 
resulted from the amendments to the natural NPL at the end of the two consultative 
processes (with agencies and civil society participating in 2007 and 2009) that lead to 
two sets of reforms for impacts of development projects.  
 
In 2012, the French Environmental and Sustainable Development Ministry of the 
Environment (MEDDE) published guidelines (2012 b) on the use of BO after following 
modifications to the EIA and SEA (Decrees 2012-616 and 2012-995). The guidelines 
reiterate offsetting as a mechanism to achieve NNL through the ERC sequence policy 
(MEDDE, 2012a; and 2013). Although these principles, there is still little knowledge 
on the offsetting projects occurrence on the ground by private and public developers. 
This because the EIA application is derogated from the Environment Protection 
National Council to lower regional authorities, and even sometimes, to developers 
itself (Quétier et al., 2014). Consequently, different review teams are created (Cosnier, 
2013) deciding when and how to require an offset hindering the NNL achievement.  
 
In the light of learning from self-experiences, the MEDDE launched in 2008 the 
“biodiversity offset supply”, an experimental biodiversity bank scheme providing 
offset credits for habitat, species and ecosystem functions (Calvet et al., 2015) delivered 
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by public or private land. The French offset supply keeps developers responsible for 
the successful delivery of equitable compensation. Currently, the scheme has created 
one operating bank, the Cossure operation, implemented by the CDC Biodiversité11 in 
Southeastern France. The bank extends over 357 ha of previously commercial orchards 
and helps addressing several environmental and economic issues: 1) the restoration of 
low grassland vegetation habitat of native bird species in the corridor of the Réserve 
Naturelle des Coussouls de Crau, 2) to encourage land-use planning improvements 
(Froger, et al., 2014), and 3) provide experience on the enforcement of NNL policies.  
 
After more than 5 years of operation, the French first offset supply experiment has 
not been able to have enough credits demand. In 2011,  MEDDE initiated a 
participatory process asking for proposal that should result in the launch of four more 
banks to get involved more landowners and developers (Froger, 2014). However, to 
date no more banks have been established and Cossure operation has offset a limited 
number of mostly private projects,  because the lack of specific guidelines directing 
developers to acquire credits, the lack of incentives for landowners to create more 
banks, and hence, to be able to offer a wider variety of credit types supplied by 
different ecosystems.  
 
4.2.4 Spain 
 
As a response of the foreseen adaptive mechanism of the European Union on 
environmental impacts compensation, Spain has amended its Environmental 
Evaluation Law of 1988 (today 21/2013) to set the floor for BB development and 
implementation. This law now includes an additional disposition on BB (disposition 
8 [4]) as a legal offsetting alternative by the acquisition of ‘conservation credits’ 
recognized by the Agriculture, Food and Environmental Ministry (BOE, 2013). Such 
                                                          
11CDC Biodiversité is the first biodiversity offsetting financial operator of biodiversity conservation. 
It was created in February 2008 as subsidiary of the French financial organization Caisse des Dépôts 
et Consignations (1816) (Froger et al., 2014). 
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credits would be voluntarily generated by landowners creating a biodiversity bank 
according with a set of rules yet to be published by the Environmental Ministry. 
 
ECO@CSA is a private company founded in 2012 with the idea of starting 
Biodiversity Banking to protect biodiversity and reward local landowners of Spain 
for their environmental sustainable practices delivering ES. The model of 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has inspired ECO@CSA founders to offer 
developers green alternatives to compensate for their residual environmental 
impacts. Despite the government initiatives to incorporate the offsetting 
alternative in the Environmental Evaluation Law 21/2013, the lack of official 
guidelines and the current Spanish political environment have hindered the 
launch of biodiversity banking. In July 2016, the Extremadura Region expressed 
ECO@CSA their interest to plan a Regional Conservation Bank scheme. 
Extremadura is the 5th Region with more forest land and 30% of the total protected 
areas of Spain and one of the most advances Regions on environmental 
regulations. The advice of ECO@CSA to prepare a BB in Extremadura can become 
the milestone of BB in Spain and offer empirical experience on developing and 
implementing BB that can be further used by the National Environmental 
Ministry. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
OFFSETTING VALUATION METHODS: THE METRICS 
 
This chapter first explains what are the metrics and their role in biodiversity 
offsetting. Then it presents the current applied methodologies used to assess 
environmental impacts and to design biodiversity offsets, like Habitat Equivalence 
Analysis and other different metrics used in the English, Australian and American 
offsetting schemes. Finally, this chapter analyses the metrics dilemma to understand 
the difficulties of creating the basis of a new proposal for biodiversity offsetting and 
presents an adaptation of a metrics for the ecosystems in Italy and its application in an 
empirical case study of a development project in Northern Italy (Chapter 6).  
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5.1 Metrics in biodiversity banking 
 
As seen in Chapter 2, Biodiversity Banking (BB) is a market-based mechanism 
where biodiversity credits are traded as a form of environmental compensation of 
impacts derived from development projects. Such credits are a measurement unit of 
the ecosystem services (ES) lost due to a development project (also called debits) that 
ideally will be compensated by equitable ES-derived from an offsetting project 
(credits), or a biodiversity bank also measured in that same credit unit. The difficulty 
in capturing all the ES traded means that the ecosystem itself is not a tradable market 
commodity, hence the need for proxies, metrics, to assess the ES into a standard unit 
of measurement, called ‘credits’ (Bull, et al., 2013). 
 
The metrics are also identified as the ‘currency’ of biodiversity banking that allows 
comparing credits and debits. These metrics are in essence ecological proxies can be 
divided in direct such as a set number of individuals of a particular bird or mammal 
species, or indirect, as a surrogate of measures like the measure of habitat area, 
structure or complexity, or viability of the species of conservation concern. 
Consecutively, those can be aggregated measures that combine area and condition of 
habitat; or disaggregated such are the area of a particular habitat. 
 
Choosing the metrics methodology and developing one is a crucial step in the 
design of a single biodiversity offset or a biodiversity banking scheme. The use of 
certain metrics depends for example on the availability of real biodiversity data and 
knowledge of the ecological context at the scale of the offset impact (local, regional or 
site-level, i.e.) (BBOP, 2012). This chapter presents different environmental impacts 
assessing methodologies and finalize by proposing a metrics to assess impacts and 
design offsets in Italy. 
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5.2 Resource-based equivalence approaches 
 
In the USA non-market valuation methods as travel cost, hedonic, contingent 
valuation and conjoint analysis (choice modeling) are often used to assess the 
compensation measures cost. These methods are value-to-cost equivalency 
approaches where the value of damage is used to design the remediation. Because the 
difficulties related with these non-market valuation approach (value-to-cost), another 
kind of procedures based on the assessment of the impact resources were developed 
in the USA under the Natural Resource Equivalency Analysis (NREA) (NOAA, 1996; 
NOAA, 2000) and started to be applied in cases of environmental damage. 
  
Traditionally, the interim and permanent losses are compensated after the 
development project is finished12 similarly as if it was a compensation for 
environmental damage. However, the BO goal is NNL through complementary and 
compensatory remediation measures (hereafter referred as the offsetting project) to 
offset unavoidable residual impacts of development projects (Chapter 2, section 2.1). 
In other words, residual impacts were, and sometimes still are, addressed by ex-post 
compensatory remediation measures, which are often designed by the application of 
damage compensation approaches as value-based equivalence methods and resource-
based equivalence analysis. 
 
The value-based equivalence methods are value-to-cost methods that assess the 
cost of the damage by using economic approaches as the Contingent Valuation and 
Travel Cost Method (Mitchell & Carson, 1989; Louviere, et al., 2000; Martin-ortega et 
al., 2011). On the other hand, the resource-based equivalence analysis aims to in-kind 
compensation, i.e. service-to-service compensation. This means that the ES and 
functions lost should be compensated with the same or similar ES and ecosystem 
                                                          
12 Several case-studies and pilot projects around the world have compensated their impacts after 
the project is finished, i.e. the case of Anglo Platinum. 2009. BBOP Pilot Project Case Study. 
Potgietersrust Platinums Limited (PPRust). Johannesburg, South Africa. www.forest-
trends.org/biodiversityoffsetprogram/guidelines/angloamerican-case-study.pdf 
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functions. ES can be fishing, hunting, boating, hiking, bird watching, flood control, 
shoreline storm protection, and enjoyment of a healthy and function natural 
environment. While, ecosystem functions are the services delivered to ecosystems and 
other ecological resources, including habitat for food, shelter, and reproduction; 
organic carbon and nutrient transfer, biodiversity and maintenance of the gene pool 
(eftec-IEEP et. al, 2010).  
 
As stated in the European Environmental Liability Directive, the resource based 
compensatory measures are preferred (ELD 2004/35/E Annex II 1.2.2 and 1.2.3) rather 
than the value-based equivalence methods because they avoid assessing the value 
people give to a given environmental site and quantify it in economic value, i.e. avoids 
giving a monetary value to nature. Flores & Thacher (2002) have discussed and 
suggested some advantages of the resource-based equivalence analysis as 1) it 
eliminates the problem of assessing the passive use values and non-use values 
paradigm (the example of the Exxon Valdez Oil spill damage assessment, Carson, et 
al., 2003). 2) Eliminates the ignorance/unknown value perceived from people to 
unfamiliar injured sites (Dumax & Rozan, 2011). 3) It allows reaching a better 
equivalence of the damaged environment since the compensation is estimated 
considering the level of the natural resources and services injured or lost by the 
incorporation of biophysical indicators (Martin Ortega et al., 2011). 4) It facilitates the 
legal procedure of environmental damage since the resource-based methods are 
preferred by the authorities (ELD 2004/35/E Annex II; NOAA, 1997; Thompson, 2002; 
Thur, 2007) 
 
The resources-based equivalence methods commonly applied to provide in-kind 
compensation are the Habitat Equivalence Procedure, HEP; Habitat Equivalence 
Analysis, HEA, and the Resource Equivalence Analysis, REA13 (Penn & Tomasi, 2002; 
Dunford et al., 2004; Tanaka, 2008; Dumax & Rozan, 2011). The main difference 
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between HEP and HEA is the availability of data regarding the environmental impact. 
HEP calculates the compensation measures based on a hypothetical, or sometimes 
assessed by the EIA, environmental impacts of the development project, as it aims to 
scale compensation for future LUC due to development projects. While HEA, uses the 
data of the actual environmental impact as this method is often used on compensation 
after the impacts are made, i.e. environmental damage. On the other hand, the 
difference between REA and HEA is that the HEA assess only the habitat, while the 
REA includes all kinds of natural resources, as for example the number birds or sea 
turtles that were lost due to the impacts (Zafonte & Hampton, 2007). This chapter 
explores the applicability of HEA in the assessment of LUC related impacts through 
the identification of the ES delivered by the injured habitats (see also section 5.2.2). 
 
5.2.1 Habitat Equivalence Procedure  
 
Habitat Equivalence Procedure (HEP) (USFWS, 1980) is a resource-based valuation 
method, (Schamberger & Krohn, 1982) that bases the environmental impacts 
estimation on hypothetical compensation (Dumax & Rozan, 2011). The HEP aims to 
calculate ex-ante the scale of off-site compensation measures when the initial state of 
nature is known but the final environmental condition after the development shall still 
be predicted. As stated by Tanaka (2008) “HEP is not a technique of absolute evaluation, 
but a technique for comparatively evaluating alternatives”.  
 
Habitat Evaluation Procedure was developed in the United States to be used in the 
wetland mitigation banking system to achieve the NNL criteria. HEP measures the 
exact extent of the off-site compensatory measures using the actual site’s information 
(status of the receptor habitat) where compensatory measures are going to occur. 
 
The application of HEP can be divided into three steps: 1) Estimating the 
environmental impact that the development project would induce by executing an 
EIA. If the EIA has not been completed, then HEP can help comparing different 
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scenarios of environmental impacts (Tanaka, 2008). 2) Identifying the “ideal” 
compensatory/complementary remediation measures, i.e. measures that would 
adequately compensate the impacts if they were really implemented, and that is the 
biodiversity offset project. And 3) Evaluating the cost of the 
compensatory/complementary project following economic methods of monetization 
(Dumax & Rozan, 2011). 
 
The applicability of HEP gains reliable importance in the calculation of 
compensation measures of unfamiliar sites to society that will be subject to a LUC, i.e. 
ecological environments of fundamental importance unknown or poorly known for 
society. Thus, the premise of HEP is that environmental impacts over unfamiliar sites 
are more accurately estimated by using ecological information, rather than 
information collected by stated and/or revealed preferences economic methods.  
 
The published HEP by USFWs in 1980 is a species-habitat approach for impact 
assessment with the fundamental assumption that habitat quality and quantity can be 
numerically described and that species can be proxies of habitat quality. Dumax and 
Rozan (2011) adapted the original HEP by adding one step14 and converting it into an 
economic valuation method with ecological data as input. Both the original and the 
adapted HEP are used to calculate the optimal size of the compensation area based in 
the predicted impacts over the natural resources/services. It uses ecological data to 
calculate the area, in Habitat Units15 (HU) predicted to be lost in consequence of the 
development project, and compares it with the HU that can be created to compensate 
such loss by considering hypothetical compensation measures planned to be carried 
out in a selected candidate area. The last result is therefore, the area (in physical units) 
needed to compensate the predicted impacts. 
                                                          
14 The “adapted HEP” of Dumax and Rozan (2011) also uses flora and fauna species rather than 
only flora as in the original method.  
15 The Habitat Units (HU) resultant of the HEP is equivalent to one credit tradable in the market-
based mechanism of Biodiversity Banking. 
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5.2.2 Habitat Equivalence Analysis 
 
Habitat Equivalence Analysis (HEA) was developed in early 1990’s under the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) of the United States, as a 
methodology used to design compensatory restoration measurements in the 
framework of oils spills following the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. HEA quantifies the 
natural resources lost within a Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) and 
calculates the scale (magnitude) of the offsetting (compensatory and complementary 
actions) of the services lost. The cost of the resulted restoration project by the 
application of HEA becomes the measure of the damage (Zafonte & Hampton, 2009). 
 
By the mid-1990s the HEA began to be applied in the USA to more difficult damage 
cases when for example the baseline was unknown, the harm was not clearly, or it 
eliminated the habitat features by physical damage (Chapman & LeJeune, 2007). As 
the use of HEA expanded, cases arose where the damage was better measured in 
numbers of individuals lost, such as birds or fish, than in habitat units (i.e., area). In 
such cases, the remediation was scaled to provide equivalent numbers of replacement 
individuals, on the theory that the replaced individuals would compensate fully for 
the lost services. This application of resource-to-resource scaling came to be called 
Resource Equivalency Analysis (REA). The methods of REA are fundamentally the 
same as for HEA, but the units of quantification differ (eftec-IEEP et. al, 2010). 
 
The application of the HEA consideres three different options for delivering 
compensation: 1) ‘in kind no-trade-off goal’, where identical type of the services must 
be given back by the same natural providers (i.e. species, resources); 2) ‘traded in kind 
goal’, in which the services deliver the same functions but are being generated by 
different providers (i.e. different species or resources, of example water protection 
coming from forest with different tree species); 3) ‘cross habitat goal’, when different 
services are being provided with diverse natural functions and being delivered by 
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different natural providers as long as a ratio is defined between the new services and 
the lost ones (Dumax & Rozan, 2011) 
 
The HEA scales the magnitude of the compensation measures by using the 
following formula (NOAA, 2006; Defrancesco et al., 2014):  
 
         (Equation 1) 
 
Where: 
J , is the number of units of the impacted area (e.g. ha or acres) 
Vj, is the service(s) provided by the impacted area in units of value per year  
P, is the number of offsetting units (in the unit of discounted service-area-year) 
r, is the social discount rate. This is used to compare the cost and benefits received by 
the offsetting actions at differents points in time 
m, is the year when the offsetting project starts to provide services 
n, is the year when the offsetting project reaches the maximum possible level of 
provided services for the first time 
Vp, is the number of units (area) where the offsetting project is providing services per 
year  
bj, is the services baseline provided by the impacted area 
xt j, is a number of services provided per unit of the impacted area at time t 
bp, is the initial level of services delivered by the offsetting site 
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xt p, is the level of services delivered per unit of the offsetting site  
l, is the time when the offsetting project provides the maximum level of services in 
perpetuity.  
  
In the ex-post calculation of the compensatory remedial measures, the HEA is 
usually the methodology applied (Penn & Tomasi, 2002; Dunford et al, 2004; Tanaka, 
2008; Dumax & Rozan, 2011). Nonetheless, the advantages found in this method, 
criticisms and doubts have arisen regarding the liability to calculate the equivalent 
size of the compensatory remedial measure for the environmental damage in question 
(Dunford et al., 2004; Zafonte & Hampton, 2007).  
 
As analyzed by Dunford et al. (2004) HEA has several assumptions that make this 
method very sensitive and not a robust method to design compensation projects. 
According to Dunford et al. (2004) the fundamental assumptions of the HEA are: 1) it 
uses one single metric to measure the ecological services provided by the injured 
habitat and the restoration habitat, even when the method is applied to habitats with 
equating services of different type and quality (e.g. bottom sediments Vs. wetland); 2) 
it fixes the same proportion of monetary value of the habitat services to the habitat 
services level; 3) it gives constant and permanent monetary value to one unit of habitat 
service (e.g. one acre of wetland); 4) it gives same value to the injured service and the 
services created by the scaled compensation project (Vj/Vp =1); 5) it gives a fix 
discounting rate (r) to the value of the scaled serviced delivered by the compensation, 
all along the compensation project lifetime; and 6) it sets the same time profile for the 
recovery of the different environmental services injured at different extents and 
magnitudes. 
 
Although the Dunford et al. (2004) have recognised the above as HEA’s “weak 
points” because they represent a “deviation to reality” of the compensation project, 
the HEA application is still widely used to assess the sum of compensations for 
Chapter 5__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
environmental damage. HEA helps to assess suitable settlements when applied under 
the following circumstances, as concluded by Dunford et. Al (2004): a) there is just one 
contaminant or source of injury; b) the injury is relatively short and occurs in a 
relatively short and medium-term length; c) there is good baseline information for the 
services of the injured habitat; d) only one service has been affected; e) similar habitat 
service can be created or enhanced nearby as a compensation; g) there is a relatively 
short and relatively certain compensatory-restoration period. 
 
The consideration of welfare and heterogeneity of social preferences are more 
difficult to be included in the HEA. This issue is still a matter of study (Flores 
&Thacher, 2002; Zafonte & Hampton, 2007; Martin-ortega et al., 2011; Quétier & 
Lavorel, 2011) and future work is still needed to analyze the level of applicability of 
value-based methods as choice experiment and benefit transfer to be incorporated in 
the HEA.  
 
Besides the HEA’s limitations to address compensation for environmental 
damage, it also has limited applicability in the field of biodiversity offsetting. More 
specifically, HEA has limited application in the task of assessing credits and debits for 
a market-based mechanism due to the high sensibility of the method related to: 1) a 
number of habitat services equal to the monetary value of the habitat service, so if the 
habitat services decrease the value of the habitat also would decrease in the same 
amount. 2) The oversimplification of using one single metric to assess the injured and 
compensated habitats, which becomes very important when dealing with complex 
habitats as coastal habitats. 3) The assumption that the injured services and 
compensatory services are the same type and quality. 4) The uncertainty in the time 
needed for the compensation to deliver the expected ES and the assumption that those 
services will be delivered at their maximum value in perpetuity (NOAA, 2006) These 
assumptions can become an issue in some cases and increase the uncertainty to the 
calculated compensation for the injured habitats. For these reasons, the Habitat 
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Equivalence Procedure (HEP) has been widely applied in the field of biodiversity 
compensation even though the HEA is a newer methodology.  
 
5.2.2.1 HEP application example: analysis and discussion of limits and opportunities 
 
An infrastructure development project realized in the coastal Adriatic area at the 
Northeast Italy (2010) has been taken as a case study for applying the HEP. The area 
selected for the project is considered unfamiliar since it’s not directly used by the near 
inhabitants neither visitors, making the compensation case suitable for the application 
of the HEP. Furthermore, the present case provides detailed ecological data to be used 
for calculating the target16 compensation related to the project’s impacts, since HEP is 
a strong ecological data based compensation valuation method. Lastly, the present 
infrastructure project gives us the opportunity of comparing the HEP outcome with 
the real compensation measures taken in place, contributing to the study and analysis 
of HEP’s applicability for future works in the field of ex-ante compensations. 
 
In this case-study, it is known that for the infrastructure construction three 
ecological areas of a total surface of 88456 m2 were identified after the Evaluation 
Impact Assessment (EIA). In those zones, 2110 trees of 24 different protected flora 
species and diverse sizes and ages were cut. Now, to know what is the target 
compensation measure needed to equitably giving back the environmental values we 
applied the HEP following the further steps: 1) calculation of the baseline condition in 
Habitat Units, 2) calculation of the future condition and net impact in Habitat Units, 
3) identification of losses, target species and compensation goal, 4) selection of a 
candidate compensation area, 5) calculation of the Habitat Units for future conditions 
                                                          
16 Target outcome means the best compensation measures from HEP accordingly to the input 
parameters it requires for calculation to be done, but this procedure it is not the only one that can 
be used for such calculation. Likewise, other methods as the HEA also offer and a methodology to 
calculate the optimal compensation for a given environmental impacts. Thus, the target 
compensation expresses this is for this method the best compensation measure calculated, but it 
doesn’t mean that over all other methodological possibilities be the only compensation calculated 
as the best.  
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without management, 7) selection of management alternatives, 8) calculation of the 
Habitat Units for future conditions with management actions, 9) assessing the suitable 
area for the “ideal” compensatory mitigation measures, and finally 10) estimation of 
the environmental cost. 
 
Baseline condition in Habitat Units 
 
Following the steps of the “adapted HEP” (Dumax and Rozan; 2011), it is necessary 
at first identify the delineation of the study area and ecological features to select the 
evaluation species (indicator species) that allow estimating the baseline condition of the 
areas that are expected to have changes in their biological conditions due to the 
development project.  
 
The three injured areas have different species presence offering similar ecological 
services with a density expressed in 42 tree per every 200 m2. Table 5 presents the 
ecological features of the three areas and the evaluation species we have selected from 
the data collected (Table 5.), we have followed the Russell et al. (1980) method to 
calculate the Total Habitat Units (THU) of the baseline are 7104.72. 
 
Table 4. Linking ecosystem services, area types, evaluation species and calculation of 
Baselines Total Habitat Units. 
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1 The tree density of the areas was assumed to be equal to the annex areas reported to have 42 tree every 
200 m2. 
2 Habitat Sustainability Index (HSI) was calculated using the area density divided by the maximum area 
density following the model of Russell et al. (1980). We have assumed the maximum density area to be 
0.25 as indicated to be the expected recovery in the damage compensation measures report. 
3 The HU is calculated by the multiplication of the area (in m2) by the HSI value. 
 
Future condition and net impact in Habitat Units 
 
The estimation of the area future condition area after the occurrence of the 
predicted impacts was assumed to be equal to the real environmental damage of the 
areas. This is based on the hypothesis that if a development project was conducted on 
the site, all the area would be lost. Thus, the resultant affected area in HU is equal to 
our estimated baseline. Another way to explain that the hypothesis applies to this case 
is by considering that all the trees would be cut in our hypothetical development 
project, the resultant density will be nule and whereby also the HSI. In conclusion, the 
net impact of the net impact is equal to 7104.72 HU. 
 
Identification of losses, target species and compensation goal  
 
In the hypothetical case that all the areas will be lost because of the development 
project, and considering that the compensation goal is to have back the same level of 
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services (relative replacement objective), the selected target species17 (Table 2) are going 
to be different from the evaluation species considered selected for the baseline 
conditions. This is in line with our damage case study, where additional species were 
used to compensate the losses.  
 
Habitat Units for the future condition without considering management 
 
We have first considered the candidate compensation area to be 4630 m2, as this 
was the available zone where the real case study compensation measures were placed. 
Then, the calculation of the correspondent HU was computed considering the HIS to 
be different from the lost areas’ HSI. In the lost areas, the density was 0.21 tree/m2, 
while in the proposed compensation area we have assumed it to be 0.105 (the 50% of 
the lost area density) due to their degradation conditions. Thus, it is obtained that the 
candidate area without interventions is equivalent to 1944.60 HU. Such figures 
indicate that a bigger area would be needed to equivalently compensate the 7104.72 
HU of net impact, or that much effort should be done on implementing management 
activities to increase Habitat Units of the candidate area. 
 
Habitat Units for the future conditions with management 
 
Reforestation is planned to be carried out in the candidate compensation area. As 
in the lost areas, three different portion of land were individuated to be enhanced for 
creating habitat ecologically similar in terms of offered quantity of services. Since the 
reforestation will increase the tree density, our calculations of HU resulted from the 
“enhanced candidate area” consider 0.25 trees/m2 for both, the maximum density and 
the target density at the area. With this information, it was obtained that the candidate 
                                                          
17 Species identified to be the indicator of the level of gained services equivalent to the losses. This 
species can be a) identical to the evaluation species- when considering in kind no-trade-off goal of 
the compensation measurements, 2) different species- whenever an equal replacement objective is 
selected to have the same services, 3) different species- whenever a relative replacement objective 
is selected to provide different services as long as a ratio is defined between services (Duxman & 
Rozan, 2011) 
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compensation area offers 4630 HU. This is 2685.4 HU more than the candidate zone 
without the interventions. Table 5 resumes all the ecological information of the 
subdivided compensation area and the results of its equivalent HU.  
 
Even if a considerable number of HU has been gained after comparing the 
candidate area with or without management, still the HU of the net impact (7104.72 
HU) is greater than the HU calculated (4630 HU) for the “enhanced candidate area” 
(with the management actions of reforestation).  Therefore, there are 2474.72 HU that 
would not compensate if the candidate compensation area is not enlarged., or another 
additional complementing area is considered. 
 
Table 5. Linking ecosystem services, area types, evaluation species and calculation of 
Total Habitat Units of compensation areas future conditions. 
1 The tree density of the areas was assumed to be equal to the annex areas reported to have 42 tree every 
200 m2. 
2 Habitat Sustainability Index (HSI) was calculated using the area density divided by the maximum area 
density following the model of Russell et al. (1980). We have assumed the maximum density area to be 
0.25 as indicated to be the expected recovery in the damage compensation measures report. 
3 The HU is calculated by the multiplication of the area (in m2) by the HSI value. 
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Target compensatory mitigation measures  
 
A candidate compensation area of 4630 m2 is not sufficient to offer a proper 
compensation for the net impact on the original habitat of 8456 m2. Thus, there is the 
need to know what extension of the area would equitably give the target compensation 
to the net impact. The optimal size of the compensation area (equation 2) is then 
8717.48 m2. 
 
𝒁𝑪 = −𝑨(
∑ 𝑰𝒊
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏
∑ 𝑴𝒊
𝒏
𝒊
)            (Equation 2) 
 
Where: 
 
ZC, optimal size of compensation area (physical units) 
A, candidate area size (physical units) 
I, habitat unit losses for the evaluation species i 
M, habitat units gained after the management of the candidate area for all the target 
species i 
n, total number of identified species, either target or evaluation species 
 
Environmental cost  
 
Given the optimal size of the compensation area, 8717.48 m2, the last step of the 
HEP is the estimation of the environmental cost based on the estimated cost of 
implementing the management actions that would equitably compensate for the 
natural resources/services lost (net impact).  
The compensation measurements carried out in our coastal damage case study 
consider the reforestation of 4630 m2 of similar areas near the damaged zone. The 
average cost of the reforestation measures per m2 was calculated in 7.06 Euros; this 
gives a total compensation cost of 32 687.80 Euros.  
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Taken the optimal size of compensation area resulted from applying the HEP to 
our hypothesis of environmental impacts on the same coastal habitat in consequence 
on an assumed environmental project that would destroy the entire area, we know the 
compensation area would need to be 8717.48 m2. To estimate the environmental cost 
based in the assumption it equals the cost of the target compensation measures it is 
necessary to consider: planning and designing, environmental impact assessment, 
permits request, construction and/ or execution of the complementary/compensatory 
measures (including land purchase), monitoring and mid-course corrections (Dumax 
& Rozan, 2011). 
 
Keeping the same price of reforestation actions as 7.06 Euros/m2, the cost of the 
reforestation would be 61 545.41 Euros. Also, considering that the rest of the cost 
calculated in our case study is given by the cost of planning and design, 8 808.80 Euros; 
land purchase (50 Euros/m2) 435 874.00 Euros; permits and security work 
measurements 35 129.18.00 Euros; taxes (21%) 20 124.53 euros; and mid-course 
corrections 10 516.78 Euros, the total environmental cost is 571 998.70 Euros. 
 
Per the HEP results for the coastal damage case study, the reforestation of 4630 m2 
of coastal land was not sufficient to compensate for the lost areas. The compensation 
area of 8717.48 m2 would then equitably compensate the net impact. Consequently, 
the scale and cost of the compensation measures differ considerably. By applying the 
compensation measure obtained from HEP would secure the environmental 
compensation of the unfamiliar site, since the method is strongly ecology-based. 
However, several issues of this method are still in debate and need further 
investigation.  
It is worth to mention that the considerable difference between the compensation 
project scale obtained by HEP and the real compensation of our case study is mainly 
due to the differences in the methodologies used. The valuation method followed by 
the Italian local authorities was a hybrid monetary-resource based valuation method 
developed exclusively for the occurred damage. According to their experience and the 
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Italian Environmental Impact Assessment Law art. 32 (VIA della L.R. 8 Settembre 
1997), the Environmental Regulations (Legge 3 Aprile 2006 No.152) and the Internal 
Regulations of the Protected Area where the damage occurred, the authorities decided 
to focus the estimation of the compensation measurements in the amount of money 
the responsible enterprise had to pay and the possible environmental enhancements 
it could carry out as compensation. 
 
In conclusion, the application of the Habitat Equivalence Procedure seems to be a 
promising environmental-ecological-based method to compensate environmental 
impact of unfamiliar sites where value-to-cost methods (as revealed and stated 
preferences) may have limited applicability. Additionally, it may help authorities to 
follow straightforward procedures. On the other hand, more efforts are needed to 
adequate the methodology when applying it to ex-ante compensation measures of 
development projects. We agree with Dumax and Rozan (2011) that additional 
economic methods, more species indicators and better HSI models may make the HEP 
more suitable to apply for scaling compensatory environmental measures.  
 
5.3 Simplifying the habitat equivalence methods into an offsetting calculation 
methodology 
 
Today, with the worldwide current application of offsetting, there is not a unique 
methodology to calculate the debits and credits of an offsetting scheme. For example, 
Germany uses the eco-scores (Ökopunkte) procedure (Naumann, et al., 2008), the State 
of Victoria in Australia uses the habitat hectares approach (McCarthy, et al., 2004), 
while the State of New South Wales uses the BioBanking Assessment Methodology 
(DECC NSW, 2007), etc.  
 
In this section, some of the different approaches to calculate debits and credits are 
revised to analyze the differences in the methodologies used in Germany, Australia, 
and England to scale offsetting projects.  
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5.3.1 German eco-score approach 
 
The German eco-score approach is based in the so-called ‘biotope value’ 
procedure. In this context, biotopo refers to the habitat types defined in each German 
Federal State’s List of Biotopes (Biotoptypenlisten)18. The eco-score method relies on the 
biotope types as indicators for complex ecosystem situations to quantify the debits 
considering the state of the biotope impacted. Thus, biotope quality is evaluated on 
the basis of validated (scored) biotope lists available for each German Federal State. 
These lists are state-wide biotope maps and are supplemented with specific guidelines 
that allow qualifying the biotope status considering biotic and abiotic factors as 
metrics (Naumann, et al., 2008).  
 
The eco-score approach allocates ‘points’ to biotopes according to their ‘ecological 
value’(Quétier & Lavorel, 2011). However, the eco-scores are not designed to account 
for full ecological equivalency since the scores do not take into consideration 
variations within a biotope, like location and connectivity, or presence variations of 
some species or ecosystem-ecological status (Quétier & Lavorel, 2011).  
 
In Germany, the HEA is used in offsets compensation for rare habitats or high-
value habitats affected by the impacts of development projects. The HEA provides in 
these cases a more detailed and accurate calculation of debits and credits because it 
considers more detailed data about the habitat’s baseline, services loss and presented 
a number of species (Naumann, et al., 2008). 
 
5.3.2 Australian habitat hectare approach 
 
The Victorian Department of Natural Resources and Environment in Australia has 
developed the Habitat Hectares Approach (HHA) as a methodology for assessing the 
quality of native vegetation (Parkes, et al., 2003; McCarthy, et al., 2004; Quétier & 
                                                          
18 See the definition at: http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Biotope.html 
Chapter 5__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Lavorel, 2011). This approach claims to be rapid, objective, reliable and reputable to 
measure the ‘naturalness’ of a habitat as an indicator of its quality for a broad range of 
species of sites with low-quality vegetation. In this manner, different sites with low-
quality vegetation types can be compared based on a single metric identified as the 
‘naturalness’ (McCarthy, et al., 2004).  
 
In reality, the Australian HHA uses a set of indicators that describe the site 
condition (as the species composition, potential to provide a habitat for species 
through time, invasive species, etc.) and its landscape context. These indicators are 
weighted and combined into a habitat score. Then the habitat score multiplies the site 
area resulting in a habitat unit that can be used to compare debits and credits. Also, 
the HHA uses reference areas of ‘natural’ and ‘undisturbed’ condition of the same 
ecosystem type, called ‘benchmarks’, for evaluating biodiversity losses and gains. The 
HHA focuses on comparing the habitat status and species presence of the benchmark 
against the impacted site or the offsetting receptor site. When the benchmark is a better 
condition that the studied site, there has been an environmental loss in the site under 
study, and when this latter is in a better ecological condition compared with the 
reference site, there has been an environmental gain. In this way, benchmarks help to 
assess environmental losses and gains due to their specificity to each vegetation type 
in each biogeographic region (Parkes, et al., 2003).  
 
As all assessing methods, the HHA also has some weaknesses related to the 
measurement of the habitat attributes because of their comparison with a single 
benchmark. The uncertainty about the management contexts in which the method can 
be used, limit the method robustness to assess the losses and gains (McCarthy, et al., 
2004). In this sense, HHA can be complemented using a sort of index of conservation 
signiﬁcance (at a regional level) to generate a Biodiversity Beneﬁts Index (BBI). The 
regional conservation signiﬁcance is one way to deﬁne the area within which offsets 
must be implemented, together with considerations relating to i.e. species’ mobility or 
ecosystem services’ receptivity (Quétier & Lavorel, 2011).  
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5.3.3 English habitat hectare approach 
 
In 2012 the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs in partnership 
with the UK’s government's advisor for natural environment, Natural England, 
started a pilot scheme for biodiversity offsetting. Six sites were chosen to implement 
conservation measures that deliver biodiversity benefits in order to pilot the 
applicability of habitat equivalency methodology that sustains an offsetting scheme. 
 
The methodology applied in the piloting areas follow the methodology developed 
by DEFRA (2012) that is presented in detail in this section. 
 
5.3.3.1 Calculation of the debits and credits 
 
Similarly to the Habitat Hectare Approach, DEFRA’s methodology calculates the 
debits and credits of the impacts and offsets, by weighting the two features of the 
habitat under study referred as habitat’s ‘distinctiveness’ and ‘condition’. The 
distinctiveness refers to the habitat’s species richness, diversity, rarity (at local, 
regional, national and international scales) and the degree to which a habitat supports 
species rarely found in other habitats (DEFRA, 2011b). The designation of the habitat 
distinctiveness level is given by considering the UK Biological Action Plan and the 
Annex 1 of habitat categories, EU Habitat Directive, and the ‘technotope’ of Kyläkorpi 
et al. (2005). On the other side, the condition relates to the site’s management plan, 
which in the UK is given by the Biological Action Plan and the Handbook of Higher 
Level Agri-environmental scheme for farms Environmental Plan (DEFRA, 2011b). 
 
The combination of the distinctiveness and the habitat condition results in an 
offsetting metric identified as ‘habitat hectares unit’ (Table 6) that identifies a 
determined area of equal ecological type established by the type of habitat, species 
presence and habitat condition. If a large area of land has different types of condition 
or distinctiveness, it should be divided considering the proportion of that area that 
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shares same habitat type and ecological condition, specifically same distinctiveness 
and condition, to set one single value of ‘habitat hectares unit’ per each of the 
subdivisions found.  
 
The offset metric can be used straightforward to assess the impact on biodiversity 
at a development site, i.e. the debits of the total area of habitats lost by multiplying the 
‘habitat hectare unit’ of the site by the number of hectares identified with the 
distinctiveness and condition that resulted in that habitat hectare unit. While, when 
used to assess the credits of a site that will deliver ES as a biodiversity offset, a two-
stage approach is applied. Firstly, the current status of the offset receptor area is 
calculated in habitat hectares before any enhancement, creation or other type of 
management measures occur. Then, the credits are calculated in habitat hectares when 
the receptor site has been managed, and its ecological condition has improved. The 
value of the generated credits is the difference between the baseline biodiversity value 
of the site and its value after enhancement (Pearce, 2013).  
 
Note that this habitat hectare metric is based on habitats total biodiversity and 
condition. Therefore the credits calculation do not appropriately reflects any specific 
species status. Instead, the assessment for each hectare of habitat represents a proxy 
for the value of all the biodiversity it contains or which it may support. However, for 
individual species, other resource-based methods can be used or developed to 
incorporate the status of a particular species alongside offset when necessary (Pearce, 
2013). Also, is worth mentioning that according to DEFRA (2012) the use of this metric 
is not suitable for calculating debits and credits of hedges, since their value is better 
described using linear units. 
 Table 6. Metric used in the DEFRA offsetting pilot to calculate biodiversity offset 
values per hectare of habitat (DEFRA, 2012). 
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5.3.3.2 Application of multipliers 
 
In addition to the basic DEFRA’s metric, a series of multipliers is used to consider 
the risk factors associated with delivering an offset. As the criterion 4-3 of the BBOP 
Standard on Biodiversity Offsets indicates (BBOP, 2012), the consideration of risks are 
of great importance in delivering offsets. Multipliers can incorporate the risk(s) 
associated with the following factors on offsetting:  
 
Delivery risk: Risk of not being able to restore or create a particular habitat type 
successfully. Improving the condition of habitats that are already of high 
distinctiveness (defined as ‘habitat restoration’ in the offsetting pilot) is more 
straightforward than trying to re-create habitats from the land of low distinctiveness 
(defined as ‘habitat creation’ in the offsetting pilot). Table 7. Delivery Risk multiplier 
for accounting the difficulty of restoration or creation of a habitat illustrates this risk 
multipliers used for the DEFRA’s pilot projects. Additionally, DEFRA’s guidance 
(DEFRA, 2012) provides an indication of the timescales and restoring feasibility for 
some ecosystems types in Europe to give an indication of the type of risk that can be 
associated with a wider type of ecosystems depending on their practicality of been 
restored or created.  
The spatial risk is associated with the choice of location of the offset (Table 8). It 
addresses the fact that biodiversity offsetting is likely to be most effective when it is in 
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line with established strategies for biodiversity enhancement within a particular 
territory. To account for proposals in which a potential offset site does not contribute 
to such strategies a multiplier is added to the calculation of credits. This multiplier has 
the effect of steering schemes towards sites that best meet the needs of local strategies. 
Thus it is governed by policies established in England by local authorities for the 
prioritization of receptor sites.  
 
The temporal risk is associated with the length of time required to create or restore 
habitat (Table 9). It addresses the fact that, where compensatory offsets are initiated at 
the same time or after development activity, there will be a period in which overall 
biodiversity is lost. In such situations, the impacts of the development will only be 
fully compensated once the offset project has reached its agreed target. Thus the effect 
of this multiplier is to increase the area of compensation required in line with the 
number of years needed to achieve the objectives of the compensation offset scheme.  
 
It is worth to bear in mind these multipliers are applied to all compensation 
measures of environmental damage, and to offsets that occur contemporaneously or 
after the development project, i.e. all measures delivering the benefits after the 
impacts, i.e. post-impact compensatory and complementary remediation measures. 
These multipliers are not applicable to calculate the compensation credits in 
Biodiversity Banking. This, encourages the provision of offsets where the credits are 
delivered ex-ante the impacts and therefore, are likely to have a significantly greater 
value regarding offset credits per hectare, than a similar area of land that is proposed 
for future offsetting.    
 
The risk multipliers are applied to the value of offsets credits calculated for 
receptor sites of the offsetting. Although referred to as multipliers, mathematically 
they can be used in two ways: 1) as multipliers, to increase the total area of land 
required to deliver a set number of credits or, 2) as dividers, to reduce a number of 
offset credits that a set area of land can deliver (Pearce, 2013).  
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Table 7. Delivery Risk multiplier for accounting the difficulty of restoration or 
creation of a habitat (DEFRA, 2012). 
 
 
 
Table 8. Spatial risks multiplier associated with the choice of location of the offset 
(DEFRA, 2012). 
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Table 9. The temporal risk associated with the length of time required to create or 
restore habitat (DEFRA, 2012). 
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DEVELOPING A BIODIVERSITY OFFSETTING METRIC FOR ITALY 
 
 
This chapter proposes a metrics tailored for the case of Italy and exercises its 
practrical application in the case study of the high-speed railway Pedemontana Veneta 
of Northern Italy. 
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The proposed metrics considers the condition and area of the impacted 
environment through proxy measures falling into the definition of aggregated and 
indirect-multiple attributes (as seen in Chapter 4) and are based on the Habitat Hectare 
Approach (HHA). The HHA was originally developed in Victoria Australia in 2002 
and ever since used internationally by the Business and Biodiversity Offsets 
Programme (BBOP). More recently, in 2012, the HHA adapted by the UK Department 
for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) to give the basis for the English 
Biodiversity Offsetting Scheme (Platinum, 2009; Treweek, J., et. al., 2009; DEFRA, 
2012).  
 
The HHA assess the impacts by quantifying the value of habitats considering three 
criteria (DEFRA, 2012):  
 
1. Distinctiveness refers to the importance or rarity of the habitat concerned at 
local, regional, national and international scale. The distinctiveness is assessed 
as low, medium, high depending on its capacity to support flora and fauna 
important species.  
 
The distinctiveness of a habitat include parameters such as species richness, 
diversity, rarity (at local, regional, national and international scales) and the 
degree to which a habitat supports species rarely found in other habitats. 
(DEFRA, 2012). The designation of the habitat distinctiveness level is given by 
considering the habitat type/biotope and priority according to the EU Habitat 
Directive and national importance expressed by the Italian Institute for 
Environmental Protection and Research, ISPRA (Istituto Superiore per la 
Protezione e la Ricerca Ambientale). 
 
2. Condition refers to the quality of the impacted environment. It can be 
identified as poor, moderate or good based on an assessment considering the 
local standard framework. 
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The condition can also be thought as to the habitat capacity to provide a 
suitable environment to support the species survival. The area’s management 
plan is a good indicator of the area’s condition. In the UK the Biological Action 
Plan divides the habitat condition into three categories according to the 
Handbook of Higher Level Agri-environmental scheme for farms 
environmental plan (DEFRA, 2011b). In Italy, the condition is given by the 
Habitat Conservation Degree in the case of Annex 1 habitats of the Habitat 
Directive, and by the management plan for other areas.  
 
3. Area of the impacted environment in hectares.  
 
Altogether, the three habitat proxies, distinctiveness, condition and area, allow 
assessing the magnitude of the impacts occurred in the developed site in habitat units, 
or as it can also be expressed in habitat debits.  
 
In addition to these three elements, the quantification of the habitat units provided 
by a potential land for compensation incorporate the use of multipliers that allow 
considering the risk linked to an off-site compensation as presented in Chapter 5. Such 
risks are: (BBOP, 2012; DEFRA, 2012): 1) delivery risk associated with the risk of not 
being able to restore or create a particular habitat type successfully. 2) The spatial risk 
associated with the choice of location of the offset. In the case of Italy, such areas are 
primarily given by the European Habitat Directive (92/43/EEC) and supported, by the 
Italian Institute for Environmental Protection and Research, ISPRA (Istituto Superiore 
per la Protezione e la Ricerca Ambientale) with the declared critical national habitats 
(ISPRA, 2014). And 3) temporal risk associated with the time required to create or 
restore habitat.  
 
To measure the area, condition and distinctiveness previous to the development 
(pre-operam state), ecological information such as land use, habitat type, species 
presence and relevant related data given by the Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA) and the Ecological Impact Assessment (EcIA) set the ecological baseline. In like 
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manner, the information of the potential offsetting area should be available to contrast 
the deliverable habitat credits with the habitat debits of the development project. 
Therefore, this information is processed resulting in habitat credits and debits 
necessary to scale up a proper offset.  
 
6.1 Italian factors to consider  
 
Italy hosts a large proportion of the species that are threatened at European level, 
and as an EU Member State the country has committed to halt the biodiversity loss by 
2020 according to the Biodiversity Strategy 2020. Considerable conservation efforts are 
needed to ensure that the status of the Italian species improves in the long term. In this 
direction, the present metric proposal aims to contribute to developing suitable 
methods for biodiversity conservation in Italy. The objective of is to create a proxy to 
assess the environmental impacts of Italian habitats not addressed by neither the 
European Habitat and Wild Birds Directives, nor the EIA Directive.  
 
The proposed metric is based on the HHA and its most recent application into the 
English biodiversity offsetting metric (DEFRA, 2012), with the particularity that it 
introduces three elements considered essential for the biodiversity offsetting 
applicability in the Italian territory: 1) proximity to the impacted site, 2) landscape 
contribution, and environmental services delivered. 
 
The development of the metric here proposed considers a series of principles19 
important for the metrics target, goal and transparency. Such principles have been 
established by the internationally recognized standards of BBOP which are here 
described:  
 
1. No net loss. The offset must contribute to the not net loss of the biodiversity in 
Italy and seek preferably a net gain of the biodiversity values affected because 
of development. 
                                                          
19 Principles based on the BBOP principles for Biodiversity Offsets http://bbop.forest-
trends.org/documents/files/bbop_principles.pdf  
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2. Mitigation hierarchy. The offset must be applicable after the mitigation 
hierarchy committed to avoiding, minimize and compensate the 
development’s projects impacts on-site. 
 
3. Limit to what can be offset. The offset should be feasible and realistic 
compensating for biodiversity values able to be targeted, assessed and 
monitored. Some values of biodiversity can never be adequately compensated, 
such as in endangered species and habitats, and therefore are not appropriate 
for offsetting. 
 
4. Additional to existing schemes. The offset should be additional to the already 
planned or implemented activities to conserve biodiversity and should 
enhance the management of local habitats. 
 
5. Consistent with legislation. The offset must not obstruct the in force 
legislation of environmental impacts liability and should not overlap with it. 
 
6. Clear and understandable. The offset should establish a simple and clear tool 
to be implemented easily by developers, local authorities, and others. 
 
7. Transparent and inclusive of traditional knowledge. The offset should allow 
the stakeholder participation and consider the traditional knowledge for its 
implementation. 
 
8. Landscape-scale and long-term outcomes. The offset should consider the 
landscape context and seek long-term outcomes by planning the management 
approach to be implemented, maintained and evaluated at least for the 
project’s impacts, and preferably in perpetuity to compensate for the occurred 
land-use change (i.e. consumed land). 
 
The metric consists of the following steps sequence to assess the total habitat debits 
at first:  
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1. Identify the land transformed due to the development project;  
 
2. Map the consumed land and divided it into its habitat types identified by the 
CORINE habitat biotope (ISPRA biotopes equivalence table Annex 1 of this 
thesis) and indicate its area in hectares; 
 
3. Assess the habitat distinctiveness value according to the habitat type. It is 
important to mention that the development projects falling into Natura 2000 
sites (i.e. the Annex 1 of the EU Habitats Directive20) undergo mandatory 
compensation revised by the local authority and required on case-by-case 
basis. Accordingly, these habitats are not accounted in the total habitat debits 
unless the EIA and EcIA mention non-significant impacts or temporary 
impacts over those areas that won’t be addresses by the mandatory 
compensation.; 
 
4. Assign the habitat condition value according the habitat management, if any, 
or ecological indicators surveyed onsite; 
 
5. Calculate the habitat debits for each type of habitat by multiplying the habitat 
distinctiveness value, its condition value and its area in hectares; 
 
6. Assess the total habitat debits by summing up the debits of all habitat types 
impacted; 
 
7. Assess the habitat credits the development project is considering to create on-
site, if any, by considering the foreseen habitat restoration o recreation included 
into the development project; 
 
                                                          
1. 20 For more details 
http://www.minambiente.it/sites/default/files/archivio/allegati/rete_natura_2000/misure_
compensazione_direttiva_habitat.pdf (available in Italian). 
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8. Quantify the net debits by substracting the credits of the development project 
from the total debits. The net debits are the total impact needing compensation.    
 
6.1.1 Habitat distinctiveness  
 
This metrics proposal bases on the habitat distictiveness, condition and area of the 
impacted site. Then, to recognize the different habitats that underwent land 
transformation, the development site need to be mapped, divided into the different 
habitat types according to their biotope (Annex 1) and assign to each habitat type their 
distinctiveness value following the Table 1.   
 
There are some very valuable habitats classified as critical habitats (Table 10) which 
situation and modification are addressed by the Habitats (Art 6 [3] and [4]) and Wild 
Birds Directive (92/43/EEC and 79/109/EEC, respectively) and by the Annex B of the 
D.P.R. on Environmental Impact Assessment (Decree of the President of the Republic) 
published on April 12 1996 (after the first version came into force in 1985).  These areas 
are proprietary and protected by the European Union, and so, bespoke compensation 
is required and followed up by the Italian Government.  
 
The EcIA and EIA of projects traversing or modifying Natura 2000 habitats give 
the information necessary of the compensation that the developer will carry out as 
part of the project. Often nonsignificant impacts and interim losses are identified in 
these official documents, which can be of use to design the offet for the unaviodable 
impacts, and that in fact are considered in this metrics proposal (see section 6.2, metrics 
proposal application to the Pedemonatana Veneta case-study). This metric proposal 
provides valuable guidance to assess, in advance the impacts, the equitable 
compensation measures to compensate for impacts on Natura 2000 sites. 
 
According to the distinctiveness of the impacted habitat in question, the offset 
must comply with a suitable compensation goal to give back to nature what has been 
impacted. For example, all habitats of high distinctiveness (natural and seminatural 
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habitats) enlisted in Annex 1 of this thesis, may need a like for like offset as the first 
option or, in justified cases, a trade in kind offset when the overall result delivers better 
results.  
 
The value of the habitats distinctiveness is based on the logic followed by DEFRA 
Methodology for Biodiversity Offsetting and the scientific research that supports this 
methodology (DEFRA, 2012; DEFRA, 2011; Treweek, 2010; Temple et al., 2010). 
 
According to BBOP, the definition of the habitat classification can be understoon as 
(Table 10): 
 
• Critical habitat: Areas with high biodiversity value, including:  
 
(i) Habitat of significant importance to critically endangered and endangered 
species; 
(ii) Habitat of significant importance to endemic and restricted-range species; 
(iii) Habitat supporting globally significant concentrations of migratory species 
and congregation species; 
(iv) Highly threatened and unique ecosystems; and/or 
(v) Areas associated with key evolutionary processes.’ (BBOP, 2012) 
 
• Natural and seminatural habitats: ‘Areas composed of viable assemblages of 
plant and animal species of largely native origin, and/or where human activity 
has not essentially modified the area primary ecological functions and species 
composition.’ (BBOP, 2012). 
 
• Modified habitats: ‘Areas that may contain a large proportion of non-native 
plant and animal species, and/or where human activity have substantially 
modified the area’s primary ecological functions and species composition. It may 
include areas managed for agriculture, high nature value farmlands, forest 
plantations, reclaimed coastal zones and reclaimed wetlands’. (BBOP, 2012). Also 
_________________________________________Developing a biodiversity offsetting metric for Italy  
 
including areas with landscape beauty value as mosaic landscapes with forest 
elements, vineyards, olives plantations and other fruits plantations. 
 
• Heavily modified habitats: Areas with non-native plant and/or animal species 
where human activity have severely modified the ecological functions, such as 
intensively managed areas for intensive agriculture, modified rivers and 
streams, mine remnants, hedges, recreational parks and artificial lakes and 
grasslands of large dimension that provide the society with recreational, 
environmental services as well as the historical building as historical walls, 
castles, and villas. 
 
• Artificial habitats: are all urbanized and industrialized habitats covered with 
merely asphalt flooring.  
 
Defining of the offsetting goals (Dumax & Rozan, 2011; DEFRA, 2012): 
 
o Bespoke compensation is a customized compensation that the local authority 
requires the developer in order to gran the construction permit, in case the 
project falls into Natura 200 habitats and woodlands. The development on these 
habitats would be unlikely, but in case a local planning authority granted a 
permit on this habitat type, any compensation would have to be bespoke, 
preferably on-site, and managed on a case by case basis. It is the responsibility of 
the local planning authority to decide if the offsetting mechanism can be used. 
o Like for like: in kind, no-trade-off goal, identical type of the services must be 
given back by the same natural providers (i.e. species, resources).  
 
o Traded in kind: the services lost are compensated by the same services provided 
by different species or resources, as long as the habitat credits are equitable. For 
example, water protection coming from forest with different tree species.  
 
o Trade up: cross-habitat goal, when different services are being provided by 
diverse natural functions and delivered by different natural providers, as long as 
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an equivalence is defined between the new services and the lost ones in terms of 
habitat credits. Offsite-compensation is encouraged with higher distinctiveness 
habitats. 
 
Table 10. Habitat type, distinctiveness and biodiversity offseting type. 
 
                                                          
21 The designation of non-significant impacts must follow the significate criteria of the EIA 
Guidelines published by the Italian Ministry for the Environment and Land (2001) available at  
http://www.isprambiente.gov.it/it/temi/valutazione-di-impatto-ambientale-via  
22 The Ramsar sites are included in the protected habitats of the Habitats Directive, and hence, 
incorporated into the Natura 2000 sites and their correspondent habitat type.  
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6.1.2 Habitat condition 
 
Besides the habitat distinctiveness of the impacted sites it is important to know the 
condition of such habitat, i.e. its capacity to provide the suitable environment to 
support the species survival. The condition assessment has not standardized 
procedures and relies on experts’ opinion of the impacted site. DEFRA’s offsetting 
methodology uses the area management plan as an indicator of the area condition and 
divides it into three categories according to the handbook of Higher Level Agri-
environmental scheme.   
 
Usually, the management plan gives a good level of information about the site 
condition as it normally includes detailed information about the species presence, 
distribution, and abundance. Nonetheless, not all impacted sites will have a 
management plan, and in such cases, it would be necessary to have a standard 
guideline to determine the area’s condition and be used in this metrics. The Annex 2B 
of the Italian Guidelines for the EIA execution (ISPRA, 2001) gives a list of sensible 
sites in terrestrial and marine environments that need a detailed valuation of the 
condition. For these environments and the rest of the Italian CORINE biotopes types 
an assessment of the flora and fauna species presence must be carried out as well as 
an evaluation of other environmental area functions (as water purification and 
provision, food provision, soil erosion protection, etc.) to assess the site condition.   
 
The flora and fauna species condition can be assessed using the ecological surveys 
of the ISPRA manual “Gli habitat in Carta della Natura” (Angelini et al., 2013). This give 
a detailed description of the species representing diverse habitat types (identified with 
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the EUNIS code, equivalent the CORINE Biotope23) for proprietary, non-proprietary 
sites, whether Natura 2000 sites or not.  For the Natura 2000 sites the Italian 
Interpretation Manual of the habitats (92/43/EEC Directive) (Biondi et al., 2010) gives 
a straight forward guideline to assess the characteristic element’s condition of priority 
habitats. On the other hand, the consideration of ecological functions of the habitat in 
question is open to the expert site interpretation. 
 
After the on-site application of the survey to the site in question, the condition can 
be identified as good, moderate or poor. In certain cases, the on-site assignation of the 
site’s condition can be replaced by the analysis of the recent (realized within five years 
time frame) management plan if any. 
 
6.1.3 Offsetting factor  
 
The integration of the habitat distinctiveness and condition, whether for the 
impacted or offset site, gives results in the value of the offsetting factor (Table 11) used 
to account for the habitat debits and credits. 
 
Table 11. Offsetting factor values resulted from the combination of habitat’s 
distinctiveness and condition. 
 
                                                          
23 Equivalences table of EUNIS, CORINE and Habitat Directive codes available at 
http://www.isprambiente.gov.it/it/temi/biodiversita/lispra-e-la-biodiversita/attivita-e-
progetti/elenchi-degli-habitat-italiani  
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The habitat units (debits for the impacts and credits for the offsets) is then obtained as 
follows:  
 
Habitat unit = Offsetting Factor (OF) * Area (ha)                  (Equation 3) 
6.1.4 Designing the offsetting project 
 
Following the calculation of the habitat debits of the impacted site two different 
manners of scaling-up the compensation project exist: 
 
A. Using the debits.  
The design of the offset project can be done by converting the debits into 
the area that will be required to offset the habitat debits. The offsetting area 
will then provide compensation suitable for the set offsetting goal 
according to the distinctiveness of the habitat lost. This scaling-up 
procedure can be used as an exploratory measure to know the offsetting 
cost and the area needed to compensate for a development project.  
 
B. Using the available compensation receptor site. 
From the practical point of view, the compensation of a development 
project is scaled-up after the receptor site is identified. In this case, the goal 
of the offsetting can tackle specific conservation priorities and help to 
develop environmental compensation policies towards specific needs at 
local scale. The receptor site can be selected by the developer in voluntary 
basis or be suggested by the local authorities.  
 
The credits are assessed using the same metrics and procedure to evaluate 
the condition and distinctiveness of the site, as follows: 
 
 The metrics consider the following steps for scaling-up the offsetting: 
1. Identify the receptor site according to the offsetting goal; 
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2. Map the receptor site and divided it into its habitat types identified by 
the CORINE habitat biotope (ISPRA biotopes equivalence table Annex 
1 on this thesis) and indicated its area in hectares; 
 
3. Assign the habitat distinctiveness value according to the habitat type24; 
 
4. Assign the habitat condition value according to the habitat 
management, if any, or ecological indicators surveyed on-site; 
 
5. Identify and assign the risks multipliers according to the 
creation25/restoration26 of the offsetting site; 
 
6. Calculate the habitat credits for each type of habitat by multiplying the 
habitat distinctiveness value, its condition value and its area in hectares; 
 
7. Sum of the habitat credits of all habitat types;  
 
6.1.5 Consideration of risk multipliers 
 
 As described previosly, the quantification of the habitat credits provided by the 
offsetting receptor site shall consider the risk multipliers. In this metrics proposal, the 
delivery and temporal risk multipliers agreed on the same values as the DEFRA 
Offsetting Methodology, 2012 and are detailed in Annex 2 of this thesis and 3.  For the 
spatial risk multiplier this metrics proposes the following parameters:  
 
                                                          
24 Notice that development projects falling into Natura 2000 sites (i.e. the Annex 1 of the EU Habitats 
Directive) undergo mandatory compensation revised by the local authority and required on case-
by-case basis. Accordingly, these habitats are not accounted in the total habitat debits unless the 
EIA and EcIA mentions non-significant impacts or temporary impacts over those areas that won’t 
be addresses by the mandatory compensation.  For more details 
http://www.minambiente.it/sites/default/files/archivio/allegati/rete_natura_2000/misure_compens
azione_direttiva_habitat.pdf (available in Italian) 
25 Establish priority habitat on land where it is not present and where no significant relicts of the 
currently exist (DEFRA, 2012) 
26 Improve the condition of an existing habitat (DEFRA, 2012) 
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- Multiplier = 1. The offset receptor site is buffering, linking or enlarging an 
Italian priority habitats27 in the same geographical region where the impacts 
occurred. 
 
- Multipliers = 2. The offset receptor site is buffering, linking or enlarging Italian 
priority habitats in a different region where the impacts occurred. 
 
- Multiplier = 3. The offset receptor site is not contributing to buffering, linking 
or enlarging  Italian priority habitats. 
 
6.2 Metrics proposal application: The case of the Pedemontana Veneta highway 
in Veneto 
 
6.2.1 The project of Pedemontana Veneta highway 
 
The “Superstrada Pedemontana Veneta” is a 94,577.57 km long toll highway proposed 
by the Veneto Region to enlarge the national highways network into the European 
Corridor no. 5 of the Trans-European Transport Network project of the European 
Commission28. The SPV (Superstrada Pedemontana Veneta, named SPV hereafter) aims 
to improve the quality and security levels of the development and mobility needs of 
the most industrialized area of the northeast region of Italy and contribute to the 
projected European corridors network.   
 
The SPV seeks to alleviate the busy area of the Vicenza and Treviso communities, 
and in particular the Valle dell’Agno, Montecchio Maggiore e Castelgomberto, and the 
piedmont zone in Veneto extending between Malo and Bassano del Grappa in the 
Vicenza Providence and S. Zenone degli Ezzeini, Montebelluna e Spresiano in Bassano del 
Grappa in Treviso Providence. In total, the SPV project intersects 36 communities of 
these two providences, 22 in Vicenza and 14 in Treviso (Table 12). 
 
                                                          
27 Natura 2000 areas, SSSI, SPA or SAC 
28 http://ec.europa.eu/transport/infrastructure/tentec/tentec-portal/site/en/maps.html 
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Table 12. Communities intersected by the SPV in Vicenza and Treviso. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The project will be divide into 26.50 km of elevated road, 51 km of the trench, 
9.50 km in the artificial tunnel and 7.50 km in the natural tunnel. In total, there will be 
35 tunnels, 33 artificial and two natural. Figure 3 shows the SPV’s geographical 
location in Italy, and figure 4 shows the technical division sections the projects was 
divided into for its construction.  
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Figure 3. SPV location into the Veneto Region of Italy.
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Figure 4. SPV project sections subdivisions.
Section 1 
Section 2 
  
6.2.2 Ecological Impact Assessment 
 
The Ecological Impact Assessment (EcIA) of the SPV (elaborated by PROTECO) 
follows the “Methodological guidance on the provisions of Article 6 (3) and (4) of the 
Habitats Directive 92/43/EEC” (European Commission, 2001) and the Dgr 3173/2006 of 
the Italian Veneto Region “Methodological guide for the EcIA”. Furthermore, it provides 
detailed information related to the ecology of the development site, as required by the 
Article 5 of the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive and its Annex IV (Drayson 
& Thompson, 2012).  
 
There were elaborated two EcIA of the SPV project, one in 2005 and a more recent 
version in 2012, because of the modification made in the project to decrease the impact 
mainly over Natura 2000 sites and the enforcement of the Dgr 3173/2006 “Methodological 
guide for the EcIA”. The most recent EcIA depends on in the analysis of the ecological 
impacts and gives detailed information about the impacts of the following direct and 
indirect impacted Sites of Communal Interest (Figure 5):  
 
i. SSSI IT3220039 “Le Poscole” intersected by the section 1, subsection 1C 
 
ii. SSSI IT3220040- “Bosco di due Vile risorgive limitrofe” intersected by the section 2, 
subsection 2B 
 
iii. SSSI and SPA IT3260018 “Grave e zone umide del Brenta” intersected by the section 
2, subsection 2C 
 
iv. SPA IT3240026 “Prai Castello di Godego” not directly intersected but neighboring 
the highway with 130 m distance 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Natura 2000 sites directly impacted by the SVP. 
IT32220039 
IT3260018 
IT3220040 
Legend:  
IT3220039 “Le Poscole”, IT3220040- “Bosco di due Vile risorgive limitrofe”, IT3260018 “Grave e zone umide del Brenta”, IT3240026 “Prai Castello di Godego”  
SPV          Intersected sites          SSSI                SPA                 Providences            Municipalities 
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There are another eleven Natura 2000 sites neighboring the SPV that go from 0.13 km 
to 7.85 km distance of vicinity to the road (Table 13). However, the only site considered 
into the EcIA is the ZCI IT3240026 “Prai Castello di Godego” because it short distance to the 
highways (only 0.13 km away).  
 
Table 13. Natura 2000 sites neighboring the “Superstrada a pedaggio Pedemontana 
Veneta”. 
 
 
6.2.2.1 Predicted adverse impacts 
 
The EcIA sets the physical area limiting the impacts that the project will have over the 
environment by considering the following elements (PROTECO, 2012): 
 
 the nature and dimension of the project and possible effects 
 the project’s data and information disponibility 
 the project dimension, the effects over the interested area due to past, present or 
future activity linked to the project 
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 the landscape features and relevant ecological boarders 
 
According to this, the impacts were identified as permanent and temporary. The 
permanent impacts are due to the change of land use, habitats extension reduction, and 
greenhouse gases, noise and vibrations emission from the road in use. On the other hand, 
the temporary effects relate to the construction phase and are the sediments movement, 
the pollutant gasses from the construction equipment, the particles suspended due to the 
transport of material and construction, and the temporary occupation of the environment 
as construction site (PROTECO, 2012). 
 
According to some scientific studies cited in the EcIA, it is stated that during the 
construction and operative phases the noise emissions become a real disturbance to the 
fauna if it exceeds 50 dB (PROTECO, 2012). The results obtained from an experiment 
carried out by the EcIA support that the noise values are bellow 50dB when the distance 
to the highway is at least 400 m. So that, the EcIA considers the highway longitude and 
width plus 500 m of buffer surrounding all the development, to identify the temporary 
and permanent alteration factors and evaluate the significance/insignificance of direct 
and indirect impacts.  
 
The EcIA concludes there are not significant permanent impacts over none of the four 
Natura 2000 sites of interest, but one interim loss over the communal interest habitat 6510 
of the SCI IT3220039 “Le Poscole”. In the section 1, subsection 1C, the project considers the 
construction of a natural tunnel implementing the jet-grouting technic that will 
temporary alter 6,000 m2 of the habitat 6510. The restoration of this temporary habitat loss 
and fragmentation at the SSSI Natura 2000 site “Le Poscole” will become after the 
construction phase finished trying to recover the site to the ante operam conditions. 
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6.2.2.2 Considered mitigation measures 
 
In 2010 the Landscape and Environmental Insertion Plan became part of the project 
after considering the mitigation measures for the non-significant impacts but the 
“landscape and environmental interferences” (PROTECO, 2012) to occur in the Natura 2000 
sites’ environment and landscape. The mitigation actions for the environmental insertion 
includes the following interventions. 
 
Intervention for the landscape insertion and wildlife connectivity:  
 
i. The single arboreal spin of first magnitude 
d. Populus nigra Italiana 
m. Salix babilaonyca 
 
ii. Single arboreal spin of second magnitude 
c. Monus Alba 
 
iii. Single shrub hedge 
e. comus mas  
g. crataeugus monogyna 
l. salix purpurea 
 
iv. Single arboreal-shrub hedge of mixed size of second magnitude 
 
v. Sipe of mixed shrubs 
 
vi. Line of mixed shrubs 
vii. Forest/woodland, species: 
Viburnum lantana, Cornus sanguinea, Rhamnus cathartica, Morus alba, Hacer 
campestre, Prunus avium, Prunus spinosa, Ulmus minor 
viii. Meadow with tree species:  
Acer pseudoplatanus, Franix angustifolia, Populus nigra, Quercus robur   
ix. Meadow with shrubs 
x. a. Permanent pasture  
b. Flowered pasture 
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xi. Ornamental spots 
b. Genista hyapanica 
c. Rosa tappezzante  
 
xii. Arboreal-shrub spots for the fauna use 
xiii. Hydrophilic hedge 
xiv. Climbers to cover the noise barriers 
xv. Arboreal-shrub hedges to cover the construction area 
xvi. 92 artificial corridors for wildlife: 
- 21 above the highway’s artificial tunnels  
- 2 above the natural tunnels 
- 28 paths alongside the cycling path or hydraulic channels near the 
highway bridges 
- 4 under the viaduct passes  
- 7 in vicinity to the overpasses 
- 8 along the agricultural underpasses 
- 2 in proximity to quarries 
- 20 irrigated underpasses 
 
xvii. Individual trees 
 
xviii. Noise barriers and sound proofing 
 
All these mitigation areas are created to improve the project insertion into the 
landscape and to connect the fauna along the fragmented areas (temporary or 
permanently). Besides, the 6,000 square meters of communal interest habitat 6510 will be 
restored after the completion of the works in the section 1C (PROTECO, 2012). 
 
6.2.3 Study Area 
 
The “Superstrada Pedemontana Veneta” has been taken as a case-study to implement the 
condition-area metrics proposed in this thesis, as this development project provides with 
a detailed Environmental Impact Assessment and the related mitigation measures. The 
section 1 and 2 of the SPV are the area of analysis since the three Natura 2000 sites 
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traversed are present in the Vicenza Providence within the first 56 km of the project 
(Figure 6).  
 
The three Natura 2000 sites traversed by the SPV in the sections under study are: 
 
i. SSSI IT3220039 “Le Poscole” intersected by the section 1, subsection 1C 
 
ii. SSSII IT3220040- “Bosco di due Ville e risorgive limitrofe” intersected by the section 
2, subsection 2B 
 
iii. SSSI and SPA IT3260018 “Grave e zone umide del Brenta” intersected by the 
section 2, subsection 2C 
 
6.2.3.1 Non-significant impacts accounting for debits 
 
According to the project’s EcIA, the post-operam restoration of 6,000 square meters of 
the communal interest habitat 6510 are considered non-significant (PROTECO, 2012) 
since a bespoke compensation is foreseen by the project after the construction phases is 
ended. The construction phase will overall disrupt the site, and it is likely that the area 
kept for post-operam restoration will loss considerable ecological value before any 
restoration actions are completed. Besides, the restoration of an area of such 
distinctiveness will need a long time for restoration especially because the pristine 
conditions are most likely to take longer time that the project is accounting for, and so the 
temporal risk and delivery risks should be considered by the SPV project.    
 
The post-operam restoration of 6000 m2 habitat 6510 were accepted as suitable bespoke 
compensation by the project and the local authorities, and any kind of biodiversity 
offsetting project should not replace that commitment. However, the temporary impact 
can be accounted as interim losses and quantified by the metrics to account for the total 
habitat debits of the project.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend 
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           Natura 2000 sites (from left to right: IT3220039, IT3220040 and  
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Municipalities traversed by section 1 and 2:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.  SPV case-study area. 
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6.2.3.2 Habitat debits calculation  
 
The following sections constitute the application of the metrics to the SPV case-
study, first to assess the habitat debits, and second, to scale-up two different options of 
offset projects. 
 
Assessing the lost habitats in habitat debits 
 
As described before the condition-area metrics of biodiversity offsetting are based on 
the value of habitats given by its distinctiveness and condition. The compensation of 
significant impacts over Natura 2000 sites are addressed by existing legislative measures 
indicated by the Habitats Directive 92/43/EEC, Environmental Impact Assessment 
Directive 97/11/EEC and Dgr 3173/2006 for the Veneto Region in Italy, and can only be 
consider for the offsetting calculation if residual/non-significant unavoidable adverse 
impacts are still pending for compensation. The rest of non-Natura 2000 habitats that 
undergo land use change, whether permanent or temporary, are identified and quantified 
to account for the habitat debits.  
 
The superposition of the CORINE Biotopes29 of the 22 communities traversed by the 
SPV section 1 and 2 shows the habitat types undergoing permanent land use change. Is 
important to bear in mind that the SPV project considers the construction of natural and 
artificial tunnels and bridges that decrease the extension of directly affected habitat. In 
total, 87.13 ha account for permanent land-use change, and 0.60 ha of the habitat 6510 
(equivalent CORINE 38.22) for interim losses (section 6.2.3.1). These two types of direct 
impacts are accounted as habitat debits, although the indirect impacts due to the soil 
movement and pillars construction for the tunnels and bridges are not considered by this 
metrics due to the difficulties for they consideration.  
                                                          
29 CORINE Biotopes most recent version 2006 available at the Data Catalogue of the Veneto Region 
under the Territorial Data section, Habitat Types. 
http://idt.regione.veneto.it/app/metacatalog/index?deflevel=165 
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The permanent and temporary land-use change data was processed in the 
Geographical Information System software ArcGIS® (version 10.2.2, year 2014) to obtain 
the area of the modified habitat type used for the habitat debits calculation (Table 14).  
 
The assignation of the habitat distinctiveness follows the guidance created for this 
metrics proposal30 (Annex 1) according to the Italian CORINE Biotopes (version 2006). On 
the other hand, the habitat condition was assigned to be “moderate” since it was not 
possible to conduct the habitats survey on the field by following the ISPRA guidelines 
(Angelini et al., 2013) and the Italian Interpretation Manual of the Habitats (92/43/EEC 
Directive) (Biondi et al., 2010). The “moderate” level is a midpoint on the condition scale31 
that gives an indicative calculation of the habitat debits. However, in order to consider 
the differences in the outputs with different values, the “poor” and “good” conditions 
were used as well (Table 15). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
30 Distinctiveness values assignation are based on the DEFRAs Guidelines (DEFRA, 2012; DEFRA, 2011; 
Treweek & Temple, 2010; Temple et al., 2010). 
31 Nonetheless, the surveying manual of the Italian Habitats “Gli habitat in Carta della natura” developed 
by ISPRA and updated in 2013, not proposed a means of assessing the condition of some habitat types 
traversed by the SPV.  
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Table 14. Offset calculation for habitat lost 
 
a The condition of the habitats were considered to be ‘moderate’ and therefore represented with the value of ‘2’ as 
indicated by this metrics proposed (Table 11). 
b The distinctiveness of the habitats is linked to the offsetting goal according with the proposed metrics of this 
thesis (Table 10).  
 
Table 15. Offset calculation for habitat lost comparing “poor”, “moderate” and “good” 
habitats condition  
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Assessing the interim losses  
 
The EcIA states the temporal loss of 6000 m2 of the communal interest habitat 6510 due 
to the construction of a natural tunnel at the SCI IT 3220039 Le Poscole”. Yet, no 
description of the necessary time to recover completely the area was given as it is 
uncertain and the risk of failure also exist. According with the offsetting objective of 
compensating all residual unavoidable impacts, the interim losses need to be considered 
to scale-up the offset. This interim loss has been accounted as the rest of the permanent 
losses of the SPV based on the following reasons: 
 
- The overall disruption at the site is likely to take off all the biodiversity value of the 
land and its restoration is more likely to become an area for recreation. 
- The unclear restoration objective as it is not indicated the target state the area will 
be likely to achieve. 
- The unknown time for achieving the ante-operam conditions of the site. 
 
The following assumptions were considered to account for the habitat debits of the 
interim losses:  
- The area condition is “good” since the description made in the EcIA suggest this 
area is in favorable circumstances (PROTECO, 2012).  
 
Table 16 show the results of the habitat debits calculation. 
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Table 16. Habitat debits accounting for the interim losses. 
 
 
 
The debits of the interim losses are considered as permanent losses to facilitate 
calculation and, more important, to contribute with no net loss and preferably net gain of 
the biodiversity values impacted by the development. Although, the EcIA states this area 
will be recovered after the development is finished, the time the environment takes to 
recover until the ante-operam conditions should not be underestimated as well as the risk 
of failure. Thus, considering the interim losses as part of the permanent losses enhances 
the offsetting achievements toward net gain. Table 17 shows the total habitat debits for 
the three condition scenarios. 
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Table 17. Total habitat debits for the three habitat condition scenarios. 
  
* The debits calculation of habitat 38.22 considers the distinctiveness as “very 
high” since this is a priority habitat and its condition as “good” according with 
the description in the EcIA. 
 
Assessing the on-site habitat credits 
The SPV project foresees the creation of 15 different mitigation measures on-site that 
account for habitat credits that diminish the total habitat debits (PROTECO, 2012). To 
account for these credits it is necessary to consider the risk multipliers of time and 
delivery, but spatial risk is not applicable, as the mitigations will occur on-site. 
 
Considering the detailed information about species composition, location and actions 
planning, the 15 mitigation measures were grouped in larger categories of habitat types 
resulting in 9 different types of biotopes accounting for habitat credits (Table 10) for all 
SPV under study (section 1 and 2).   
The habitat credits quantification considers the following assumptions: 
 
- The distinctiveness scores of the created areas is consider 1 or 2 since the created 
habitats are identified as modified and heavily modified habitats according with 
the EcIA description of the mitigation measures, its type, location and species 
composition. 
 
- The habitat created will be inside the highway area susceptive to water and air 
pollution due to the automobiles gas emissions and possible chemicals leakage; 
therefore, it is consider reaching poor condition.  
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- The delivery risk of the habitats very between low and medium difficulty of 
recreation or restoration (guidelines in Annex 2). 
 
- The temporal risk varies between 5 and 15 years depending in the type of 
mitigation measure and species used (Table 10, based in the temporal risk 
guideline and presented in Annex 3).  
 
The delivery and temporal risk multipliers are crucial when accounting for the habitat 
credits. In the USA and in the DEFRA’s Environmental Liability Directive Guidance use 
a standard discount rate that goes from 7 % to 3 % to account for the fact that the 
biodiversity values of the offset will deliver the benefits in the future and not when the 
impacts are having place (DEFRA, 2012). The discount rate value has been discussed by 
the National  Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration of the US in its paper on Habitat 
equivalence Analysis (NOAA, 2006) and by a study for the design and use of biodiversity 
offsets in England conducted for DEFRA (Treweek, J., et al., 2009). In this metrics proposal 
the discount rate used is 3.5% as recommended by the English Treasury Green Book, since 
this value seems to reflect the value society attaches to the enjoyment of good and services 
(DEFRA, 2012).  
 
The number of years to consider and select the temporal risk value is from the time 
when the impact occurs and the estimated time that will take the offset/mitigation 
measure on-site to achieve the target condition. To simplify the choosing of the time 
necessary to create or restore a type of habitat, TEEB 2009 32 (Besshöver et al., 2009) 
provides an insight of the type of habitat created/restored and the needing time for 
achieving the condition goal (Annex 3). 
 
The delivery risk expresses the difficulty to create or restore a habitat based in its 
inherent nature. The more difficult to create/restore a habitat the more likely to fail the 
                                                          
32 In the Table 9.1, Chapter 9, page 7 of The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity for national 
and International Policy Makers, available at http://www.teebweb.org/wp-
content/uploads/Study%20and%20Reports/Reports/National%20and%20International%20Policy%20
Making/TEEB%20for%20National%20Policy%20Makers%20report/TEEB%20for%20National.pdf  
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offset, and hence, larger multiplier value is applicable.  Annex 2 presents a guideline for 
selecting the delivery risk multiplier for a list of different habitat types.  
 
The SPV project plan considers the creation of 9 different types of habitat types 
identified with the CORINE biotope code. These habitats, once created, account for 
habitat credits (Table 18) that need to be deducted from the total habitat debits calculated 
in the previous section in order to obtain the net habitat debits. Hence, the net habitat 
debits become the target of the biodiversity offsetting project, and the design process 
bases on this value and the offsetting goal (Table 10 and Table 19).  
 
The mitigation measures consider the creation of hedgerows along the road, these 
habitat accounts for habitat credits that cannot be directly consider to decrease the total 
habitat debits because the different measurement unit between the area of habitat 
impacted given (in hectares) and the length of the hedgerows (in meters or km).  
Therefore, the hedgerows habitat credits do not account to diminish the total habitat 
debits based in the following reasons: 
 
- The creation of linear habitats cannot be compared to the area habitats lost by the 
development since these create habitats of less ecological value, as their 
distinctiveness cannot be considered equitable with any other type of habitat but 
hedgerows only.  
 
- The difference is the measurement unit. 
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Table 18. Habitat types, distinctiveness and condition identification of the SPV 
mitigation measures on-site. 
 
*See detailed description of the mitigation type in section 6.2.2.2  
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Table 19. Habitat credits delivered by the areas created on-site. 
 
Assessing the net habitat debits 
The subtraction of the habitat credits on-site from the total habitat debits result in the 
net habitat debits. To complete this calculation properly, the offsetting target of the total 
habitat debits given by the different habitat types impacted is considered, i.e. the habitat 
credits from the mitigation on-site should only account for the equivalent habitat debits 
or those with trade up goal (see Table 14). Therefore, the eight habitat types accounting 
for habitat credits can be consider to diminish the habitat debits of most of the habitat lost 
except for the loss of the priority habitat 6510. The habitat created can even deliver 
equivalent environmental services that compensate for some of the debits on the habitat 
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38.1 needing in kind compensation (Table 14). Nonetheless, the compensation of the 
habitat 6510 (CORINE code 38.22) need to be completed as the local authorities required, 
as described in the EcIA, and in this case, the interim losses of such habitat accounted as 
habitat debits would need trade in kind compensation.  
 
The habitat credits delivered by the mitigations on-site decrease the habitat debits of 
the habitats with trade up goal. However, the impacted habitats of CORINE biotope code 
38.22 and 38.1 requiring trade in kind and like for like offset goal remain with the same 
habitat debits since the mitigation measures will not deliver habitat credits of equitable 
offsetting goal (Table 20). 
 
The hedgerows deliver also habitat credits that do no decrease the total habitat debits 
because their linear units do not compare with the area units of the rest of the debits. Also, 
because linear habitats cannot be compared to the area habitats lost by the development 
since these create habitats of less ecological value, as their distinctiveness cannot be 
considered equitable with any other type of habitat but hedgerows only. In this case, the 
total habitat debits needing compensation with offsetting the goal of “trade up” are 
171.25, and with 7.54 with the “trade in kind” goal.  
 
Table 20. Equivalency of habitat debits and habitat credits on-site, scenario 
considering habitat lost in “moderate” condition. 
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Simplifying this calculation for the other two condition scenarios, the net habitat debits 
change in +/-115.15 habitat debits units as shown in Table 21. 
 
Table 21. Net habitat debits for “poor”, “moderate” and “good” condition scenario 
of the habitat lost. 
 
 
 
Results of habitat debits calculation  
 
The SPV construction of section 1 and 2 (55.85 km long) will impact 87.12 hectares 
having permanent land use change (Table 14). And 7.20 hectares of priority habitat 6510 
(38.22 CORINE biotope code, Table 16) will be disrupted during the construction phase 
and not recovered until their restoration. In total, 87.73 ha of nine different types of 
habitats account for 237.49 habitat debits considering the “moderate” condition scenario 
of the habitats lost, this is in average 2.71 habitat debits per hectare.  
 
The most impacted land by the SPV construction are unbroken intensive cropland and 
extensive cultivation (82.1 and 82.3 CORINE biotope, respectively) that together score for 
75.58 ha, i.e. 86.15 % of the total hectares needed for the project, and 95.33 % of the total 
habitat debits (calculated with “moderate” condition scenario).  
 
Considering the habitat debits created on-site, the net habitat debits score 178.78 units 
(calculated with “moderate” condition scenario) due to the 58.71 habitat credits meant to 
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be delivered on-site. 95.78 % of these net habitat debits can be offset with trade up goal, 
while 4.22 % would need in kind compensation. In the case of “poor” and “good” 
condition scenarios, the net habitat debits score by +/- 115.15 units from the moderate 
condition.  
 
The project also considers the creation of 52,798 meters long of hedgerows that will 
deliver nearly 44 km of linear habitat credits. Such credits are not considered to decrease 
the total habitat debits since the impacted areas and credit units are not equivalent. Hence, 
these credits would account for extra credits if an offsetting project was conducted by the 
developer. 
 
6.2.3.3 Designing the offsetting project 
 
The Superstrada Pedemontana Veneta will change the land use of 87.72 ha of nine 
different habitats, accounting for 178.78 net habitat debits needing compensation. The net 
habitat debits represent the value of biodiversity loss that would need to be compensated 
through additional conservation activities in other locations considering the offsetting 
goal of the impacted habitat. This section presents two explorative alternatives of how the 
compensation could be achieved.  
 
There are three offsetting possibilities to design compensation according with their 
location:  
 
A. Offset project for the restoration within Natura 2000 sites, mainly the areas 
identified by the Italian Prioritized Action Framework. 
B. Offset project planned to buffer, link, restore or expand the near areas of Natura 
2000 habitats. 
C. Offset project not linked with priority areas. 
 
According to the spatial risk multiplier, the habitat debits delivered by an offset are 
influenced by their location. Offsets are likely to deliver better results when located in the 
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right place according to the type of ecological actions. It should be decided together with 
the local authorities the best areas to locate offset projects to contribute to the ecological 
planning. Besides, locating the offsets strategically in areas with more potential to deliver 
better ecological results will reduce the risk of failure if the offsets is placed less favorable 
areas. The involvement of the local authorities in offset projects would deliver better and 
bigger biodiversity values accounting for positive actions in favor of the local biodiversity 
status, and so, would contribute with the regional and national biodiversity conservation 
goals.  
 
The principle 4 of this offsetting metrics proposal (section 6.1) considers additionality 
as an important feature to consider when designing the offset. As stated by the BBOP 
principles33 the additionality means that the offset should be supplementary to the 
already planned or implemented activities to conserve biodiversity, and should enhance 
the management of local habitats. Thus, the option A for the offsetting possibility 
wouldn’t comply with this criterion. This does not mean that a project or scheme cannot 
be built to co-fund the management of Natura 2000 sites in Italy, but that such initiative 
should be created and launched by the authorities considering the prioritized Natura 2000 
network.  
 
The offsetting option C would mean to compensate for the SPV impacts in areas far 
away from the debits location and that the biodiversity values will not be given back to 
the environment impacted and people that may benefit from them. The spatial multiplier 
distinguishes this issue by adding a higher value for those areas of offsets not linked with 
the impacted site, but does not reflect the different possibilities that an offset can have. 
Compensation within the same municipality, region, state, country or even international 
compensation could exist in the voluntary basis. Thus, the option of upscaling an offset 
not linked with the SPV development project is not considered. Still, more research on 
spatial risk multipliers is needed in order to better consider the distance between the 
impact and the offset. 
                                                          
33 http://bbop.forest-trends.org/documents/files/bbop_principles.pdf 
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Option B is taken as the offsetting possibility to upscale compensation of the SPV net 
habitat debits since it considers the additionality principle by enlarging/enhancing the 
status of buffering areas of Natura 2000 sites. Besides, this option allows developers to 
compensate the impacts near the impacted site, and hence, reduce the spatial risk. Two 
different hypothetical offsetting projects are developed in the following sections to 
compensate for the net habitat debits of the SPV project.   
 
The first offsetting option addresses the invasive species issue in the buffering areas 
of the Natura 2000 site IT3260018 “Grave e zone umide del Brenta” intersected by the 
project’s section 2, subsection 2C. There is evidence about the need of management 
activities within protected areas against alien species (Celesti-Grapow; et al., 2009; 
Blackburn et al., 2014), and this problem also exists in the SSSI IT3260018 according to the 
literature and ecologist familiar with the area (Celesti-Grapow; et al., 2009). While the 
second offset, calculates the habitat credits of a real project of land use change were 2.5 
ha of intensive maiz cropland has been transformed into a forest plantation (CORINE 
biotope 83.3) in the adjacent municipalities of the SPV. 
 
Offsetting project 1: Management of hop-hornbeam riparian forest  
 
An offsetting project to compensate for the SPV net habitat debits is explored to 
manage the hop-hornbeam riparian forest buffering area of the Natura 2000 site 
IT3260018 “Grave e zone umide del Brenta”. 
 
Two areas of hop-hornbeam riparian forest (CORINE biotope 44.61) buffering the 
Brenta river priority site were identified using GIS, and selected as receptor sites for this 
hypothetical offsetting project. The areas are located in the municipality of Bassano del 
Grappa and score for 8 ha in total (Figure 7). To assess the habitat credits delivered by the 
offset (considering the enhancement of these areas) the following assumptions were 
considered:  
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- The net habitat debits of the SPV needing compensation score 178.78 units 
(moderate condition scenario). 
 
- The current condition of the offset receptor areas is “poor” due to the presence of 
the invasive species Robinia pseudoacacia and the target condition after the 
management is “good”. 
 
- The current and target condition of the receptor sites is comparable as the areas 
are uniform in type.  
 
- The distinctiveness of the offset receptor area is very high since the hop-hornbeam 
riparian woods are in fact categorized as priority habitat 92A0 (CORINE biotope 
44.61), according with the code of the interpretation Manual of European Union 
Habitats, EUR28 (Annex 1). 
 
- The delivery risk is medium (1.5) since the management of the area can involve a 
combination of different ecological actions that may change the current habitat 
equilibrium. 
 
- The time needed to reach the good condition after the management activities is 10 
years (temporal risk = 1.4) 
 
- The management of hop-hornbeam riparian forest habitat 92A0 (CORINE biotope 
44.61) can offset the net habitat debits of the impacted habitats needing in kind 
compensation (with CORINE biotope code 38.1 and 38.22). 
 
An excel model was built to calculate the habitat credits delivered by the offset 
receptor sites (Annex 4). The model calculates the credits available from the receptor site 
in its current condition and the habitat credits potentially delivered when achieving the 
target condition considering the risk multipliers. The target habitat credits minus the 
current habitat credits give the deliverable habitat credits by the receptor sites. Table 22 
shows the results of this calculation for the theoretical receptor sites of hop-hornbeam 
riparian forest. In total these areas can deliver 3.81 credits/ha, thus, 46.93 ha of this habitat 
type would be needed to offset the 178.78 net habitat debits of the SPV project. 
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Along the SPV there are more areas of hop-hornbeam riparian forest that could be 
used to offset the net habitat debits. In total, there were identified 519 ha of hop-hornbeam 
riparian forest only in the Vicenza providence (Figure 8, shows the areas in Vicenza and 
Treviso). Some of those areas could be included in the offset project in order to completely 
compensate for the 178.78 net habitat debits. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Table 22. Habitat credits delivered by the hop-hornbeam riparian forest receptor offset site  
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Figure 7. Offset receptor sites hop-hornbeam riparian forest in Bassano del Grappa municipality.
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Figure 8. Potential offset receptor sites of hop-hornbeam riparian forest along the SPV (section 1, 2 and 3). 
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Offsetting project 2: wet woodland plantation 
 
The wet woodland plantation project Bosco Limite34 is a real initiative launched in 2011 
to create new forest lands in the lowlands of the northeast Italy. The conversion of a 
extensive maize monoculture into wet forest lands has been considered as a possible 
offset for the SPV impacts since the activity was carried out by a private landowner as an 
innovate manner to generate income from a more sustainable activity, that in fact can 
have interesting income sources compare to the maize revenues.  
 
The conversion of 2.5 ha of maize fields into forest plantation with fresh water 
channels (CORINE biotope 83.32 and 89.2) is considered an offset possibility for 
delivering habitat credits to compensate for the SPV impacts (Figure 8). The calculation 
of the habitat credits consider the following assumptions:  
 
- The net habitat debits of the SPV needing compensation score 178.78 units 
(moderate condition scenario). 
 
- The wet woodland plantation (CORINE biotope 83.32 and 89.2) can offset 
the net habitat debits of the impacted habitats needing in-kind compensation (with 
CORINE biotope code 38.1 and 38.22). 
 
- A suitable plantation and management plan has been developed to create 
a wet forestland of 4 different tree species, genus Quercus, Ulmus, Fraxinus, 
Carpinus, and several different fruit bushes and truffle trees. 
 
- All the habitat credits delivered by the offset receptor areas come from its 
transformation into a forest plantation. The assumption is that none of the forest 
plantation delivered credits are diminished by the previous lost maize cropland 
due to its low ecological value. 
 
- The distinctiveness of the woodland offset is “medium” since the forest 
plantations are classified as modified areas with CORINE biotope code 83.32, and 
the artificial fresh water channels of the forest have low distinctiveness, according 
to the habitat type distinctiveness value (Annex 1). 
                                                          
34 www.boscolimite.it/  
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- The delivery risk for the wet forest plantation is medium (1.5) as the project 
needs the effort to create a good and strategic plan and regular management 
operations. On the other hand, the freshwater channels creation has low creation 
creation difficulty (Annex 2). 
 
- After 15 years, the wet forest plantation will reach poor condition (temporal 
risk = 1.7), as a woodland is very likely to need decades to mature and become a 
natural habitat for local animal species. Meanwhile, the freshwater channels will 
start functioning earlier and reach a good condition in about 5 years since. 
 
The credits calculation model in Annex 4 was used to assess the habitat credits 
delivered by the offset receptor site using the input data for the 2.5 ha of forest plantation 
CORINE 83.32 and 1200 meters of linear freshwater channels (Figure 9). This separated 
calculation was due because there is not information about the distinctiveness of wet 
woodland plantations in the list of CORINE biotopes for the Italian habitats (Annex 1). 
Thus, the water services delivered by the freshwater channels are accounted knowing that 
the 12000 m3 are infiltrated annually into the water table, among 8 ground water wells 
located in the Cammazzole di Brenta and Carmignano di Brenta municipalities. 
The creation of 2.5 ha of lowland wet forest (Table 23) would deliver 2 credits/ha, thus, 
89.39 ha of this habitat type would be needed to offset the 178.78 net habitat debits of the 
SPV project.  The 1200 m of linear freshwater channels of Bosco limite account for 3 linear 
habitat credits/m. As in the case of the hedgerows included in the mitigation measures, 
the linear credits delivered by the freshwater channels cannot be used to estimate the total 
number of credits this kind of habitat would be needed to offset the net habitat credits. 
The reasons are because this habitat forms part of the wet woodland plantation project 
which by its self wouldn’t deliver the equivalent ecosystem services the SPV impacts need 
to compensate.  
 
Thus, the credits delivered by the freshwater channels (Table 24) account for extra 
credits that could be used to compensate the environmental impacts of the pillars used 
for the bridge construction over the Brenta River included in the SPV project. In this case-
study analysis, the data needed to account for these specific impacts is unknown, and 
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hence, the linear habitat credits delivered by the freshwater channels of this offsets 
contribute to the offset’s net gain objective. 
 
Comparing with the offset presented in the previous section, the management of hop-
hornbeam riparian forest to control invasive species, the Bosco limite forest plantation 
creation would deliver fewer habitat credits than an offsetting with higher 
distinctiveness. However, the deliverable environmental services and credits are very 
valuable because represent a real possibility enlarging the buffering area of the Brenta 
River Natura 2000 site according to with the Municipality’s Land-Use Plan, and so, can 
deliver additionality to protected sites near the impacted area.  
 
6.2.3.4 Results and analysis of the offsets habitat credits calculation 
 
The 178.78 net habitat debits of the SPV could be compensated with either the offset 1 
or offset 2 proposed above. As identified in the EcIA, the permanent impacts over the 
environment due to the SPV construction are the permanent land use change, habitats 
extension reduction, and greenhouse gases, noise and vibrations emission from the road 
in use. Besides, the temporary negative effects related with the construction phase as the 
sediments movement, the pollutant gases from the construction equipment, the particles 
suspended due to the transport of material and construction, and the temporary 
occupation of the environment as construction site (PROTECO, 2012). 
 
The EcIA does not describe the environmental functions and services lost after the 
SPV construction, but those can be drawn after the analysis of the habitat debits 
calculation, from the identification of the habitats types undergoing permanent and 
temporal land-use change. Therefore, the environmental functions and services impacted 
by the SPV construction can be identified as the following:  
 
- Food and revenue delivered by the permanently impacted lands of extensive 
cultivation and unbroken intensive cropland (CORINE biotopes 82.3 and 82.1) 
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- Water filtration and regulation important for the water table of the SSSI IT3260018 
“Grave e zone umide del Brenta” delivered by the locus tree plantations (CORINE 
biotope 83.324) 
 
- Cultural and cattle food provisioning delivered by mesophile pastures (CORINE 
biotope 38.1) 
 
- Habitat for protected species and wellbeing inspiration from nature delivered by 
the temporary impacted protected site SSSI IT3220039 “Le Poscole”. 
 
 
The trade up and in kind offsetting goal required by the habitat debits calculation 
using the proposed metrics suggests the environmental impacts identified can be 
equitable compensated whether by the offset 1 or 2. The like for like compensation goal 
for the  Both projects would contribute to enhance priority habitats that would address 
the biodiversity losses over the SSSI IT3260018 “Grave e zone umide del Brenta”, and so 
target, the provision of water filtration and regulation service, as well as protected species 
habitat provisioning and wellbeing inspiration. 
 
The management of one hectare of hop-hornbeam riparian forest would deliver 3.81 
credits. Thus, 46.93 ha of this habitat type would be needed to offset the 178.78 net habitat 
debits of the SPV project. This offsets project is possible since there are nearly 519 ha of 
hop-hornbeam riparian forest only in the Vicenza providence (Figure 8, shows the areas 
in Vicenza and Treviso). Some of those areas could be included in the offset project in 
order to completely compensate for the 178.78 net habitat debits. This kind of offset 
project would, in fact, be desirable to provide management of priority habitats invaded 
by alien species in the northeast Italy. 
 
The creation of wetland forest is the second offset proposal. This kind of project is 
indeed an attractive way to compensate for residual impacts of development projects 
since the developers could support the delivery of environmental services by private 
landowners and seek for more sustainable ways to receive revenue for their land. In total, 
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the creation of 2.5 ha of wet woodland plantation could deliver 2 credits/ha, thus, 89.39 
ha of this habitat type would be needed to offset the 178.78 net habitat debits of the SPV 
project.  Besides, 3 linear habitat credits/m can be delivered by the creation of freshwater 
channels inside the forest plantation. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 23. Habitat credits delivered by the wet woodland plantation offset CORINE biotope 83.32. 
 
 
 
Table 24. Linear habitat credits delivered by the freshwater channels, CORINE biotope 89.2, included in the wet woodland plantation 
offset 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 9. Location and forest plantation plan as a potential offset.  
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6.2.3.4 Pedemontana case-study conclusions 
 
This metrics give a pragmatic model to assess the residual environmental impacts 
of development projects and offers a replicable methodology to propose offsets that, 
only after the development mitigation hierarchy consideration, would contribute to 
no net loss of biodiversity in Italy and Europe. Nonetheless, by the applicability of the 
metrics proposal to the Pedemontana Veneta case-study suggests that a revision and 
consensus by experts is needed to set suitable values for the spatial multiplier. This 
component is, in fact, one of the most important of the metrics since it directs the 
offsets efforts towards the most needed areas, so the local and national authorities 
opinion would indicate the priorities towards biodiversity offsetting could be a 
powerful tool to manage, enhance or restore.  
 
The temporal risk and distinctiveness values also need revision and consensus by 
experts in EIA to better suit for the Italian habitats. The condition assessment of the 
impacted habitats is just a guideline and need to be revised in case by case basis 
according to the impacted sites and the offset receptor areas.  
 
Both offsetting project options analyzed for the Superstrada Pedemontana Veneta 
case-study illustrate the potential that a market-base mechanism can have to 
compensate for the environmental impacts of development projects, as it could 
become an important source of funding to manage buffering areas of priority habitats 
and/or deliver payment for ecosystem services to private farmers and landowners.  
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EMPIRICAL APPLICATION OF BIODIVERSITY BANKING IN THE USA 
 
 
This chapter presents the biodiversity banking regulation and empirical 
application of the US biodiversity banking (US BB) schemes, Conservation Banking 
and Mitigation Banking. It describes how the demand and supply side meet in the 
market of biodiversity credits, and the factors that make US BB the most experienced 
BB in the world. The practical challenges of implementing and managing BB 
throughout time from the regulators and practitioners’ perspectives are here discussed 
too. Finally, this chapter presents the results and conclusion of a survey addresses to 
conservation banking practitioners and regulators in the US to study the features and 
challenges of the most experienced market-based offsetting mechanism. 
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 7.1 Biodiversity banking regulations in the USA  
 
The foundations of BB started in the USA in the 1980’s. Since the establishment of 
the first official wetland mitigation bank in 1984 ‘Tenneco La Terre’ in Louisiana, and 
the primary conservation bank ‘Coles Levee Ecosystem Preserve’ in Kern county 
California in 1992, the USBB progressively implemented laws initiating the “incentive-
based instruments era” for biodiversity compensation.  
 
The policy milestones of BB were first published in the 70’s with the regulation on 
Wetland Mitigation Banking (MB) (Robertson, 2006), the National Environmental 
Policy Act (1971), and the California Environmental Quality Act (1972). However, it 
was until the enforcement of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA, 2002), 
better known as the Clean Water Act (CWA, section 101) of 1972, and the Food Security 
Act (FSA), that legal bindings for projects jeopardizing wetlands were established.  
 
For nearly a decade, the requirements of the CWA (section 404) and the FSA were 
complied with bespoke compensations resulting in scattered small on-site or off-site 
mitigation of low ecological values (DeWeese, 1994; Marsh et al., 1996; Redmond et 
al., 1996, and Environmental Defense Fund, 1999). The noticed disadvantages of 
project-by-project mitigation (i.e. permittee-responsible) were mainly: the time gap 
between the impacts and their offset, the substantial transaction costs, expensive land 
costs, and the time needed to achieve equal compensation on the ground (Thorne et 
al. 2014; Boisvert, 2015). Therefore, in the 1980s the USACE started approving wetland 
banks (Mead, 2008), and in 199535 it unveiled the final interagency Federal Guidance 
on the establishment, use and operation of MBs. With this, and the Transportation 
Equity Act of 1998, MB became the preferred compensatory mitigation alternative for 
impacts on wetlands involving Federal funding (USEPA, 2014).  
                                                          
35Besides the USACE, the guidelines were also approved by USFWS, EPA, the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration's National Marine Fisheries Service (NOAA’s NMFS), and U.S. 
Department of Agriculture's Natural Resources Conservation Service. 
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In the light of achieving better-performing habitat reserves, and seen the 
supporting guidance for MB, the banking concept enlarged into conservation banking 
(CB) for listed endangered and threatened species (ESA of 197336, 16 U.S.C. 1531 et 
seq.) for the first time in 1973. In 1995, the California Fish and Game published the 
official policy on conservation banking (Wheeler and Strock, 1995) reinforcing the 
development of BB. 
 
7.2 Biodiversity credits supply addressing US regulations 
 
Developers have the opportunity of purchasing credits from biodiversity banks 
when suitable credits are available to fulfill with the compensation required by the 
environmental agency (Vaissière and Levrel, 2015). The main reasons developers 
prefer BB besides permittee-responsible compensation are: (i) BB is more cost and time 
effective (Eppink and Wätzold, 2009; Vaissière and Levrel, 2015; van Teeffeelen et al., 
2015), thanks to its higher likelihood of achieving better ecological performance in 
comparison with other BO mechanisms (DeWeese, 1994; Marsh et al., 1996; Remond 
et al., 1965; EDF, 1999). This reduces the costs of compensation and the risk of poor 
ecological performance that is often derived from the permittee-responsible offsets.  
(ii) The time needed for project approval may significantly decrease if the offsetting 
credits required are already available37. (iii) The compensation liability is transferred 
from the permittee to the bank sponsor38, hence all costs related with the compensation 
site management and long-term sustainability are also transferred. (iv) The acquisition 
of offset credits provides better assurance of compensation success because banks are 
                                                          
36 The section 9 of ESA prohibits the take of endangered species, marine and anadromous 
administered by NOAA, and by USFWS. Nonetheless, section 7 allows species incidental take to 
projects with federal nexus through an incidental take statement (ITS). Whereas section 10 allows 
private developers to receive authorization through a Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP) 
accompanying the application for an Incidental Take Permit (ITP). 
37 This is possible if the regulatory agency is extending a positive biological opinion after the 
definitive project version has been presented including an EIA. 
38 In the case of private and/or public commercial banks in USA the liability is directly transferred 
from the developer to the banker (USEPA, 2014; Mead, D., 2008). For private and/or public single-
user banks (i.e. non-commercial), the permittee keeps the compensation liability, and often the 
jeopardized environmental assets are directly written into the banking instrument. 
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regulated by agencies requiring the bank to comply with ecological and economic 
performance standards39 (Hanski, 1999; Mead, 2008; Thorne et al., 2014).  
 
The reason of BB popularity and favorable outcomes in the USA do not limit to the 
business attainment of bankers (Madsen et al., 2010; Madsen et al., 2011; Denisoff and 
DeYoung, 2011). It also includes the conservation achievements, practitioners have 
encountered for species, habitat and the linked ecosystem functions (Denisoff and 
DeYoung, 2011; USFWS, 2013; Bunn et al., 2014a; Mann and Absher, 2014). Currently, 
there are 136 approved40 conservation banks and 1375 approved mitigation banks in 
the USA (RIBITS, 2016). The significant difference between the number of existing 
conservation banks and the mitigation banks can be attributed to the fact that MB 
policies were developed primary, roughly 10 years before the CB policies, giving MB 
a significant advantage over CB to evolve and be implemented.  
 
The mitigation banks are widely distributed in the USA, while conservation banks 
are more present in the Pacific west coast, except for Texas and Florida (Figure 10). 
California is by far the State with more CBs due to its pioneering State policy 
development, scientific research on ecosystems management and sustainability, and 
the availability of suitable sites with endangered species presence. On the other hand, 
Texas and Florida have embraced the Federal mitigation and conservation policies and 
developed their protocols to implement numerous banks that are, nonetheless, mostly 
MB.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
39 Often by planning contingency actions for the case of the bank financial or ecological failure (ELI, 
2002).  
40 Including the 21 sold-out banks. 
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Figure 10. Location and quantity of conservation and mitigation banks in the USA (map 
constructed from RIBITS, 2016 by the author). 
 
 
According to RIBITS, 85% of all approved American conservation banks are 
commercial, among which only the 6% are public. Whereas, 75% of the total 
mitigation banks are commercial, among which 7% are public banks. In essence, 
more than 90% of approved commercial banks are privately owned. These data 
reflect the strong market drivers of MB and CB although the high cost of delivering 
compensation in advance of development projects. The related risks and upfront 
capital investment that bankers need are reflected on the final price of 
compensation credits. The long-term credits assurance is incorporated in the 
credits price. Approximately, 25 to 30% of the price per one 
conservation/mitigation credit in the USA appertain to the risk that bankers 
assume and buffer, i.e. the uncertainty of economic downturns reducing the credits 
sales, the time need to sell all delivered credits, and the upfront capital needed to 
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cover the costs of land purchase, taxes, conservation easement41 fees, permitting 
expenses and upfront financial assurance (needed to complete the 
restoration/establishment construction actions, assure contingency protection and 
the initial management and monitoring). 
 
De facto, there are three key elements that allow MB and CB to be self-
sustainable through time: (i) the ecological features of the site and its short-term 
funding, (ii) real state assurance, and (iii) long-term management and stewardship 
funding. These three factors are crucial to get a bank legally approved and to 
diminish the risk of failure:  
 
• First, reaching and maintaining the required biology and ecology of the site 
through a suitable management plan. The short-term financial assurance is 
decisive at this phase since it allows covering the up-front costs of 
restoration, enhancement or establishment of the bank.  There are different 
mechanisms to secure the short-term financial assurance as cash escrows, 
letters of credit, performance bonds, insurances, endowments and legislative 
enacted dedicated funds for government-operated banks or similar 
instruments. One of these options may be selected on a case-by-case basis 
according to with the financial scale of the sponsoring biodiversity bank and 
the guidelines set by the approving agencies involved (the bank review team). 
 
• Second, the real state assurance clarifies who own the property and which 
rights are attached to it. The most common instrument used are the 
conservation easements. However, other restrictive covenants are used as 
multiple party agreements, title transfer and contractual documents (i.e. 
land-trust).  
                                                          
41 Conservation easement is a “recorded legal document established to conserve biological resources in 
perpetuity, and which requires certain habitat management obligations for the conservation bank lands” 
(USFWS, 2003, page 17).  
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• And third, the long-term financing is achieved through a 
conservation/mitigation endowment delivering enough funds to manage 
and monitor the bank in perpetuity, or as long the regulation requires.  
 
Considering these three key elements and other necessary actions to enable a 
new bank in the USA, the time needed to its approval may vary from 3 months up 
to 7 years, as seen from the California experience in CB (Bunn et al., 2014a; Layne 
and Rowan 2015). 
 
7.2.1 Considerations to value the cost of credits  
 
The task of assessing the cost of credits is linked to a set of transactions and 
foreseen management than the banker should consider when creating a for-profit 
conservation and/or mitigation bank. First, the expected cost of selecting the receptor 
land to establish the compensation site. Then, the acquisition or the rent of the land. 
The cost or rent will depend on three main aspects: (i) the demand for credits due to 
for instance an urbanization phenomenon, (ii) the number of green zones available 
close to the urban area demanding biodiversity credits, and (iii) the occurrence of the 
needed area with the desired species and habitat presence.  
Having acquired the future compensation site, the banker usually executes 
ecological studies to estimate the expected natural improvement after the restoration 
activities are put in place on the ground. This will support the reason of creating a 
conservation or mitigation bank in the area selected and the expected effectiveness of 
the banker’s actions that the agencies would expect to grant authorization for the bank 
creation. The cost of such studies is additional to the expected initial and long-term 
management cost of the site. 
After having improved biodiversity on the compensation site, the banker ask 
authorities for the legal agreement to sell credits. At the signature date, the banker 
obtains the right to sell the credits. At this point some time has passed since the site 
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was set ready for the restoration actions and to be ready to deliver sufficient ES that 
will be transferred into the tradable biodiversity credits.  
A risk factor that can increase the credits monetary value is the phenomenon of 
‘speculation’. Such speculation means that the anticipated expectations that the chosen 
receptor site for a conservation bank will have the presence of the species of 
importance that are credited in conservation banking. In some cases, bankers could 
try to acquire inexpensive lands where they foresee future high rate of urbanization. 
With time, the expectation becomes a reality, and the urbanization increases the 
demand for the bank’s credits. By acquiring the land before, the banker can decrease 
the cost of the land but will face the cost of having to wait for the credits to be sold.  
For public or private commercial banks, the economic objective is to make a profit. To 
do so, bankers study the urban growth and make decisions on where to establish a 
bank and what kind of species to conserve, because the process of creating and getting 
approval for the bank to start selling credits can range from 2 to 7 years according to 
with the experience of Conservation Banking in California.  
 
7.3 The role of agencies and developers  
 
7.3.1 The authority of agencies 
 
In any BB scheme, there could be a considerable, extensive list of different 
stakeholders related to an offset depending on the project size and ecosystem assets, 
the setting-up appraisal, the agencies involved, the investors, and the clarity of 
regulatory guidelines, among other factors that might come along the offsetting 
process. The recognized stakeholders involved in USBB can be grouped into 5 
categories:  
 
1) Government: City, county, state agency, special district and/or joint powers 
authority;  
2) Private parties: individual, corporation and Limited Liability Companies 
(LLCs);  
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3) Non-profit organizations: conservation organizations, Land Trust Community 
Foundation and/or communities. This commonly known ‘Land trusts’, are non-
profit organizations focused on land conservation funding conservation 
easements to protect land for its ecological value.;  
4) Public agencies (regulators): Federal, State, local;  
5) Project proponents: individuals, entities or public agencies. 
 
Depending on those entities’ interests it can appear that their roles are very well 
distinguished, however, in practice, some of their functions are shared, overlapped 
and/or intertwined (Figure 11). For example, the tasks of a land purchaser, a fee simple 
owner, a conservation easement holder, an endowment manager, a long-term steward 
and a third-enforcer principally can be easily overlapped if they need to become the 
conservation easement holder and so, execute the needed management and or 
overlook of the site to be kept in compliance with the regulatory agencies. This 
overlapping and intertwining of functions help developers, bankers and regulators to 
interact in the conservation banking process and improve communication making the 
scheme more transparent. For example, in USBB regulators do not indicate developers 
from whom they can purchase their needed credits, but help them in this task by 
setting up instruments like RIBITS, where developers meet their potential credit 
suppliers.  
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Figure 11. Roles and entities involved in biodiversity banking in the USA. 
 
 
All different parties and roles are important to make the offset a successful 
conservation project, with economic and ecological benefits delivering environmental 
services. However, as seen in the California regulatory banking scheme, natural 
resource agencies are the primary responsible of BB ecological success as their 
personnel are primarily trained in natural sciences (Denisoff and DeYoung, 2011). 
Thus, they become the most powerful party to demand compliance with all the 
environmental objectives and legal elements set in the BEI. Although there might be 
the need for more market expertise (Denisoff and DeYoung, 2011), agencies build an 
interagency review team (IRT) in the setting-up banking process to subdivide duties 
and provide specific revision of the banks requirements of administrative 
management (related with short- and long-term assurance), ecological expected 
performance, and legal issues (i.e. real state assurance as conservation easements). 
Such subdivision helps the dialogue among all signatory parties to enable the bank 
through one Banking Enabling Instrument (BEI, is the legal Bank’s contract) that will 
serve as a long term-guideline for agencies and bankers to keep track of the set 
conservation goals in a determined bank.  
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Today, a third banking type exists in addition to conservation and mitigation 
banking in the USA. Hybrid banks delivering mitigation and conservation credits are 
now common after the USACE 2008 Compensatory Mitigation Rule. This banking 
supply manner allows species credits to be established in a mitigation bank with CWA 
section 404 credit types under a multiagency review team (MRT). In such cases the 
bank need to satisfy the requirements of all different agencies before having the right 
to sell credits. Usually, the agencies involved are the USFWS with jurisdiction over 
most of ESA species, NMFS with jurisdiction over listed anadromous fish and marine 
mammals, the USACE seeking NNL of wetlands, and state agencies with jurisdiction 
over priority species (endangered or threatened) under state law. The approving 
process of this kind of banks may become a very complex process since each of the 
agencies have their guidance on how to set the bank, i.e. how to handle compensation, 
real state protection and long-term and short-term funding (Layne, 2011). 
Nevertheless, there should be just one BEI signed by all parties allowing the bank to 
operate, ideally, as soon as this enabling instrument is agreed by the MRT in less than 
five years.   
 
Regardless the mechanism used by developers to comply with agencies’ 
requirements for biodiversity compensation, the offset mechanism as BB have two 
main functions. First, to incentivize behavior encouraging better environmental 
practices among the developing sector. Second, to fund conservation more cost-
efficiently by setting up a market where demand and supply have a common objective 
for nature. These two main purposes have made US banking proliferate since their 
positive empirical performance in USA (Madsen et al., 2010; Denisoff, DeYoung, 2011; 
Madsen et al., 2011 and Bunn et al., 2014a). Also, BB helps developers to comply with 
their compensation requirements while developing a business model able to generate 
revenue and achieve long-term conservation. 
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7.3.2 The developers’ power of demand  
 
Developers have a crucial role in the credits market of BB as they are drivers of 
growth and indicator of economy’s situation. Projects seeking to satisfy society’s 
needs, whether necessary or supplementary for a more comfortable and prosperous 
well-being, must comply with all legal requirements (Maron et al., 2012), going from 
the construction materials to offsetting the identified and quantified ecological 
impacts. Consequently, the development becomes a clear sign for bankers of better 
business, i.e. more likelihood to sell credits in less time. Such scenario implies bankers 
would know beforehand where development is going to occur. However this 
information is not available from urban planning authorities (including military and 
scientific development) to bankers straightforward. In practice, the empirical 
functioning of US BB shows that developers, authorities and bankers encounter in 
national meetings where such scenarios are discussed among other issues so that 
bankers can prioritize the creation of new banks, by future development and 
conservation needs in the agenda of environmental agencies. 
 
The advantages of such communication among policy makers including agencies, 
developers and bankers are favorable for not only the BB business and the interested 
landowners, but most importantly, for the jeopardized environment, ecosystem, their 
services and functions for the species and society. The direct benefits for bankers are 
a higher certainty of credits sales, faster return on investment, hence, more likelihood 
to comply with the ecological and economic performance standards that developers, 
agencies and society desire.  
 
7.4 Bankers and land trust functions  
 
Banks are required to secure their credits permanence as long as the adverse 
impact exists as a compromise to achieve ecological equivalence towards NNL (Bull 
et al., 2013). Per the experience of US BB, one of the key elements to comply with the 
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permanence binding is using long-term financial assurances delivered by non-
commercial investment institutions (non-profit), i.e. the land trust. The main land trust 
function is to manage the endowment and deliver economical resources annually for 
the bank stewardship. In this way, the banker secures the bank’s maintenance in 
perpetuity, or for as long the conservation/mitigation bank policies require it in the 
corresponding State of operation. The banker creates a conservation/mitigation 
endowment held by the land trust to release enough economic resources to maintain, 
manage and monitor suitable ecology status of the bank annually. 
 
The interest generated by the endowment are delivered from the land-trust to the 
bank manager with the sole objective to provide financial resources for the bank 
management. During the planning of a new biodiversity bank, bankers need to 
consider three key elements needed for the banks approval and survival as mentioned 
before: 1) management plan, 2) real state protection (conservation easement) and 3) 
long-term stewardship funding. Thus, the bank agrees with the Interagency Review 
Team (IRT, the group of agencies signatories of the bank enabling instrument, i.e. the 
enabling contract) the long-term management actions needed to sustain the habitat 
and species of interest by anticipating the actions and cost of such perpetual 
management upfront. This step is extremely challenging, as a successful long-term 
stewardship is based on an adaptive management and all variable costs associated 
with the land location, area, habitat type and species. The Property Analysis Record 
(PAR©), developed by the Center for Natural Lands Management, is one tool widely 
used among bankers in the USA to facilitate the long-term stewardship and determine 
the endowment amount needed to generate enough interests.  
 
To secure sufficient funds for long-term management developers rely on the land 
trust holding non-wasting endowments to generate enough annual interests from 
their principal capital (usually ranging from 4-5% interest) used only for the bank’s 
stewardship. Currently, the US Fish & Wildlife Service encourages bankers to generate 
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enough annual earnings equal to inflation adjusted ongoing cost out of a non-wasting 
endowment. This type of endowment does not invade the capital principal but instead 
reinvest some of the earnings in order to make the endowment principal grow. Hence, 
there will be earnings thereon that will fund the inflation-adjusted costs of perpetual 
management and monitoring (Teresa, 2008). 
 
In 2008, the US Congress acted the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation (NSFW) 
as an official institution of the land trust for biodiversity bankers (for conservation and 
mitigation). With this, the delivered message to developers was that their project 
would have better acceptance when their BO is complied with credits purchased from 
banks contracted to the NSFW. In this manner, bankers and developers are 
encouraged to move towards more secure credits in the long run that satisfies agency’s 
conservation concern.   
 
7.5 Discrepancies of US biodiversity banking 
 
All BB schemes differ from each other depending on their characteristics, as: (i) be 
voluntary42 or mandatory, (ii) involve different authorities and legal frameworks, (iii) 
follow different conservation priorities related to the land and scale, and (iv) serve 
public and/or private needs for compensation on commercial and non-commercial 
basis.  
 
Once the banker succeeded to implement MB or CB, the permanence of offset 
projects is expected. There are two challenges related to this longevity issue: (i) 
defining the durability time and (ii) ensuring the ecological values are delivered and 
sustained through that time (Bull et al., 2013).  
 
                                                          
42 For example, those voluntary offsets driven by the PS6 requirements of the International 
Finance Corporation of the World Bank Group. 
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The compliance with the permanence concept is key in the US BB. The USFWS43 
(2015) ratifies the scientific understanding that species (federally listed) conservation 
is a lifetime commitment, and perpetuity should lead to a long-term net benefit. 
Notwithstanding, some States in the US engage conservation by a limited time 
allowing conservation easements to expire after some decades. The State of Alabama44 
grants 30 years of validity (NOAA, 2012), Kansas 50 years (USSCNR, 2014) and North 
Dakota 99 years (USGAO, 2007). Whereas, California, Florida, and Texas keep the 
perpetuity element. However, perpetuity is uncertain in the case of land-use 
conversion when easements are not renewed and let the impacts uncompensated. 
 
7.6 The US Conservation banking implementation practicalities and challenges  
 
Conservation Banking (CB) is the oldest known and most studied market-based 
mechanism addressing impacts over habitats and endangered species. The 
mechanism has encouraged the creation of lands permanently protected45 to deliver 
ES that provide habitat for endangered, threatened and even candidate species to be 
listed as endangered in the US (USFWS, 2015). The California Conservation Banking 
implemented in 1995, is the most experienced species compensatory program that has 
inspired other countries (like Spain and France) to create a similar offsetting scheme 
due to this program sustainability to be implemented through time.  
 
From a distant view CB seems to be a very good role-model to follow and to imitate 
as a market-based offsetting scheme due to its achievements related with the business 
accomplishment of bankers (Madsen et al., 2010; Madsen et al., 2011; Denisoff and 
DeYoung, 2011), and species and habitats conservation achievements (Denisoff and 
                                                          
43 USFWS is preparing new guidelines for the conservation banking mechanism. This new policy, 
“Endangered Species Act Compensation Policy”, renews the conservation banking definition to 
clarify that banks de facto deliver ecological services and functions needed for the enlisted species 
survival. However, the still valid definition and the anticipated new one, keep the key concept that 
“a conservation bank is a parcel of land […] conserved and managed in perpetuity …” (USFWS, 2003) 
44 Uniform Conservation Easement Act (Ala. Code §§ 35-18-1 through 35-18-2-c) 
45 The definition of “permanently” can change accordingly with the State Conservation Banking 
Regulations in place, if any, as presented in section 7.2 of this chapter 7. 
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DeYoung, 2011; USFWS, 2013; Bunn et al., 2014a; Mann and Absher, 2014). But, 
considering the longevity of the scheme and its constant applicability in the USA in 
the last decade (Bunn, 2013), researchers and other regulators can now investigate for 
this scheme’ challenges and pitfalls, and for the lessons that can be taught to other 
countries or regions looking to implement a similar scheme. Bunn et al. (2013) have 
studied the problems of CB at a State level in California and limited his investigation 
to just the State approved banks. Their findings demonstrate that there are problems 
associated to the implementation of CB in California, and that they are related with 
three main factors: 1) the lack of regulations and clear standards, 2) lack of funding, 
and 3) inefficiency and ecological limitations to manage a bank (Bunn et al., 2013).  
 
The Conservation Banking program has been implemented across the US since the 
publication of the “Guidance for the establishment, use and operation of conservation 
banks”, in 2003. Therefore, the challenges and pitfalls of more inexperience American 
States than California, are also of great value for other nations looking to develop and 
pilot or implement such a scheme. For this reason, this thesis has extended the research 
of Bunn et al. to collect the opinion of CB practitioners and regulators of States other 
than California with the objective of collecting direct information from practitioners 
and regulators about the considered factors to set and approve a bank, and the pitfalls 
and/or challenges of the US CB program.  
  
The methods for this investigation are presented in Chapter 3. The following 
results showed some points of agreement and divergent opinions in the following 
topics on CB. 
 
Motivations for the establishment of a conservation bank  
 
The most frequent motivation for establishing a conservation bank is to conserve 
biodiversity and for financial profit activity. 64% of the respondents agreed that those 
are the most motivating activities for establishing a new bank. In fact, 100% of the 
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responses stated their banks sell the credits to third parties, and 91% responded to 
represent a private owned bank. 70% of the banks surveyed were created for 
restoration and enhancement of disturbed habitat, and 75% of the banks represented 
in this study operate with profit. 
 
Criteria of approval  
 
Bankers and practitioners have different priorities of criteria to select/approve a 
conservation bank. Agency staff members identified as the most important: 1) habitat 
and species value, 2) restoration potential and 3) site sustainability. On the other hand, 
practitioners agreed that the three most important criteria are: 1) habitat and species 
value, 2) the financial soundness of the bank and 3) the market for its credits. The 
number 5 and 6 most important criteria for agency members includes markets for 
credits and financial soundness as for the bankers these criteria are in the top three. 
 
As expected agency members prioritize the biological features of conservation 
banks, while bank practitioners emphasized the importance of the credits market and 
financial risks. 
 
Criteria for selecting a receptor site for a CB 
 
For regulators the top three most important criteria to consider when selecting a 
site as a CB receptor area are: 1) finding sites with habitat and species presence, 2) 
having the knowledgable agency staff in the program to select the receptor site and, 
3) assessing the market for the credits that will be generated. For practitioners, the 
three most important criteria are: 1) the lack of agency staff to review the proposed 
site and offer feedback about it, 2) long processing time, administrative burden and 
uncertainty, and 3) getting the agencies to agree with the proposed site. 
 
Bank practitioners are more concern about the interaction with the agencies 
approving their proposed site for conservation banks, and the time needed to get 
Chapter 7__________________________________________________________________________  
 
 
approved. Both, agencies and practitioners, agreed that one of the top three criteria for 
selecting a site is the lack of agency staff dedicated to conservation banking. 
 
Difficult issues to resolve when approving a conservation bank 
 
The top three most difficult issues to resolve for practitioners are very related with 
the bureaucracy and approval from the agencies: 1) the State and Federal agency time 
needed for agreement, 2) the total length of the approving process, 3) the considerable 
bureaucracy related with CB. Whilst, agency staff top three most difficult criteria to 
resolve for approving a conservation bank is related with: 1) the biodiversity values 
linked to the site credits, 2) funding the site management, and 3) estimating the site 
management costs.  These three concerns of agencies are very often covered in the new 
bank proposal and the fact that were indicated as the top three most important criteria 
shows the agency’s concern that the bank will have enough funding to sustain the 
species. 
 
Barriers for new conservation banks  
 
Considering all the CB program challenges US practitioners and agencies mostly 
agreed on the top three barriers for new conservation banks. Both, agencies and 
practitioners agreed that the most important barrier is the approval process being too 
long. In fact, the majority of the practitioners stated the process last from 2 to 3 years. 
But in occasions it can go up to 7 years (as indicated in the survey by one respondent). 
Agency staff second most important barrier is the upfront and management cost, 
while practitioners are most worried by the lack of market. 
 
The lack of market has been selected as the third most important barrier by 
agencies, while for practitioners is the lack of dedicated agency staff. 
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Most important factors to value the bank’s service area to deliver ES and criteria to 
assess the deliverable credits 
 
Both, agencies and practitioners showed agreement on the three most important 
factors to assess the bank’s service area and available credits: 
1) Species distribution 
2) Presence of endangered/threatened species 
3) Habitat diversity 
 
Another factor suggested by both groups of respondents was the site’s ecological 
uplift potential. 
 
Most important factors to value the bank’s credits in monetary terms 
 
For agencies, the most important factors to value the credits in monetary terms 
generally agree with practitioners. However, practitioners find in the rarity of the 
credits type an important factor to consider when pricing the credits. In summary, 
regulators find the following three criteria as the most important: 1) Up-front 
investment, 2) land-price, 3) management cost. On the other side, practitioners top 
three is given by: 1) land price, 2) management cost, 3) rarity of credits type. 
 
In conclusion, considering the most important issues and problems to resolve in 
US Conservation Banking indicated by the participant regulators and practitioners, 
there is a clear difference in the priorities that agencies and practitioners consider 
when thinking about selecting and approving a conservation bank. Agencies, as it can 
be expected, are more inclined to the biology and ecological sustainability of the site 
than the credits market and time need to approve a bank. Diversely, practitioners 
consider the financial soundness and economic factors related with the bank 
sustainability and credits sales as more important criteria to approve a bank.  
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Besides, both, practitioners and regulators, mostly agreed in the most important 
challenges in CB. In this investigation, such challenges resulted to be related with the 
lack of agency staff member knowledgeable about the economic and ecological factors 
related with CB. As well as the long waiting time that agencies need to approve a bank.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
BREACH BETWEEN THE USA AND EUROPE ON BIODIVERSITY 
BANKING 
 
 
In this chapter, the USA and EU regulations for environmental impacts assessment 
through biodiversity banking are discussed from a crossed-analysis approach. The 
objective is to give answers to the first and third objective of this thesis on the 
challenges and limitations of the European efforts towards a BB scheme.  
 
 
 
 
  
Both, the USA and Europe implemented laws for offsetting in the early 1970s 
(Table 25). Nonetheless, the norms evolved into different practices to protect the 
environment. Three main gaps between the US BB and the EU compensation can be 
identified: (i) the confining different idea of unethical economics instruments 
concerning ecosystem and biodiversity, (ii) the role of regulations and institutions, and 
(iii) the strategic planning and use of mitigation hierarchy. 
 
First, the USA and European practices enforcing environmental regulations 
following different manners to enhance economic growth: financial incentives and 
market-like solutions Vs. more public-oriented conservation actions. Thus, offsetting 
in the USA has been more focused on economic incentives evolving from responsible-
permittee, in-kind and on-site offset to credits acquisition from private commercial 
banks. Whereas in Europe financing mechanisms incentivizing private investment on 
conservation actions, are still debated by policy makers, scientists, environmental 
groups, and NGOs.   
 
Second, in spite of the European environmental management regulations and 
institutions, the development and implementation of BB yet need more efforts to 
enforce ad hoc regulations and designate suitable human resources with the 
responsibility of BB application and compliance. The introduction of conservation 
easements in the European laws would allow landowners to grant their property right 
to limit development on their land, for example, a land trust or a government agency. 
Taxes can motivate such division of property rights so that the landowner can keep 
the property deed and the grantee can receive the right to use the property for species, 
and habitat conservation (i.e. wetlands).  
 
Lastly, the vast undeveloped areas of the USA offer more opportunity to plan 
development along with environmental protection considering the guidance of the 
ESA and the CWA. The convergence of environmental impacts due to new 
development and their compensation through BB is possible on a larger scale. Also, 
thanks to communication strategies policymakers, the private sector and public 
  
officials can decide to invest in large scale lands for creating BB in line with significant 
development agendas. An example is the “Capitol-to-Capitol” annual chamber 
between Sacramento, CA, and Washington D.C. where private and public sector 
confront their plans and make business agreements on future projects on topics like 
transportation, water resources, innovation and technology, development, flood 
protection, food, and agriculture, etc.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 25. Milestones of environmental impacts compensation in USA and Germany, France, Spain, and Italy in Europe 
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8.1 Lessons learned from US BB 
 
Biodiversity Banking is the resulting conservation mechanism of evolving policies 
and their implementation through nearly 30 years in the US. The USA and the 
European countries addressed in this study have different ecosystems, environmental 
institutions, and offsetting schemes. Nonetheless, the conducted crossed-analysis 
allowed us to explore BB from a theoretical and practical point of view. The USA 
experience on biodiversity offsetting, with its successes and failures, offers a valuable 
example of what are the policies and institutions needed to develop and implement 
BB schemes in European countries. The UK, Spain, France, Germany, among other 
European countries, are making notorious efforts toward market-based instruments 
to develop BB-like schemes inside and out Natura 2000 sites.  
 
The European Commission interest and policy maker’s involvement have shown 
that there is the will to develop and enforce proper regulations to implement BB for 
environmental impacts compensation. However, the lack of institutions, especially 
environmental authorities, and land trusts, and the deficiency of clear guidelines in 
Europe hinder the enforcement of current compensation policies and obstruct case-
by-case compensations. The lessons countries are learning from the BB pilot projects 
being implemented countries such as England and France help decision makers and 
practitioners to evolve suitable market-based mechanisms for their country political 
framework.  
 
The USA has implemented Federal laws and guidelines that are customized for 
their application at the State and regional scale. On the other hand, the European 
Union has launched Directives and Strategies needing to be embraced into Country 
level political framework, and even at a regional scale, to facilitate the development of 
guidelines and policies suitable to be applied on the ground and used by local agencies 
and developers. Also, the opportunities and risks of BB need to be balanced before 
establishing the regulation to frame the future practice. According to the Universal 
Agreement on Climate Change, signed at the COP21 in Paris in 2015, most of the 
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participating governments prioritize the environmental issues into their political 
agendas. Consequently, scientist and policy makers expect that market-based 
mechanism are developed with suitable policies, institutions, and guidelines soon to 
tackle the loss of ecosystem services and endangered species in Europe.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
ITALIAN LEGISLATIONS AND EFFORTS TOWARDS BIODIVERSITY BANKING 
 
 
This chapters deepens into the Italian regulations applied to require compensation 
of environmental impacts at national level. Then, this chapter analyses the Lombardy’s 
initiative, “Lombardy’s Green Fund”, towards a BO scheme to study the regulations 
and current efforts that the country is using on biodiversity offsetting. Finally, an 
analysis of the Lomardy’s Green Fund is made to conclude with a set of 
recommendations useful to develop a MBI for BO in Italy. 
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Italy hosts nearly 50% of the plant species and 30% of the animal species of all 
Europe (ISPRA, 2014). The high urbanization rate and the low compensation actions 
of such land use changes are causing the decrement of permeable land important for 
sustaining the biodiversity, hydric retention and other ES (ISPRA, 2014). Today, only 
the Annex 1 of the Habitat Directive (Art. 6, 4) requires compensation for projects that 
have significant impacts on Natura 2000 sites. In Italy, the compensation and 
mitigation are carried out without a considerable positive long-term impact for 
environmental conservation. Therefore, development of a biodiversity offsetting 
scheme would introduce a modern solution to tackle the Net Loss of ES in Italy.  
 
Italy embraced the European EIA (in 1988 and amended into the law no. 152/2006) 
to require compensation for adverse impacts on Natura 2000 sites and forest land46 
(D.Lgs. 227/2001). Nonetheless, there are several issues with the practical application 
of these laws at the national level (Costantino and Scialò, 2008; Landi 2009; COWI A/S 
2009; Bassi et al. 2012). The issues arise with the vague criteria to consider an impact 
significant enough to comply with compensation measures, especially with impacts 
on Natura 2000 sites. The problem arises noticeably in more industrialised areas with 
high population density. Italy reached the forth place of the countries with more land 
use change in Europe from 1990 to 2000. With nearly 8,400 ha of land consumed in 
average annually, Italy was above Germany, Spain and France on this list (Pileri, 2007).  
 
Often projects jeopardizing ecosystem values at landscape scale and Natura 2000 
sites, limit to propose restoration without aiming at the NNL of the impacts (D. Lgs. 
152/2006). Despite the EIA, BD and HD stated preference of possible compensation or 
offsetting; it is still a common practice to underestimate impacts over Natura 2000 and 
to not offset permanent and interim unavoidable residual impacts (Bassi, A., et al., 
2012), as it has not been made clearly mandatory yet.  
                                                          
46 In-kind compensation of forestland is mandatory for private projects transforming at least 100 
m2. The threshold is increased to 1000 m2 in the case of public projects in mountain areas. In both 
cases, the compensation can only be the afforestation of other lands, according with the art. 4 of the 
Legislative Decree of May 18 2001 N. 227. 
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In Italy when protected sites are involved in development projects, it is requested 
to carry out the EIA, even when the development does not fall into the Annex I of the 
Directive 2011/92/EU, according to the Annex B of the the D.P.R. (Decree of the 
President of the Republic) No. 152 published on April 12 1996 (after the first version 
of the EIA Directive came into force in 1985). The process of assessing the impacts 
clarifies if the project will have a negative footprint on the environment and, 
specifically, in the Natura 2000 sites. In some European countries like the UK and 
Sweden, the mitigation measures in the EIA are a more common implemented practice 
(Thompson, 2013) in order design and deliver an offset for the impacted ES.  In some 
other countries, including, Italy the EIA and EcIA can be considered just an 
administrative procedure that the developer has to give compliance with, therefore, 
EIA and EcIA are not always executed during the planning of the development project 
and not totally required to deliver offsets.  
 
Also, the forest land and Natura 2000 sites are protected against the land use 
change (Decree of the legislation, D. Lgs. May 18 2001, no. 227; D.P.R. 12 April, 1996), 
but the concerns related accumulate because more common lands undergoing change 
are often underestimated.  
 
In Italy, the compensation for forest land has also been developed. Whenever forest 
land is subject to LUC, the Legislative Decree of May 18 2001 N. 227 (D.Lgs. 227/2001) 
according to its Article 4, the occurred forest transformation must be compensated 
with the reforestation of other areas (D.Lgs 227/2001, 2001). 
 
The forest is one of the land-uses more protected by the civil law, and the 
environmental and urban jurisdiction in Italy. Thus, all kind of modification and 
alteration to the forest values of the ecosystem, landscape and historic lands must be 
authorized by the local authority and regional authority.  
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9.1 Veneto forest land compensation legislation 
 
Since 1978 the Veneto Region of Italy has adopted its legislation to preserve the 
forest land. According to this law, forest is all lands covered with arboreal forest 
vegetation (with or without the shrubby cover) of natural or artificial origin at any 
development stage covering at least 30% of the land area (L.F.R. September 13, 1978; 
ARPAV, 2010). Also, lands covered by chestnuts are considered forest, as well as those 
areas temporarily with no vegetation (or less than the 30% of the canopy) due to 
natural or human causes, but not the woody crops. (L.F.R. September 13, 1978). 
 
The article 15 of the Veneto’s forest regional law prohibits any forest reduction 
unless the land use change is authorized by the Regional Council and the lost forest 
functions are compensated trough the following measures: a) create a new forest of at 
least equal area that the transformed forest, b) improve the forest management of an 
existent forest of at least two times the area of the modified forest, c) pay to the 
corresponded regional found the amount equivalent to the average cost of the forest 
management of b). (L.F.R. September 13, 1978). 
 
9.2 The Lombardy practices in forest land  
 
The Lombardy Region has amended the Forest National Decree into its Regional 
Forest Law, L.R. 27/2004, following the D.Lgs. 227/2001 in order to introduce the 
concept of forest compensation. This law states that all the forest interventions 
eliminating the natural forest vegetation for different purposes are banned and can 
only be executed with the authorization of the regional authority, the mountain 
community and the parks and reserves managers, in order to conserve the 
biodiversity, the terrain stability, the water regime, the flood prevention and the 
landscape protection. 
 
The L.R. 27/2004 was first included in the Regional Decree (D.G.R.) 13900/2003 
where the threshold of 100 m2 (1000 m2 in the case the forest land were needed for a 
public project in mountain areas) was considered to be the smallest area of forest 
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transformation subject to compensation. The choice of this threshold is subject to 
debate because the fragmentation of the forest due to the loss of smaller deforestation 
but with higher occurrence can be still a source of forest transformation. 
 
In 2006 the D.G.R. 13900/2003 was amended including three new exceptions: 
 
1) The forest compensation will be required only for forest land transformation over 
2000 m2 (included in protected areas) when the land is needed for:  
a.  Useful public projects; 
b.  Construction of roads with forest and cattle feeding purposes.  
 
2) The compensation for deforestation over 500 m2 will be required only for: 
a. Projects aiming to connect  existing building with roads or other technological 
forms of transport; 
b. Projects to enlarge existing buildings used for the agriculture located inland 
categorized for the agro-forestry use (category E) according to the L. 765/1967. 
 
3) The compensation will be required for the transformation of the land larger than 
20000 m2 when these are planned to be transformed with the following objectives:  
a. Elimination of abandoned agricultural land of up to 30 years old with presence 
of shrubs and trees species; 
b.  Recovery of agricultural land, to be used for agricultural purposes in the same 
location for ar least 20 years without any kind of construction involved; 
c.  Construction of agro-forestry areas categorized “E” by the L. 765/1967; 
d. The transformation is executed in Mountain areas classified according to the 
D.G.R. 10443 (September 30, 2002), or in areas classified as “hills” by the ISTAT 
where there is an elevated forest area index. 
 
Following the previous guidelines the developer must compensate the 
transformation of forest land with the reforestation of other lands according to the 
Forest Law L.R. 27/2004 Article 4,4 subsection b that states that the compensation must 
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be executed in non-forested land that is two times larger that the transformed land 
(ratio 1:2) whenever the transformation be carried out in areas with forest cover less 
than the 15%. This means that for the transformation of 1 m2 of land 2 m2 must be 
reforested (Pileri, 2007). 
 
9.3 Lombardy’s Green Fund  
 
The Lombardy’s Green Fund (Fondo Verde di Lombardia) is an Italian scheme for the 
environmental compensation of agricultural-land-use transformation into developed 
land, i.e. paved land. The fund was enforced in 2009 in all the municipalities of 
Lombardy’s Region to collect a monetary contribution from the development projects 
occurring in the territory. The contribution is an in-lieu fee collected into a financial 
account funded by the developers and hold by the Financial Department of 
Lombardy’s Region to compensate for their environmental impacts on agricultural 
land. Developers pay a fee that ranges from 1.5% to 5% of the development’s project 
total cost (Figure 12). All, small and big projects causing the LUC of agricultural land 
are required to pay this in lieu fee. The money is collected by each municipality and 
then deposited in the Regional Fund. The money is then used to finance environmental 
enhancement and creation projects in the same municipality where the LUC. The 
money allocated to each environmental intervention is equivalent to the money 
deposited corresponding to one particular project. In this way, each project causing 
the LUC of agricultural land in a particular municipality funds an environmental 
enhancement in that same political area in a project-to-compensation basis. However, 
the project-to-compensation system can be enlarged to more comprehensive projects 
to deliver better environmental enhancement on the ground when small 
developments have made a small contributions, and better results can be delivered by 
summing up efforts instead of individualising into a project-to-compensation singular 
case.  
 
Since the date the developer delivers the fee to the Green Fund, the municipality 
has three years to design and execute the enhancement on the law. To further have a 
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higher impact on the Lomardy’s ecosystems, the Region allocates the money to co-
fund the ecological interventions in the framework of larger projects co-funded too by 
the European Union, as the LIFE47 projects. Therefore, the first environmental 
enhacement on the land were registered in 2011 after three years of the fund started. 
The common project include the stewarship of swamps, water courses, natural hedges 
and shrubs, the enhacement of grasslands with target species. 
 
The Lombardy’s Green Fund model has collected up to July 2016, 6 millions Euros 
of which it has invested nearly just 18% in 63 projects covering a surface of 77.30 ha, 
divided into mainly 5 ha of linear natural hedges, 16 ha of forest, 38 ha of silvicultural 
enhancement practices, 8 ha of other natural improvements (MFAV, 2016). From the 
moments the environmental improvemet corred the scheme considers two years of 
management actions to make support better ecological results. The Plan of Ecological 
Network and the Forest Regional Plan of Lombardy offers a guideline to communities 
to know where to place the fund money to allocate the offsets. 
 
Overall the Lombardy’s Green Fund is a good example of how to fund 
environmental management and improvements from projects that have a negative 
impact on the environment without conflicting with the Natura 2000 sites network, 
and the related European regulatiosn that overlook and require the compensations for 
impacts over such valuable ecological sites. A separate fund like the Green Fund can 
become a powerful tool for directing efforts towards the creation of a NNL scheme 
offsetting impacts over agricultural and other type of non protected habitats. The 
limitations that this scheme is encountering are: 1) the difficulty to find recepting 
areas, and 2) the lack of monitoring and assessing of the delivered ES after the land 
has been managed. Learning form the Lombardy’s green fund experienece Italy can 
                                                          
47 LIFE is the EU’s financial instrument supporting environmental, nature conservation and climate action 
projects throughout the EU. Since 1992, LIFE has co-financed some 4306 projects for the protection of the 
environment and climate. 
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think of  extending such scheme or to lean toward a MBI for BO and incorporate new 
regulations to fund activities to conserve the Italian biodiversity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Green Fund graphical representation of the in-lieu fee program. 
 
 
9.4 Italian existing compensation methods and potential for change: towards a 
MBI for BO 
 
Italy has three types of compensation schemes working. The compensation of 
forest land, compensation of impacts on Natura 2000 sites and the compensation of 
LUC of agricultural land applicable in Lombardy's Region. The compensation of forest 
land is a permittee-responsible compensation type of scheme executed on a case-by-
case basis and regulated by the Municipality where the impact happened. The impacts 
on Natura 2000 sites are also permittee-responsible compensations, meaning that the 
developer executes the EIA and EcIA to identify and divide the impacts into 
permanent or temporary and carry out the mitigation for such impacts according with 
the requirements of the local authority. Finally, the compensation of the LUC of 
agricultural land, i.e. the Green Fund Model of Lombardy. The Green Fund is an in 
lieu fee program where the money is collected by the Communities and allocated in a 
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regional fund financing the enhancement, creating or protection of important 
environmental sites delivering compensation of development projects.  
 
The common features of these three existing compensation methods are that all are 
regulated by the legislation, occurred ex-post of the development project and are 
rarely monitored and/or long-term financed to ensured permanence after their 
environmental services delivery. 
 
The Lombardy’s Green Fund is an in lieu fee program launched in 2009 used to 
compensate for the LUC of agricultural land due to development projects. The fund is 
a BO mechanism that has shown some difficulties to be applied due to the limitation 
of authorities capacities at the Community’s level to plan and develop the 
compensation actions. The Green Fund finances compensation in a case-by-case basis 
to offsets ex-post and off-site the environmental impacts due the LUC of agricultural 
areas. The lack of guidelines to know how to choose a suitable compensation for each 
project, i.e. location and extension of the offset, and the lack of the small local 
authorities capacity to implement the environmental enhancement projects are 
making that the Lombardy’s Green Fund gets limited results on the land in terms of 
ecological value (ES delivery, species occurrence) of the produced offsets.  
 
Nonetheless Lombardy’s Green Fund limitations, it is a very valuable empirical 
example of BO applicability in the form of an in-lieu fee program. It helps to raise 
funds to be invested in the enhancement, creation, or protection of valuable ecological 
zones.  Such scheme can become the first step into developing a MBI for BO. 
Understanding the Fund dynamic and building capacities at the regulators level will 
serve to be able to develop a legislation capable of sustaining a MBI where the supply 
side (landowners ) can meet with the demand side (developers in need of 
compensation) to offsets unavoidable residual impacts of LUC related with the 
execution of development projects.  
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The development of a MBI for the LUC of agricultural land and other important 
habitats that are not designated protected sites (Natura 2000 areas), would allow to 
finance the creation of habitats of significant ecological value. The issues that such 
scheme can encounter are related to the fundamental features of the US BB:  
 
1) Short-term funding for creating, enhancing or protecting the site and make all 
necessary management to set the offset and deliver ES.  In the USA, the offsets 
are often provided by stable Biodiversity Banking Companies that invest in 
advanced mitigation by acquiring the land (or the proterty rights of a land) to 
create a conservation bank. The conservation bank would be located on an area 
with the aimed specific type of habitat and species. The company or companies 
investing on the advanced mitigation, i.e. conservation banks, are able to 
finance such business with the cash flow of other connected business, as it can 
be real state trade activity or other financing shares from development 
companies. In Italy, the capital can be raised stabilizing an in lieu fee programs 
like the Lombardy’s Fund to finance the creatin of offsets. This would need a 
regulatory agency requiring developers to pay their contribution to offsets 
their impacts on the caused LUC. Italy could standardize such requirements 
like Lombardy’s Region and collect the money in a specific fund to be used for 
offsite and ex-post compensation of development projects. The difference 
between the US BB program and this hypothetical Italian program would be 
that the mitigation is not in advance and so the discounting factor would 
become important to consider the time needed to have the expected ES on the 
environment.  
 
2) Real state assurance is given by land trusts agencies that keep the conservation 
easement to protect the receptive offsetting area from changing land-use in 
future. Such assurance can be obtained in Italy by the creating a contract with 
the landowners to assure it will me managed and used, as long as possible and 
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accepted by the regulators, for the conservation of biodiversity according to a 
set plan of management to maintain the ES in the long term.  
 
3) Long-term management and land protection assurance. The American 
conservation easements and the existance of land trusts to hold those 
easements aim to the long-term mantainance of the offset receptor site. The 
long-term management is possible by disposing of a certain quantity of money 
to the management of the site in perpetuity or as far as regulations requires it. 
In the USA non-expendable endowments are funded to provide sufficient 
resources to manage the land annually. In Italy, a similar scheme for annual 
funding can be obtained with Green Investment Funds working like a 
collective bank account. Differently from the non-expendable funds the 
investment funds can be funded by diverse parties and, generally, increase 
their main principal to give a determined percentage of interest that can be 
used to cover the long-term management costs. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
There is no doubt that Biodiversity Offsets are a useful and effective tool to regulate 
and deliver compensation for the unavoidable residual environmental impacts related to 
the land-use change of development projects. The diversity of regulatory schemes types 
and the variety of metrics that can be implemented to assess and offset such environmental 
impacts accommodate to the different governmental regulations, geographical regions 
and the practitioners of a certain region or country. Biodiversity offsetting in its three main 
forms, i.e. permittee-responsible (project-by-project compensations), in-lieu fee 
(compensation payments) and biodiversity banking (trade of compensation credits 
created off-site to provide like-for-like compensation in advance of the impacts), are 
widely applied in the USA to compensate for environmental impacts, and are also applied 
in Europe. However, greater efforts are needed to tackle the alarming rate of habitats and 
ecosystem services loss in Europe.  
 
The Biodiversity Strategy and the No Net Loss (NNL) Strategies are an invitation for 
the Members States to develop more cost and ecologically effective manners to protect and 
conserve European ecosystems, their habitats, delivered ecosystem services and species of 
special interest. In this sense, this thesis looked to investigate from an institutional, 
regulatory and empirical point of view the use of the Market-Based Instruments (MBI), 
Biodiversity Banking, to address the loss of ecosystem services in Europe, and to provide 
a scientific framework for policies and impacts assessment tools to facilitate policy makers 
the development of MBI to compensate for environmental impacts, in Europe and in Italy. 
This thesis studied from a regulatory and ecological view the assessment methods of 
environmental impacts and investigated from a political point of view the policies and 
regulations implemented in Europe and the USA to deliver compensation of 
environmental impacts.  
 
The metrics investigated in this thesis to account for the environmental impacts, and 
its applicability to the Italian ecosystems, provides an influential scientific framework for 
the development and employment of a metrics to the current compensations, and future 
development of MBIs. The customization of the DEFRA Offsetting Methodology to the 
Italian ecosystems, and its empirical application to the High-Speed Road Pedemontana 
Veneta case-study, exemplifies in detail the ecological and site-specific factors to consider 
  
in biodiversity offsetting. Both offsetting project options analyzed for the Superstrada 
Pedemontana Veneta case study illustrate the potential that a market-base mechanism can 
have to compensate for the environmental impacts of development projects, as it could 
become an important source of funding to manage buffering areas of priority habitats, and 
deliver payment for ecosystem services to private landowners. Therefore, the tailored 
metrics developed in this study provides a powerful tool for policy makers and 
researchers to consider the ecological and economic features of compensation on the 
ground. This metrics give a pragmatic model to assess the residual environmental impacts 
of development projects and offers a replicable methodology to propose offsets that, only 
after the development mitigation hierarchy consideration, would contribute to no net loss 
of biodiversity in Italy and Europe.  
 
The European Habitats, Wild Birds, and the Environmental Impact Assessment 
Directives play an important role in conserving the habitats and species of the Natura 2000 
network of protected areas. However, there is still an opportunity for improvements and 
conserve important areas in addition to the Natura 2000 network, and aim at the NNL of 
ecosystem services including biodiversity of all types of habitats subject to land-use 
change (LUC) due to development projects. The unavoidable residual impacts of 
development projects are a source of net environmental loss, and such effects need to be 
addressed in Europe in addition to the compensations related to Natura 2000 sites. This 
thesis studied the countries of Germany, France, Spain, Italy and the UK, and their 
initiatives on developing MBI like Biodiversity Banking (BB) to offsets for the land-use 
change related to development projects, also, outside Natura 2000 sites. This thesis 
showed that the common limitation of these countries’ MBI initiatives is the need of more 
developed guidelines and policies to regulate and create a demand of offsetting from the 
governmental agencies side. For example, the case of the UK Habitat Banking pilot 
projects of DEFRA had limited results on helping to initiate a BB scheme. The 
government’s loss of interest in creating a policy to require environmental offsetting of 
development projects impacting outside protected sites, have delayed and hindered the 
development and application of an innovative MBI for funding new forms of 
environmental conservation through biodiversity offsetting. Despite the UK policies 
limitation for a BB, there are voluntary forms of compensation occurring in England 
because of the revealed interest of private companies and some Local Planning 
Authorities.  
  
 
Moreover, the efforts of Germany to offer compensation for the agency’s’ projects 
show that a non-market based scheme, but a regulated government-driven compensation 
mechanism, would also help tackle the loss of ecosystem services on the ground by 
creating conservation sites that provide compensations for development projects. This 
bundle of single-user offsets located in one selected natural conservation site, accounts for 
the compensation of state and regional agency’s projects while being also an innovative 
way to tackle the loss of ecosystem services due to LUC.  
 
The studied case of the USA Conservation (species) and Mitigation (wetlands) 
Banking Scheme, from the interviewed practitioners and regulators point of view, showed 
that there are key factors to consider when developing, implementing and utilizing 
biodiversity offsets schemes: 1) the clear and standardized regulations and guidelines to 
require offsets of development projects, i.e. the demand side creation, and hence, the 
creation of incentives for the supply side to create habitat banks. The designation of a 
sufficient and knowledgeable number of agency staff is needed for the development, 
implementation, monitoring and auditing of the occurred offsets. 2) The MBI profitability 
assurance, i.e. the income generation of landowners (or bigger practitioners like the 
American conservation banking companies) to incentivize the creation of conservation 
areas generating habitat credits to compensate in advance of the impacts. And 3) clear 
guidelines and regulations for the creation and maintenance of the conservation banks to 
supply with good quality ecological habitat credits. Time longevity, environmental 
standards accomplishment and long-term financial funding should be addressed in such 
guidelines to assure that the ecosystem services and goods are managed and have a 
meaningful time of permanence.  
 
The Italian environmental offsets are occurring under the Habitat, Wild birds and EIA 
Directives, and the currently enforced Regional Forest Laws. However, further efforts are 
needed to fund conservation measures of important habitats outside the Natura 200 
network. The Lombardy’s Green Fund is an excellent example of an innovative initiative 
to finance the execution of environmental conservation, creation and natural enhancement 
activities. The limitations that the Green Fund is encountering are related with: 1) the 
difficulty to find recepting areas, and 2) the lack of monitoring and assessing of the 
delivered ES after the land has been managed. These challenges relate with some 
difficultiesof showed by the USA Conservation Banking scheme according with this 
investigation, and can be due to the lack of dedicated staff members. Nonethess 
  
Lombardy’s Green Fund limitations, it is a very valuable empirical example of the 
applicability and functioning of BO, in this case in the form of an in-lieu fee program.  
 
Learning from the Lombardy’s Green Fund experience can become the first step into 
developing a MBI for BO in Italy. Understanding the Fund’s dynamic and building 
capacities at the regulators level will serve on the development of legislation for a MBI, 
where the supply side (landowners ) can meet with the demand side (developers in need 
of compensation) to offsets unavoidable residual impacts of LUC related with 
development projects. The lessons learned from the USA banking schemes also serve as a 
model for Italy to build a system that would consider potential upcoming challenges, and 
resolve essential issues that any MBI will encounter and are related to the three key 
elements of the USA MBI for BO, short-term funding, the real state assurance, and long-
term management.  
 
Italy hosts an extensive variety of European protected plants and species, and unique 
Mediterranean ecosystems, the embracement of a widespread biodiversity offsetting 
scheme would help enormously the protection and management of decayed natural areas. 
This thesis offers the scientific background and key information essential for the 
development and employment of a biodiversity offsetting scheme warding our 
ecosystems and habitats and their provision of services. Weather it will be the form of a 
voluntary or mandatory scheme, the allocation of efforts and resources to learn from the 
own experience on piloting a MBI would help practitioners and policy makers to perceive 
the great potential that such instruments have to protect the environment.  
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This annex presents some of the habitat types in the Italian territory according to their codification in CORINE biotope (Table A in 
Italian) and the European Union Habitat Code (EUR28) of the protected habitats. The habitats listed here presented represent the range 
of habitat distinctiveness values according with the habitat type. This is a proposal of how to categorize the Italian habitats and use the 
values alongside the Metrics Proposal for Developing a Biodiversity Offsetting Scheme in Italy. 
This document bases on the table of codification matching elaborated by the Italian Institute for Environmental Protection and Research, 
ISPRA (Istituto Superiore per la Protezione e la Ricerca Ambientale) in 2013, available at 
http://www.isprambiente.gov.it/it/temi/biodiversita/lispra-e-la-biodiversita/attivita-e-progetti/elenchi-degli-habitat-italiani  
The proposed rule for assigning the distinctiveness value of a habitat type in this thesis is to divide the developed land into the habitat 
types and scored according to the distinctiveness value given in the Table A following the reasoning explained in the Chapter 6 (section 
6.1.1 Habitat distinctiveness).  
 
NOTE: The full list of habitat types and their codification can be consulted in the electronic version of this thesis by double clicking on 
the following icon. 
   
Table A. Habitat distinctiveness according to the Italian habitat type of the CORINE BIOTOPE CODE 
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
This guideline is based on DEFRA’s offsetting metric, Appendix 2: Risk factors for 
restoring or recreating different habitats  (DEFRA, 2011b).  
Table A gives the value of the delivery risk factor to use as multiplier for the habitats 
restored or created in offsetting projects. Table B provides a list of different types of 
habitats and indicates its level of difficulty to restored or recreated.  
Note that this values follow the DEFRAs guidelines and still a specific Italian 
consultation needs to be completed to adapt and adequate this habitats and values for 
the Italian biotopes. These values are purely a guideline and depending on the specific 
cases this values may change according to substrate, nutrient levels, state of existing 
habitat etc. Final risks values should be agreed case by case as part of setting up the 
offset.   
 
Table A. Risk multipliers 
Difficulty of 
restoration/creation 
Multiplier 
Very High 10 
High 3 
Medium 1.5 
Low 1 
 
Table B. Technical difficulty guidelines for some habitat creation and restoration  
Habitat type Technical difficulty for 
creation 
Technical difficulty for 
restoration 
Aquifer fed naturally  
Fluctuating water bodies 
Very high impossible  Medium 
Arable field margins Low N/A 
Blanket bog Very high/impossible High 
Calaminarian grasslands High Medium 
Coastal and floodplain 
grazing marsh  
Low Low 
Coastal saltmarsh Medium Medium 
Coastal sand dunes Very high/impossible Medium 
Coastal Vegetated shingle High High 
  
 
Eutrophic Standing waters Medium Medium 
Hedgerows Low  Low 
Inland rock outcrop and 
scree habitats 
Very high/impossible Medium 
Limestone paviments Very high/impossible Medium 
Lowland beech and yew 
woodland 
Medium  Low 
Lowland calcareous 
grassland 
Medium Low 
Lowland dry acid 
grassland 
Medium  Low 
Lowland fens Medium  Low 
Lowland heathland Medium Medium 
Lowland meadows Medium Low 
Lowland mixed deciduous 
woodland 
Medium  Low 
Lowland raised bog Very high/impossible Medium 
Maritime cliff and slopes Very high/impossible High 
Mountain heaths and 
willow  
Scrub 
High Medium 
Oligotrophic and 
Dystrophic  
Lakes 
Medium Medium 
Open Mosaic Habitats on  
Previously Developed 
Land 
Low Low 
Ponds and freshwater 
channels 
Low Low 
Purple Moor Grass and 
Rush  
Pastures 
High Medium 
Reedbeds         Low Low 
Saline lagoons Low   Low 
Traditional orchards    Low Low 
Upland calcareous 
grassland 
High Medium 
Upland Flushes, Fens and  
swamps 
High Medium 
Upland hay meadows   Medium Low 
Upland heathland Medium Medium 
Upland mixed ashwoods Medium Low 
Upland oakwood Medium Low 
Wet woodland   Medium Low 
  
Wet heath   High High 
Wood-pasture & parkland Medium Low 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
This guideline is based on DEFRA’s offsetting metric, Appendix 2: Feasibility and 
timescales of restoring-Examples from Europe (DEFRA, 2012) and TEEB 2010 Table 
9.1, Chapter 9, page 7 of The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity for national 
and International Policy Makers (Besshöver et al., 2009). 
Table A gives the value of the time risk factor to use as multiplier for the habitats 
restored or created in offsetting projects. Table B provides a list of different types of 
European habitats and indicates their estimated time for creation/restoration.   
Note that this values follow the DEFRAs (2012) and TEEB (2010) guidelines and still a 
specific Italian consultation needs to be completed to adapt and adequate this habitats 
and values for the Italian biotopes. These values are purely a guideline and depending 
on the specific cases this values may change according to substrate, nutrient levels, 
state of existing habitat etc. Final risks values should be agreed case by case as part of 
setting up the offset.   
 
Table A. Temporal risk multipliers 
 
Years to target condition Multiplier 
5 1.2 
10 1.4 
15 1.7 
20 2 
25 2.4 
30 2.8 
32 3 
 
Table B. Temporal risk multiplier guideline for some European habitats 
  
Ecosystem 
type 
Time-scale 
Notes 
Temporary 
pools 
1-5 years Even when rehabilitated, may never support all pre-existing 
organisms. 
Eutrophic 
ponds 
1-5 years Rehabilitation possible provided adequate water supply. Readily 
colonized by water beetles and dragonflies but fauna restricted to 
those with limited specializations. 
Mudflats  1-10 years Restoration dependent upon position in tidal frame and sediment 
supply. Ecosystem services: flood regulation, sedimentation. 
Eutrophic 
grasslands 
1-20 years Dependent upon availability of propagules. Ecosystem services: 
carbon sequestration, erosion regulation and grazing for domestic 
livestock and other animals. 
Reedbeds 10-100 
years 
Will readily develop under appropriate hydrological conditions. 
Ecosystem services: stabilization of sedimentation, hydrological 
processes. 
Saltmarshes 10-100 
years 
Dependent upon availability of propagules, position in tidal frame 
and sediment supply. Ecosystem services: coastal protection, flood 
control. 
Oligotrophic 
grasslands 
20-100 
years + 
Dependent upon availability of propagules and limitation of 
nutrient input. Ecosystem services: carbon sequestration, erosion 
regulation. 
Chalk 
grasslands 
50-100 
years + 
Dependent upon availability of propagules and limitation of 
nutrient input. Ecosystem services: carbon sequestration, erosion 
regulation. 
Yellow dunes 50-100 
years + 
Dependent upon sediment supply and availability of propagules. 
More likely to be restored than re-created. Main ecosystem service: 
coastal protection. 
Heathlands 50-100 
years + 
Dependent upon nutrient loading, soil structure and availability of 
propagules. No certainty that vertebrate and invertebrate 
assemblages will arrive without assistance. More likely to be 
restored than re-created. Main ecosystem services: carbon 
sequestration, recreation. 
Grey dunes 
and dune 
slacks 
100-500 
years 
Potentially restorable, but in long time frames and depending on 
intensity of disturbance Main ecosystem service: coastal protection, 
water purification. 
Ancient 
woodlands 
 500 – 2000 
years 
No certainty of success if ecosystem function is sought – dependent 
upon soil chemistry and mycology plus availability of propagules. 
Restoration is possibility for plant assemblages and ecosystem 
services (water regulation, carbon sequestration, erosion control) 
but questionable for rarer invertebrates. 
Blanket/Raised 
bogs 
1,000 – 
5,000 years 
Probably impossible to restore quickly but will gradually reform 
themselves over millennia if given the chance. Main ecosystem 
service: carbon sequestration. 
Limestone 
pavements 
10,000 years Impossible to restore quickly but will reform over many millennia 
if a glaciation occurs. 
  
 
 
The following tables show how the deliverable habitat credits are calculated using 
the offset receptor site 44.61 hop-hornbeam riparian forest.  
This calculation steps are the same for all types of offsets.  
 
  
Input information  
  
Offset receptor 
habitat type 44.61 hop-hornbeam riparian forest 
Type of offset  
Improvement action/management to 
control invasive species  
Offset 
multipliers  
Spatial   1 
Delivery (medium difficulty) 1.5 
Temporal (10 years) 1.4 
Net habitat 
debits to be 
offset  178.78  
   
 
Habitat's current natural status Habitat's 
target natural 
status 
Condition  1 3 
Distinctiveness 4 4 
Area 8 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
OFFSET HABITAT CREDITS CALCULATION MODEL 
       
Habitat credits of receptor site current condition     
Distinctiveness  Condition  Offset factor Area, ha Current habitat credits  
4 1 4 8 =4*8   
       
Habitat credits of receptor site target condition    
Distinctiveness  Condition  Offset factor Area, ha Target habitat credits  
4 3 12 8 =12*8   
       
Deliverable habitat credits 
   
   
Current Target  Spatial risk  
temporal 
risk  
Delivery 
risk  
Deliverable tot 
habitat credits  
=4*8 =12*8 1 1.4 1.5 = ((4*8)-(12*8))/(1*1.4*1.5)  
 
Habitat credits/ha    
=(((4*8)-(12*8))/(1*1.4*1.5))/8 
     
Total hectares of receptor site needed to offset the net habitat debits  
=178.78 / ((((4*8)-(12*8))/(1*1.4*1.5))/8)    
______________________________________________________________________________ 
OFFSET HABITAT CREDITS CALCULATION RESULTS 
 
Habitat credits of receptor site current condition     
Distinctiveness Condition 
Offset 
factor Area, ha Current habitat credits  
4 1 4 8 =32   
       
Habitat credits of receptor site target condition   
Distinctiveness Condition 
Offset 
factor Area, ha Target habitat credits  
4 3 12 8 =96   
       
Deliverable habitat credits 
   
   
Current Target Spatial risk 
Temporal 
risk 
Delivery 
risk 
Deliverable tot 
habitat credits  
=32 =96 1 1.4 1.5 =30.48  
 
Habitat credits/ha    
= 3.81 
     
Total hectares of receptor site needed to offset the net habitat debits  
= 46.93    
  
 
 
This annex presents the questions included in the survey sent to regulators and 
practitioners related with the Conservation Banking Program of the USA. Such 
questions were adapted from the previous study elaborated by Bunn et al. in 2013.  
Practitioners were questioned all questions included in the following questionnaire as 
those are related with the profitable activity of a conservation bank. Whilst regulators 
were asked only from question 6 to 11 only. 
 
Biodiversity Banking in USA 
Consultation  
2015 
General comments 
A scientific research is being carried out at the University of Padua in collaboration with the University of 
California Davis for studying the American and Italian mechanism of environmental compensation related to 
development projects. The objective is to assess the positive factors and pitfalls of the conservation banking 
in the USA. A parallel study is conducted in Italy to identify the different compensation mechanisms and 
evaluate their performance.   
The results of this study will provide reliable information to update the status of the conservation 
banking in the USA, as well as to evaluate and analyze the incentives-disincentives of the program 
by considering the conservation agencies and banking practitioner’s opinion. 
Instructions 
We kindly ask you to participate in this consultation process and respond to the following 6 
questions. We appreciate very much your time and willingness to participate. We want you to know 
that your opinion is very valuable and in return for sharing your views, we will be glad to inform 
you the results of this study. 
 
Should you have any problem with this online survey please send an email to 
ariadna.chavarriaresendez@studenti.unipd.it. In case you prefer to answer offline, you are welcome 
to fill the .doc document that has been attached to the email and send it to the same email address. 
The PhD candidate Ariadna Chavarria is the responsible for this survey, and will be happy to resolve 
any issue you may encounter. 
  
This consultation is part of a PhD dissertation supported by the Italian Ministry of Education, 
Universities and Research. Your answers will be kept anonymous. All the information will be 
exclusively used for research purposes and will not be shared with third parties. 
The estimated time to complete this survey is 15 min.  
Thank you in advance for your participation and support. 
 
Supporting Accademic Institutions  
  
 
 
 
For any questions, please don’t hesitate to contact: 
Ariadna Chavarria Resendez (PhD candidate) 
University of Padua, TeSAF Department 
Via dell’Università 16- 35020 Legnaro (PD) 
 ariadna.chavarriaresendez@studenti.unipd.it 
  +1 530 9794380 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Name of the person completing the questionnaire: Click here to enter text. 
Name of your organization: Click here to enter text.  
Position: Click here to enter text. 
Would you like to receive information about the results of this study?  Yes☐  No☐ 
 
 
Please provide your opinion to the following respond to the following questions by checking the boxes:  
 
1. What was the motivation for the conservation bank establishment? 
 
Conservation ☐ 
Financial for profit ☐ 
Financial for non-profit ☐ 
Other: 
Click here to enter text. 
 
☐ 
 
If you answered to 1 was financial for profit or non-profit, please answer this question: 
1.1 What is the economic success that betters describes the bank situation? 
  
Breaking even or operating with gain ☐ 
Operating with loss ☐ 
I prefer not to answer ☐ 
 
2. Select the option(s) that better describe the situation under which the bank was created:  
 
Under the situation of 
Acquisition of existing habitat ☐ 
Creation of a bank in an already owned land ☐ 
Protection of existing habitat through 
conservation easements 
☐ 
Restoration or enhancements of disturbed habitat ☐ 
Creation of new habitat  ☐ 
Other: 
Click here to enter text. 
 
3. What are the activities allowed in the bank:  
 
Activity 
Cattle grazing ☐ 
Hunting ☐ 
Horseback riding ☐ 
Hiking ☐ 
  
 
Fishing ☐ 
Biking ☐ 
Camping ☐ 
Other: 
Click here to enter text. 
 
4. What is the ownership of the conservation bank: 
 
Public organization  ☐ 
Private Organization ☐ 
Other: 
Click here to enter text. 
 
 
5. Intended use of the credits: 
 
Internal use-Single user ☐ 
Sold to third parties ☒ 
Other: 
Click here to enter text. 
 
 
 
Please provide your opinion to the following 6 questions about banking program for conservation or 
mitigation according with your experience.  
  
6. What are the most important criteria for selecting and approving conservation banks?  
Rank the given factors from 1 to 13. Number 1 will be the most important factor and 13 the less 
important.  
Criteria Ranking of importance from 1 to 13 
Habitat and species value Click here to enter text. 
Site connectivity Click here to enter text. 
Financial soundness Click here to enter text. 
Site sustainability  Click here to enter text. 
Markets for credits Click here to enter text. 
Site size Click here to enter text. 
Regional conservation value Click here to enter text. 
Manageable stewardship Click here to enter text. 
Wildlife agencies’ support Click here to enter text. 
No easement restrictions Click here to enter text. 
Local government support Click here to enter text. 
Landowners willingness Click here to enter text. 
Restoration potential Click here to enter text. 
  
7. What are the greatest challenges of site selection and approval?  
Rank the given challenges from 1 to 15. Number 1 will be the most important factor 
 
Challenging factor Ranking of importance from 1 to 15 
Lack of agency program staff Click here to enter text. 
Process too long, administrative burden and uncertainty Click here to enter text. 
Ensuring conservation success Click here to enter text. 
Cost assessing financial risks Click here to enter text. 
Determining service area Click here to enter text. 
  
Getting agencies to agree Click here to enter text. 
Determining credit value and release schedule Click here to enter text. 
Finding sites to meet habitat and species criteria Click here to enter text. 
Assessing market for credits Click here to enter text. 
Assessing risks that threaten the physical site including title Click here to enter text. 
Working with landowners not affiliated with CB firm Click here to enter text. 
Lack of guidance of what agencies want Click here to enter text. 
Negative perception of program (internally and externally) Click here to enter text. 
Gaining legal access to site for review Click here to enter text. 
Communications between banks and agencies Click here to enter text. 
 
 
8. What are the most difficult issues to resolve for approval of a conservation bank? 
Rank the given issues from 1 to 18. Number 1 will be the most important factor 
 
Challenging factor Ranking of importance from 1 to 18 
Biodiversity values linked to the site credit Click here to enter text. 
Service area Click here to enter text. 
Funding site management  Click here to enter text. 
Title and easement issues Click here to enter text. 
State and federal agency agreement Click here to enter text. 
Endowment issues Click here to enter text. 
Estimating cost Click here to enter text. 
Process length Click here to enter text. 
Access to site Click here to enter text. 
Changing templates Click here to enter text. 
Pollution on site Click here to enter text. 
Fully assessing bio status of site Click here to enter text. 
Ensuring market is adequate Click here to enter text. 
Ability to maintain site long term Click here to enter text. 
Getting agencies support early Click here to enter text. 
Site management flexibility Click here to enter text. 
Reducing program bureaucracy Click here to enter text. 
Political interventions Click here to enter text. 
 
 
 
9. Most important barriers to new conservation banks.  
Rank the given issues from 1 to 11. Number 1 will be the most important factor 
 
Challenging factor Ranking of importance from 1 to 11 
 
Approval process too long 
In your experience, how long does the process take? 
Click here to enter text. 
Click here to enter text. 
Upfront and management costs Click here to enter text. 
Lack of market Click here to enter text. 
Lack of dedicated agency staff Click here to enter text. 
Endowment disagreements Click here to enter text. 
Process uncertainty Click here to enter text. 
Land owner perceptions Click here to enter text. 
Lack of regional plan Click here to enter text. 
Conflicts with NCCPs/HCPs Click here to enter text. 
Difficult process Click here to enter text. 
  
 
Disagreement on management Click here to enter text. 
 
 
10. What are the most important factors to evaluate the bank’s service area and to assess the 
number of credits deliverable? Please consider the factors you may add into the ranking. The 
number 1 represents the most important factor. 
 Factors Ranking of importance  
 
Service area Click here to enter text. 
Presence of endangered/ threatened species Click here to enter text. 
Habitat diversity  occurrence  Click here to enter text. 
Site connectivity Click here to enter text. 
Range of ecosystem services delivered Click here to enter text. 
Site condition Click here to enter text. 
Site restoration or creation Click here to enter text. 
Other factors you consider important: 
Click here to enter text. Click here to enter text. 
Click here to enter text. Click here to enter text. 
Click here to enter text. Click here to enter text. 
Click here to enter text. Click here to enter text. 
 
 
11. What are the most important factors to value the bank’s credits in monetary terms? Please 
consider the factors you may add into the ranking. The number 1 represents the most 
important factor. 
Factors Ranking of importance  
Land price  Click here to enter text. 
Management cost  Click here to enter text. 
Rarity of the type of credits Click here to enter text. 
Transaction costs Click here to enter text. 
Profit forgone Click here to enter text. 
Up-front investment  Click here to enter text. 
Other factors you consider important: 
Click here to enter text. Click here to enter text. 
Click here to enter text. Click here to enter text. 
Click here to enter text. Click here to enter text. 
Click here to enter text. Click here to enter text. 
 
Thank you for your valuable cooperation! 
If you have further remarks or ideas about this study, in general about biodiversity offsetting 
and/or about the questionnaire, please use the following space to share your thoughts. 
Click here to enter text. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
